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> military vs. civilian. This means any inconvenience of using the system only matters if it leads to clear operational risks. The military are not immune to t

> military vs. civilian. This means any inconvenience of using the system only matters if it leads to clear operational risks. The military are not immune to this either. Case study, the 2006 Nimrod crash in Afghanistan [0], which killed all 14 of its crew. This plane was the flying equivalent of an unsecured server whose root password was 'password'. [0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2006_Royal_Air_Force_Nimrod_crash https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2006_Royal_Air_Force_Nimrod_cr...

buran77 6y ago
Nobody is "immune" to mistakes but the framework under which the military operates raises the bar for any kind of attack or mistake simply by forcing the personnel to more consistently adhere to stricter rules regardless of the sector (in front of a keyboard or a trigger). And coming back to the particular Nimrod crash, the findings of the inquiry suggest a chain of issues slightly more complex than your analogy suggests. Setting a root password of "password" goes way beyond poor maintenance, it's designing the plane with a crack in the wing.
- KineticLensman 6y ago
  > the findings of the inquiry suggest a chain of issues slightly more complex than your analogy suggests I agree that my analogy is an oversimplification. But I think my point stands - the plane had a massive set of issues that were tolerated because up to that point the operators had got away with it by sheer luck - there hadn't been an operational disaster, just a mass of technical and maintenance issues over the years. In this case, the flight crew as military personnel were acting at a high standard but were fatally let down by the wider organisation that allowed them to fly. The military owned safety case was fundamentally flawed and evidence that suggested otherwise had been actively suppressed, as revealed by the Haddon Cave enquiry which found fault with a range of military and contractor organisations and individuals.

buran77 6y ago

Nobody is "immune" to mistakes but the framework under which the military operates raises the bar for any kind of attack or mistake simply by forcing the personnel to more consistently adhere to stricter rules regardless of the sector (in front of a keyboard or a trigger). And coming back to the particular Nimrod crash, the findings of the inquiry suggest a chain of issues slightly more complex than your analogy suggests. Setting a root password of "password" goes way beyond poor maintenance, it's designing the plane with a crack in the wing.

KineticLensman 6y ago
> the findings of the inquiry suggest a chain of issues slightly more complex than your analogy suggests I agree that my analogy is an oversimplification. But I think my point stands - the plane had a massive set of issues that were tolerated because up to that point the operators had got away with it by sheer luck - there hadn't been an operational disaster, just a mass of technical and maintenance issues over the years. In this case, the flight crew as military personnel were acting at a high standard but were fatally let down by the wider organisation that allowed them to fly. The military owned safety case was fundamentally flawed and evidence that suggested otherwise had been actively suppressed, as revealed by the Haddon Cave enquiry which found fault with a range of military and contractor organisations and individuals.