> By cheating I meant making a sidechain that would become longer than the mainchain, thus enabling a double spending attack. A double spend attack can only sp

> By cheating I meant making a sidechain that would become longer than the mainchain, thus enabling a double spending attack. A double spend attack can only spend the attackers coins. > If the amount of money to be made in double spending attack is higher than honest mining someone will make it, the only thing protecting against that is that the cost of mining must be large enough compared to value being transferred. That's precisely the game theory and why the network remains secure. It's addressed in the whitepaper and fundamental. Economic incentives are the security model. [0] I'm not sure what the rest of your points have to do with settlement finality and assurances so I can't address them. There's been a decade of analysis of Bitcoin engineering. I'm yet to hear anyone venture an original criticism that hasn't been rigorously and extensively rebutted already since genesis. [0]: https://blog.lopp.net/are-chinese-miners-threat-bitcoin/ https://blog.lopp.net/are-chinese-miners-threat-bitcoin/