6 ms·

> It's the century plus old distinction between analytical and continental philosophy The article's claim is not that this distinction doesn't exist or that it

by Veen 6y ago

> It's the century plus old distinction between analytical and continental philosophy The article's claim is not that this distinction doesn't exist or that it is not a useful distinction, but that "pseudophilosphers" tend to equivocate between "truth as some property of the universe" and "truth as it matters to us". That seems to me to be an interesting position that is worth considering. (btw. the claim that "The definition of what is true (and thus what is not) is based on power relations" is untrue even in the "what matters to us" sense, if you take it to mean power is the only or main determinant of what is true. That's the problem with Foucault and his followers—the monomaniacal focus on power as the primary determiner of truth and human relations. It just ain't so.)

coldtea 6y ago
>but that "pseudophilosphers" tend to equivocate between "truth as some property of the universe" and "truth as it matters to us". Which he fails to demonstrate - besides them using the same term for both (which everybody does). He also fails to realize that "truth as some property of the universe" in many cases is only available through "truth as it matters to us" anyway. In which case, it's wrong to extend your claims to that too. This is not just the case for things like morals, social norms, politics, etc., but also seemingly "hard fact" things. For example, X historical event might or might have not have happened. Or might have happened in X or Y way. How exactly it did happen is "truth as some property of the universe". Lacking a time machine though, and going through history (the academic endeavor), we only have access to it as "truth as it matters to us" - even sources of the time are subject to distortion due to power relations etc, and how we accept or not some source as valid and accurate is also subject to modern power relations, ideologies, and so on. This "truth as some property of the universe" historical happenstance is thus not that objective in the end, in the sense that it's not (and will never be, without a Delorean) availabe in any objective form in which we can obtain it and use it.
- mjburgess 6y ago
  So you're defence of foucault's language is that: (1) there is no practical distinction; so (2) let's not make any. (1) is by the way False. It is precisely by establishing epistemic standards for deciding when we are mistaken, and when not, that we are able to evaluate historical sources and even formulate the claim that they are "subject to power relations". So your defence is rests precisely on the sort of underhanded equivocation being described.
  - coldtea 6y ago
    >It is precisely by establishing epistemic standards for deciding when we are mistaken, and when not, that we are able to evaluate historical sources and even formulate the claim that they are "subject to power relations". Only Foucault already knew that, and had studied extensively how those "epistemic standards" have been established and developed. That's part of the problem, those standards are not some objective yardstick, but involved in the same issues themselves (again: not for hard facts nobody really cares to challenge, like "water boils at 100oC" but for facts that people do care about, have interests invested in, and so on, whether they are political, pedagogical, historical, and so on). >So your defence is rests precisely on the sort of underhanded equivocation being described. Well, then again, your comment rests precicely on "vaguely know about the works described, so will attribute strawmans to them, as if those authors haven't already considered the naive solutions I'm proposing to the issues they study"... Re (1) there "being a practical distinction" is irrelevant, if the distinction is of no practical use. At best one can self-congratulate himself of knowing the "real truth", while outside, the accepted truth is something different. And nobody in their right mind would just trust that person, or trust that "they" have the correct epistemology/methodology, when most disagree. For example, in the 19th century South the "truth" was that "blacks are inferior", and that didn't change with a different epistemology -not to mention most scientists agreed at the time to the same "truth" in every "civilized" country-, only with different power relations and social work. In the end, it took a whole civil war. Any "methodology" will be applied (and accepted) once the power relations change (or are forced to change) not before. It's the power relations enabling the change of the "truth". Heck, even in hard sciences, like physics, as Kuhn wrote: "a new scientific truth does not triumph by convincing its opponents and making them see the light, but rather because its opponents eventually die, and a new generation grows up that is familiar with it."
mordymoop 6y ago
This is a rhetorical trick that people have been using for a long time. The Thinker takes a bold and shocking stand, which is compressed, by the rules of memetic natural selection, into the boldest and shocking-est possible framing: "People don't actually care about their children." Or "Truth doesn't exist." Or "We should kill poor people to increase the average level of happiness." People are instantly nerdsniped by the idea. The implications! Could it be true? The curious reader finds there is always a deep and sophisticated literature backing up the crazy-sounding claim. Only after investing a huge amount of energy can the scholar even hope to unpack the fact of the matter, which is: the Thinker never really meant that claim, not the way it's stated, not using those words the way most people mean them. It always, always, always turns out that the Thinker was either being intentionally provocative with the big-bold-claim, or else using language in an idiosyncratic jargon-ified way. (Sometimes there is no single Thinker, and instead the big-bold-claim is a meme that bubbles up organically out of a whole school of thought, and is memetically selected for promulgation on the basis of its outrageousness.) If Foucalt had just written: "The agreed-upon 'truth' of the social, subjective stuff that people tend to loudly disagree about is often decided by who is in power, and who is advantaged by the 'truth' coming out one way or another," well, that's not a body of thought, that's a low-performing tweet. He needs to make it seem big, important, sweeping, general, touching upon every facet of human endeavor. This is not necessarily to say that Foucalt is some kind of intellectual grifter; this is simply the pressure that the universe exerts on all thinkers. To be more general, more important. But, as the Thinker is forced to make their big idea more general and more important, it loses the simple and obviously true (and fundamentally anodyne) tweet-length core. tl;dr: Memetics ruins everything.
- BlueTemplar 6y ago
  You seem to have exaggerated the 'stands' you give as examples. The problem with that is that I'm instantly reminded of all those times where I've seen critics of some 'Thinkers' accuse them of taking 'stands' like these, and after more or less digging (depending on of unpopular they were) it indeed ended up being either words taken out of context, or just strawmen.
  - 6y ago
denton-scratch 6y ago
> It's the century plus old distinction between analytical and continental philosophy Hmmm. Kant, Frege, Hegel: these Germans laid the foundations of anglo-saxon analytical philosophy. Frege (who I struggle to understand) was a towering figure in language and logic, as well as maths. And wasn't Descartes from the continent? Sartre had never heard of postmodernism. His work was of a literary kind, which I associate with Nietsche. He's considered an existentialist, par excellence (and 'scuse my French). FWIW, I think it's the study of logic that has the power to immunise you against bad reasoning (you also have to be bright). In one of the Enid Blyton books, the kids visit an academic uncle who bemoans the fact that "they don't teach logic in schools any more". Dammit, that was in the 1st half of the 20th Century. You still can't learn logic at school. I went to a good school; logic was not on the curriculum. I had only the vaguest idea of what it was, until I started a philosophy degree. I've never read a book by a postmodernist. So I don't have standing to attack postmodernism. But it doesn't interest me much; nor do bodice-buster romantic novels.
- coldtea 6y ago
  >Hmmm. Kant, Frege, Hegel: these Germans laid the foundations of anglo-saxon analytical philosophy. Frege (who I struggle to understand) was a towering figure in language and logic, as well as maths. And wasn't Descartes from the continent? Sure, but Continental and analytical are not geographical terms. They only originate etymologycally from the loose preference and emergence of difference schools in different geographical areas -- but obviously a European philosopher can be analytical, and an American philosopher can be continetal. Sort of like an merican band can play Irish folk and be good at it. But the Irish do it more, and usually do it better - it's, so to speak, their thing. >FWIW, I think it's the study of logic that has the power to immunise you against bad reasoning (you also have to be bright). You get immunity against some kinds of bad reasoning, and a vulnerability to others (scientism being one, systemic over-explanations being another, blindness to subtle things not quantifiable or qualifiable as truth propositions or logical axiomatic statements, but important nonetheless being the most important).

