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In addition to this, I frequently hear people talk about how Signal would prevent monitoring of groups like those that stormed the capital. As if you can create
by godelski 6y ago
In addition to this, I frequently hear people talk about how Signal would prevent monitoring of groups like those that stormed the capital. As if you can create a secret communication channel that members of the public can join but the FBI is unable to infiltrate.
Signal and E2EE stop dragnets, not targeted efforts. Which honestly is exactly what I want and seems like what we want in a free and open society. Monitoring shouldn't be the default but only happen when there is a warranted reason to monitor, preferable with a literal warrant. This embodies the idea of "innocent unless proven guilty" but balances the ability to move from suspicion to evidence gathering and minimizes the collection of data of innocent people. It's not "if you have nothing to hide then you have nothing to fear" but "if you have nothing to suspect then you have no reason to search." I don't know how a dragnet doesn't violate the 4th amendment.
- nefitty 6y agoThis comment helped clarify a lot of my intuitions regarding privacy.
- BugsJustFindMe 6y ago> As if you can create a secret communication channel that members of the public can join but the FBI is unable to infiltrate. Back in the day people used to, hilariously, have MOTD notices on all of their illegal servers saying the internet equivalent of "You have to tell me if you're a cop".
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- banana_giraffe 6y agoI first saw that on BBS's, and it made it's way onto some forums in the early days of the web. I always found it humorous what laws they'd cite, when they bother to, to say basically "By clicking this button you assert you're not law enforcement officer".
- Panino 6y agoYeah it's a commonly held misconception spanning decades that cops must identify themselves if asked. I wonder where it originated. Needs some sunlight like: Badger: "Prove you're not a cop." ... Undercover cop: "If you ask a cop if he's a cop, he's like... obligated to tell you -- it's in the Constitution." - Breaking Bad, Season 2, Episode 8, moments before Badger gets arrested
- taneq 6y agoI don’t think the server notices were based on this assumption. They were trying to use the draconian cyber security laws instituted after Mitnick and others got caught, which stipulated 10 years jail time for “unauthorised access to a computer system.”
- banana_giraffe 6y agoThe ones I saw, for the most part, predated Mitnick's arrest. Some by many years. (Blah, I'm old)
- taneq 6y agoHuh, I just kind of assumed they were related since the whole moral panic over "hacking" was about the same time (or, in hindsight, the same time I started using telnet... I'm less old but still quite old. :P )
- btown 6y agoNot a lawyer, but I seriously doubt any prosecutor would bring a criminal case against a law enforcement officer whose access to a system was denied for being a law enforcement officer, and while there are some situations where one can make a civil claim under the CFAA, what legitimate damages could you show that an officer caused you by accessing your site in the furtherance of their duty? If someone actually tried to sue for this, it would be a very interesting case indeed.
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- LatteLazy 6y agoWe laugh now, but plenty of people believe in Warrant Canaries...
- lima 6y ago> Monitoring shouldn't be the default but only happen when there is a warranted reason to monitor, preferable with a literal warrant. In many cases, well-done E2EE like Signal stops dragnets and targeted efforts. Even with a literal warrant.
- godelski 6y agoI'm not sure I buy this, but it depends how we define targeted attacks. If we include getting access to the device, which I think is reasonable, it obviously doesn't stop targeted efforts. Not to say it doesn't make it more difficult. Remotely, are we only talking Signal or the system as a whole? AFAIK nothing is unhackable, only difficult to hack. But as long as we're playing the cat and mouse game I'm happy. Improving defensive technologies shouldn't ever be stopped or hindered. I'm not sure why this isn't seen as a national security issue but that's a bigger discussion. But my main point is that most people are afraid of large organizations of terrorists or bad actors will be able to discuss things without the ability for the FBI to surveil them. Well you can't have "large" and "vet everyone to an extremely high degree." Sure, this will make it more difficult to stop small groups, but those have been notoriously difficult to find and stop in the first place.
- bigiain 6y agoMy personal perspective is that if a Three Letter Agency becomes specifically “interested” in me, I’m fucked. No matter what I do. Even if I fake my own death and live in a submarine... What I can do, however, is take measures to protect myself against less powerful or sophisticated attackers. Where I come from, “communications metadata” is required to be kept by all telcos and isps. This metadata is them “available to law enforcement” - which is not just investigations into child abuse and drug running, as the proponents of the laws made out when advocating for them, but includes agencies such as the Taxi commission, various local councils, and state fisheries departments. https://www.theregister.com/AMP/2018/11/14/comms_alliance_metadata_scope_creep/ https://www.theregister.com/AMP/2018/11/14/comms_alliance_me... Using (trusted) vpns and e2e encrypted messaging will reduce the chance of a local council or a fisheries inspector being able to get as much information from my metadata as they might from non VPN and secure messaging using people. (Of course, it might backfire and just paint a big target on my back... One potential privacy advantage of COVID and widespread wfh is that many many more people are using VPN tunnels for ordinary and mundane purposes. Adding extra hay to the haystack my needle is trying to hide in is a good thing. So long as it’s not Mossad looking for my specific needle...)
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- alexisread 6y agoI've upvoted you but wanted to nitpick (sorry) - innocent unless proven guilty doesn't have the temporal connotations that 'until' has.
- godelski 6y agoIf we're going to nitpick I think HN is the place that this is acceptable, especially when done in a good manner. I do think you make a good point since "until" implies that anyone is guilty given enough time. I'll try to adopt this change into my vernacular. I updated my comment in an effort to acknowledge and support this idea.
