We deal with imperfect information all the time when building complex software systems. Let's talk dead node detection, for example, and consensus. "Perfect de

We deal with imperfect information all the time when building complex software systems. Let's talk dead node detection, for example, and consensus. "Perfect detection" is impossible due to possible network partition, yet we can build reliable distributed systems on top of that imperfect reality, even in face of malicious nodes (B-F/T). We do this via redundancies; mutli-step 'actualization' of system changes (e.g. transactions); and the ability to revert to a known stable state. Based on that analog, I think it reasonable to strive for security regime approaches that permit for security failures at component levels. The computational and bandwidth loads may be excessive (ATM) but ultimately there will be systems observing systems and a type of 'security consensus or quorum' theoretical work informing how to build such systems. There is a thin layer of semantics that overlays the generalized and irreducible state transition due to input: one instance is preventing inconsistent action on data; the other is preventing insecure action on systems.