> As McGilchrist puts it, Libet’s apparent findings are only problematic "if one imagines that, for me to decide something, I have to have willed it with the co

> As McGilchrist puts it, Libet’s apparent findings are only problematic "if one imagines that, for me to decide something, I have to have willed it with the conscious part of my mind. Perhaps my unconscious is every bit as much 'me.'" Why shouldn't your will be associated with deeper, less conscious areas of your mind (which are still you)? I think I associate the idea of "free will" with conscious thought and conscious decision-making. But it really feels as if most of my decisions come out of the unconscious part of my mind, in which case they might as well have come from an external source. All the conscious part of my mind seems to do is to make up ad hoc justifications. Sure, my unconscious mind is still 'me'; so the decisions are somehow 'mine'; but what difference does it make? It doesn't seem very free in the end.