by Veen 6y ago

coldtea 6y ago

>but that "pseudophilosphers" tend to equivocate between "truth as some property of the universe" and "truth as it matters to us". Which he fails to demonstrate - besides them using the same term for both (which everybody does). He also fails to realize that "truth as some property of the universe" in many cases is only available through "truth as it matters to us" anyway. In which case, it's wrong to extend your claims to that too. This is not just the case for things like morals, social norms, politics, etc., but also seemingly "hard fact" things. For example, X historical event might or might have not have happened. Or might have happened in X or Y way. How exactly it did happen is "truth as some property of the universe". Lacking a time machine though, and going through history (the academic endeavor), we only have access to it as "truth as it matters to us" - even sources of the time are subject to distortion due to power relations etc, and how we accept or not some source as valid and accurate is also subject to modern power relations, ideologies, and so on. This "truth as some property of the universe" historical happenstance is thus not that objective in the end, in the sense that it's not (and will never be, without a Delorean) availabe in any objective form in which we can obtain it and use it.

mjburgess 6y ago
So you're defence of foucault's language is that: (1) there is no practical distinction; so (2) let's not make any. (1) is by the way False. It is precisely by establishing epistemic standards for deciding when we are mistaken, and when not, that we are able to evaluate historical sources and even formulate the claim that they are "subject to power relations". So your defence is rests precisely on the sort of underhanded equivocation being described.
- coldtea 6y ago
  >It is precisely by establishing epistemic standards for deciding when we are mistaken, and when not, that we are able to evaluate historical sources and even formulate the claim that they are "subject to power relations". Only Foucault already knew that, and had studied extensively how those "epistemic standards" have been established and developed. That's part of the problem, those standards are not some objective yardstick, but involved in the same issues themselves (again: not for hard facts nobody really cares to challenge, like "water boils at 100oC" but for facts that people do care about, have interests invested in, and so on, whether they are political, pedagogical, historical, and so on). >So your defence is rests precisely on the sort of underhanded equivocation being described. Well, then again, your comment rests precicely on "vaguely know about the works described, so will attribute strawmans to them, as if those authors haven't already considered the naive solutions I'm proposing to the issues they study"... Re (1) there "being a practical distinction" is irrelevant, if the distinction is of no practical use. At best one can self-congratulate himself of knowing the "real truth", while outside, the accepted truth is something different. And nobody in their right mind would just trust that person, or trust that "they" have the correct epistemology/methodology, when most disagree. For example, in the 19th century South the "truth" was that "blacks are inferior", and that didn't change with a different epistemology -not to mention most scientists agreed at the time to the same "truth" in every "civilized" country-, only with different power relations and social work. In the end, it took a whole civil war. Any "methodology" will be applied (and accepted) once the power relations change (or are forced to change) not before. It's the power relations enabling the change of the "truth". Heck, even in hard sciences, like physics, as Kuhn wrote: "a new scientific truth does not triumph by convincing its opponents and making them see the light, but rather because its opponents eventually die, and a new generation grows up that is familiar with it."

