> You can generate gigabytes of secure entropy per second in userspace. I haven't thought about this before, so please have patience: I guess the "secure" qua

> You can generate gigabytes of secure entropy per second in userspace. I haven't thought about this before, so please have patience: I guess the "secure" qualifier does a lot of work in this sentence? That there's 32 bytes of "true entropy", but "secure entropy" is theoretically weaker but practically just as strong with reasonable assumptions about an attacker's computing resources. So I'd guess the "secure" qualifier must mean something like "given any quantity of derived pseudorandom information, the seed bytes can't be efficiently deduced? Pretty neat. (I had a knee-jerk disagreement until I re-read your post and saw that you said "32 bytes", not "32 bits". Quite plausible -- and cool -- that we have a good solution with just a small amount more seed randomness though.)