- bigiain 6y ago> “ until" implies that anyone is guilty given enough time Sadly, I think that’s considered a “feature” by modern law enforcement and judicial systems. Plea bargains and the sheer volume of laws that cannot possibly be understood by normal people make for a prosecutorial power balance that genuinely means everybody really is just “innocent until they decide to prove you guilty”. The well known “Don’t talk to police” lecture is extremely on point here: https://youtu.be/d-7o9xYp7eE https://youtu.be/d-7o9xYp7eE Your _are_ guilty of something. If you come to the attention of the wrong LEO, they will find something to prosecute you for, and like Al Capone, they’ll perfectly happily send you to jail for tax evasion if they’ve decided but cannot prove you are guilty of something else. That’s totally fucked up.
- brandmeyer 6y ago> Which honestly is exactly what I want and seems like what we want in a free and open society. Monitoring shouldn't be the default but only happen when there is a warranted reason to monitor, preferable with a literal warrant. Its more than warrants, though. The evidence of the last few decades is that warrants aren't enough to block dragnets. Warrants can (and are) avoided through parallel construction. Unscrupulous agents will go off on "LoveInt" missions if it suits their ethics. Universal encryption uses economic force to make dragnet surveillance infeasible where ethical force has failed.
- newacct583 6y ago> I frequently hear people talk about how Signal would prevent monitoring of groups like those that stormed the capital Those folks walked over on public roads from a Trump rally down the street, live streaming on a hundred cameras as they did it. Of all the things that went wrong on the 6th, surveillance was clearly not one of them. What I think you're remembering is more the point that Signal and Telegram provide harder-to-surveil forums for the people who got radicalized. That having all that chatter be private by default means that we won't see the next extremist faction before its born. And that's a fair enough point. Q communities on Facebook and Twitter made it easy to see where these people were coming from. But even there, the nature of radicalization is that it happens in a big group. There may be surveillance-proof channels on Telegram where modern right wing extremists are assembling to find like minded souls, but finding them isn't a problem at all. The ones that are hard to find die out by definition.
- bigiain 6y ago> Q communities on Facebook and Twitter made it easy to see where these people were coming from. Cynical view. Those made it easy to see what the manipulated fairly public mass of disenfranchised or disgruntled or actively evil Q/Trump supporters were discussing and planning. I’ll bet people like flexcuff guy and pipebomb guy weren’t discussing _their_ plans in such public forums. And I’ll bet there was a _lot_ of planning of the sort that used to take place in underground-public places like 4chan, which has now gone deeper underground and has much more stringent initiation rites for admitting new members. The sort of planning that involves manipulating and convincing “pawns” in their “it’s all about ethics in video game journalism” games to provide cover and take the fall for deeply serious shit...
- newacct583 6y ago> I’ll bet people like flexcuff guy and pipebomb guy weren’t discussing _their_ plans in such public forums. I dunno, some of those folks were pretty brazen. Remember they thought all this was, if not "legal" exactly, "sanctioned" by their sitting president. They weren't trying to hide. But even if we grant that the premise (which is clearly true) that serious criminals will always have the ability to hide from surveillance, the presence of an easily found public forum is still a prerequisite for real insurrection. Flexcuff guy and pipebomb guy may have been hardened experts, but they couldn't have sacked the capitol with only their militias behind them. The preventable part of this is the mob violence. And mob violence requires a mob, which requires that the members of the mob (by definition amateurs) be able to find forums to radicalize them.
- HenryBemis 6y agoFun fact for the UK: "UK police have a new tactic to circumvent strong iPhone encryption: steal the unlocked phone out of the criminal’s hand" (https://9to5mac.com/2016/12/05/uk-police-have-a-new-tactic-for-circumventing-strong-iphone-encryption-steal-the-unlocked-phone-out-of-the-criminals-hand/ https://9to5mac.com/2016/12/05/uk-police-have-a-new-tactic-f...) I remember reading this a few years back. The title says it all. Why bother cracking codes etc when you can get a judge to sign THAT for you? :) Going through the PDF of the legal document, on page 10, the screenshots have a description of the "Source extraction" (point): "....<some long zip filename-I assume the dump>/private/var/Containers/Shared/AppGroup/<long HEX number>/telegram-data/account<long number>/postbox/db/db_sqlite" I got so many questions.. I believe Telegram does NOT encrypt group chats. And the default setting is that it does NOT encrypt 1-1 chats. You have to jump the extra hoop (a couple of taps) to start a new and encrypted chat (you cannot encrypt an existing chat). So.. the chat was not encrypted? So they 'just' managed to bypass iPhone's lock, and dump all the storage, look for messaging SQLITE files, read them. Are we sure they didn't get that data from iCloud (and hiding it - with permission?). Page 11 writes: "Several videos from his iCloud depict him apparently showing off his cash." Could the authorities have gotten an automated backup from iCloud, the guy was using an unencrypted Telegram chat, so basically not much hacking took place? Side note: big Supernatural fan here - page 10, the second 'blue' message writes "..Poughkeepsie". In the Supernatural universe "Poughkeepsie" is the Winchesters' secret distress signal to each other meaning that something is wrong and they are to drop everything and run.
- Nextgrid 6y agoTo defend against on-device attacks or iCloud backups, Telegram would need to do its own, separate encryption of its storage and prompt the user for a passphrase at app launch. The typical security model for iOS apps assumes that the local device is secure, as its storage is already encrypted by the system based on its passcode/biometrics (on initial power-up biometrics aren't available). End-to-end encryption within chat apps typically refers to encryption over the network. It does not include encryption of messages once they reach their intended recipients.
- JimDabell 6y ago
- chrisweekly 6y ago> "It's not "if you have nothing to hide then you have nothing to fear" but "if you have nothing to suspect then you have no reason to search." THIS. Thank you for your eloquence.