mordymoop 6y ago

This is a rhetorical trick that people have been using for a long time. The Thinker takes a bold and shocking stand, which is compressed, by the rules of memetic natural selection, into the boldest and shocking-est possible framing: "People don't actually care about their children." Or "Truth doesn't exist." Or "We should kill poor people to increase the average level of happiness." People are instantly nerdsniped by the idea. The implications! Could it be true? The curious reader finds there is always a deep and sophisticated literature backing up the crazy-sounding claim. Only after investing a huge amount of energy can the scholar even hope to unpack the fact of the matter, which is: the Thinker never really meant that claim, not the way it's stated, not using those words the way most people mean them. It always, always, always turns out that the Thinker was either being intentionally provocative with the big-bold-claim, or else using language in an idiosyncratic jargon-ified way. (Sometimes there is no single Thinker, and instead the big-bold-claim is a meme that bubbles up organically out of a whole school of thought, and is memetically selected for promulgation on the basis of its outrageousness.) If Foucalt had just written: "The agreed-upon 'truth' of the social, subjective stuff that people tend to loudly disagree about is often decided by who is in power, and who is advantaged by the 'truth' coming out one way or another," well, that's not a body of thought, that's a low-performing tweet. He needs to make it seem big, important, sweeping, general, touching upon every facet of human endeavor. This is not necessarily to say that Foucalt is some kind of intellectual grifter; this is simply the pressure that the universe exerts on all thinkers. To be more general, more important. But, as the Thinker is forced to make their big idea more general and more important, it loses the simple and obviously true (and fundamentally anodyne) tweet-length core. tl;dr: Memetics ruins everything.

BlueTemplar 6y ago
You seem to have exaggerated the 'stands' you give as examples. The problem with that is that I'm instantly reminded of all those times where I've seen critics of some 'Thinkers' accuse them of taking 'stands' like these, and after more or less digging (depending on of unpopular they were) it indeed ended up being either words taken out of context, or just strawmen.
- 6y ago

denton-scratch 6y ago

> It's the century plus old distinction between analytical and continental philosophy Hmmm. Kant, Frege, Hegel: these Germans laid the foundations of anglo-saxon analytical philosophy. Frege (who I struggle to understand) was a towering figure in language and logic, as well as maths. And wasn't Descartes from the continent? Sartre had never heard of postmodernism. His work was of a literary kind, which I associate with Nietsche. He's considered an existentialist, par excellence (and 'scuse my French). FWIW, I think it's the study of logic that has the power to immunise you against bad reasoning (you also have to be bright). In one of the Enid Blyton books, the kids visit an academic uncle who bemoans the fact that "they don't teach logic in schools any more". Dammit, that was in the 1st half of the 20th Century. You still can't learn logic at school. I went to a good school; logic was not on the curriculum. I had only the vaguest idea of what it was, until I started a philosophy degree. I've never read a book by a postmodernist. So I don't have standing to attack postmodernism. But it doesn't interest me much; nor do bodice-buster romantic novels.

coldtea 6y ago
>Hmmm. Kant, Frege, Hegel: these Germans laid the foundations of anglo-saxon analytical philosophy. Frege (who I struggle to understand) was a towering figure in language and logic, as well as maths. And wasn't Descartes from the continent? Sure, but Continental and analytical are not geographical terms. They only originate etymologycally from the loose preference and emergence of difference schools in different geographical areas -- but obviously a European philosopher can be analytical, and an American philosopher can be continetal. Sort of like an merican band can play Irish folk and be good at it. But the Irish do it more, and usually do it better - it's, so to speak, their thing. >FWIW, I think it's the study of logic that has the power to immunise you against bad reasoning (you also have to be bright). You get immunity against some kinds of bad reasoning, and a vulnerability to others (scientism being one, systemic over-explanations being another, blindness to subtle things not quantifiable or qualifiable as truth propositions or logical axiomatic statements, but important nonetheless being the most important).