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> that's what (I'm told) browser TLS implementations do. Unlike "your code" and that of your co-worker who ever that might be, I can tell you exactly what brow
by tialaramex 6y ago
> that's what (I'm told) browser TLS implementations do.
Unlike "your code" and that of your co-worker who ever that might be, I can tell you exactly what browsers do and you're wrong, though I haven't any idea who (if anybody) "told" you that they check OCSP to "check the cert chain".
Chrome doesn't have OCSP fetching code. It uses CRLsets, controlled by Google, which I described previously.
Safari does do OCSP... if Apple's backend tells the client this certificate was revoked. Why then? Ask Apple, makes very little sense to me, but that's their policy. Again you'll need to liase with Apple HQ to figure out how to get their backend to report all these certificates revoked or nothing happens.
So in the modern world that leaves Firefox, which does have OCSP fetching code, but it's default off and they recommend you leave it that way. Why? Because it's privacy infringing. OCSP sends the CA information about which subscriber certificates you relied on recently. Why were you relying on the certificate for Porn Hub? Exactly.
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> If a countersigned certificate is revoked by one signer, is it still safe to use? I hope your answer is 'no'.
There's no such thing as a "countersigned certificate" in X.509 thus PKIX and the Web PKI. There can be multiple CA certificates with the same subject, which is what we call a "cross signed" CA.
There's no reason you should treat a certificate differently based on the existence of other certificates with the same subject which have been revoked, and indeed the software you use does not (on the whole) treat them differently. It's likely that you've used such trust chains especially if you're an American because a public CA (not Let's Encrypt) signed the Federal Bridge CA mistakenly at one point, which implicitly imports this huge hierarchy of other signature chains, some of which are revoked.
> Why did they including both certs in the chain if everyone trusts the same CA?
I guess you're talking about the existence of R3 signed by DST Root CA X3 and R3 signed by ISRG Root X1. But those aren't a chain, and so they aren't "including both certs in the chain". They're two certificates for the same entity, and so there are two completely different chains offered by Let's Encrypt.