I'm not sure what you're referring to, but my comment is to the person advocating fault-tolerant systems, segmentation and the other things as panaceas to the s

I'm not sure what you're referring to, but my comment is to the person advocating fault-tolerant systems, segmentation and the other things as panaceas to the situation. These are not new concepts in the security industry. In fact very much of the opposite; manifestations of them like zero trust have been one of the main buzzwords for the last ten years or so in the cyber industry. It's a different thing sketching something on paper and how it actually works when trying to apply it into the chaotic mass corporate IT usually is. I work in this industry and talk to a lot of corporations from all over the globe about their security postures. I don't see a huge amount of companies who have the resource to pull off a well segmented environment. Truth is it is expensive, quite complex to pull off, potentially disrupts business and it's still just an internal security cost that when you present it to your boss they will ask "why are we spending all that money on firewalls then?" Anyhow the point was that if you build your security posture on the assumption that you can successfully lock everything down and you don't need to do any monitoring internally, you're setting yourself up for that massive disruption when the stars align for the attacker and they get a free roam environment in your internals. And it happens very often, as we can see.