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>Often, it’s due to simple misunderstandings (such as confusing truth with belief or knowledge), but sometimes it’s due rather to wilful obscurity Sorry, but t
by coldtea 6y ago
>Often, it’s due to simple misunderstandings (such as confusing truth with belief or knowledge), but sometimes it’s due rather to wilful obscurity
Sorry, but the pseudophilosopher here is the author of the article.
He can't disambiguate between truth as some property of the universe/time-space/actual historical occurence, and truth as it matters to us, and thinks that just because Foucault doesn't spell the distinction out, as if he spoke to 10 year olds, he himself confuses the too.
For those actually reading continental philosophy, Foucault's meaning is perfectly clear, and no, he doesn't mean truth in the sense of "this table is wooden" or "the sun is hot". Foucault doesn't do philosophy of truth in the way some analytical philosopher would.
It's the century plus old distinction between analytical and continental philosophy, and this is a tired, trite, post.
As for the quote from Foucault he gives as an exercize to the reader, it's trivial to parse. Here's my take, with extra examples to make it even clearer:
"The definition of what is true (and thus what is not) is based on power relations. We're speaking about social and political truths, here, dummy author, the kind people actually disagree about, not whether fire is hot or Australia exists.
Truth, contrary to myth (whose workings will be worth it to examine some other time), is not some higher ideal that you achieve when you free your spirit, or something that you arrive at in quiet contemplation in solitude, or a privilege of those free from social constraints.
It's something that is manufactured in this world, and it is produced following many different constraints. (e.g. truth in the medieval world followed religious constraints)."
- Veen 6y ago> It's the century plus old distinction between analytical and continental philosophy The article's claim is not that this distinction doesn't exist or that it is not a useful distinction, but that "pseudophilosphers" tend to equivocate between "truth as some property of the universe" and "truth as it matters to us". That seems to me to be an interesting position that is worth considering. (btw. the claim that "The definition of what is true (and thus what is not) is based on power relations" is untrue even in the "what matters to us" sense, if you take it to mean power is the only or main determinant of what is true. That's the problem with Foucault and his followers—the monomaniacal focus on power as the primary determiner of truth and human relations. It just ain't so.)
- coldtea 6y ago>but that "pseudophilosphers" tend to equivocate between "truth as some property of the universe" and "truth as it matters to us". Which he fails to demonstrate - besides them using the same term for both (which everybody does). He also fails to realize that "truth as some property of the universe" in many cases is only available through "truth as it matters to us" anyway. In which case, it's wrong to extend your claims to that too. This is not just the case for things like morals, social norms, politics, etc., but also seemingly "hard fact" things. For example, X historical event might or might have not have happened. Or might have happened in X or Y way. How exactly it did happen is "truth as some property of the universe". Lacking a time machine though, and going through history (the academic endeavor), we only have access to it as "truth as it matters to us" - even sources of the time are subject to distortion due to power relations etc, and how we accept or not some source as valid and accurate is also subject to modern power relations, ideologies, and so on. This "truth as some property of the universe" historical happenstance is thus not that objective in the end, in the sense that it's not (and will never be, without a Delorean) availabe in any objective form in which we can obtain it and use it.
- mjburgess 6y agoSo you're defence of foucault's language is that: (1) there is no practical distinction; so (2) let's not make any. (1) is by the way False. It is precisely by establishing epistemic standards for deciding when we are mistaken, and when not, that we are able to evaluate historical sources and even formulate the claim that they are "subject to power relations". So your defence is rests precisely on the sort of underhanded equivocation being described.
- coldtea 6y ago>It is precisely by establishing epistemic standards for deciding when we are mistaken, and when not, that we are able to evaluate historical sources and even formulate the claim that they are "subject to power relations". Only Foucault already knew that, and had studied extensively how those "epistemic standards" have been established and developed. That's part of the problem, those standards are not some objective yardstick, but involved in the same issues themselves (again: not for hard facts nobody really cares to challenge, like "water boils at 100oC" but for facts that people do care about, have interests invested in, and so on, whether they are political, pedagogical, historical, and so on). >So your defence is rests precisely on the sort of underhanded equivocation being described. Well, then again, your comment rests precicely on "vaguely know about the works described, so will attribute strawmans to them, as if those authors haven't already considered the naive solutions I'm proposing to the issues they study"... Re (1) there "being a practical distinction" is irrelevant, if the distinction is of no practical use. At best one can self-congratulate himself of knowing the "real truth", while outside, the accepted truth is something different. And nobody in their right mind would just trust that person, or trust that "they" have the correct epistemology/methodology, when most disagree. For example, in the 19th century South the "truth" was that "blacks are inferior", and that didn't change with a different epistemology -not to mention most scientists agreed at the time to the same "truth" in every "civilized" country-, only with different power relations and social work. In the end, it took a whole civil war. Any "methodology" will be applied (and accepted) once the power relations change (or are forced to change) not before. It's the power relations enabling the change of the "truth". Heck, even in hard sciences, like physics, as Kuhn wrote: "a new scientific truth does not triumph by convincing its opponents and making them see the light, but rather because its opponents eventually die, and a new generation grows up that is familiar with it."
- JackFr 6y ago> The definition of what is true (and thus what is not) is based on power relations. We're speaking about social and political truths, here, dummy author, the kind people actually disagree about, not whether fire is hot or Australia exists I think 'dummy author' has your number. From TFA: "When challenged, the obscurantist will typically retreat to the safe house provided by the trivial interpretation of his claims, only to reoccupy the controversial ground once the critic has left the scene."
- coldtea 6y agoThat's not a backtracking to a "trivial interpretation", it's what the quote says. (In fact @fratajcz continuation of Foucault's except in the comment above, makes it extremely clear that he speaks of social truths and their construction). The author makes a strawman that Foucault here implies something else ("objective truth doesn't exist at all even concerning hard facts"), and then triumphantly declares that it doesn't hold, or that Foucault doesn't justify this claim (which he never did). In the meantime, he fails to showcase that his strawman was actually meant by the philosopher, or that the intended meaning is a "safe house" retreat. (Not to mention he fails to see the cases where the "extended" -non trivial- interpretation also holds, e.g. see my answer to parent comment re: history and "facts of the universe"). It's rather the opposite: it's the trivial cases, that Foucault's thesis doesn't apply (of the "fire is hot"/"water is wet" variety, which everybody agrees anyway) - and the more impactful and profound cases (political, social, historical, truth) that it does. The author seems to apply the inverse prioritization (that challenging "fire is hot" would be the profound non-trivial claim, and challenging "abortion is a crime" kind of truths would be a retreat to triviality. That, though, is because he thinks in terms of analytical philosophy. The former were never the truths Foucault cared about or wanted to challenge. Even if it isn't evident from the except, Foucault has written extensively about and was preoccupied with, the social truths, on sexuality, mental health, crime, morality. His subject was never the trivial hard-fact truths of the "fire is hot", "water turns to ice at 0o degrees" kind. The author here pretends as if Foucault "over-extended" to them when speaking about truth, to build his strawman. So no retreat was ever necessary.
- fratajcz 6y agoWhen you add the next sentence in the original text, it's even more blatant: "And it induces regular effects of power. Each society has its régime of truth, its ‘general politics’ of truth: that is, the types of discourses which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true”
- tgv 6y agoHow can you disagree without agreeing what "truth" means?
- denton-scratch 6y agoHa! Well, "obviously" everything that I know must be truth; otherwise it would be mere belief. But for everything I think I know, there's someone that believes different. In that light, it seems unreasonable for anyone to think they have access to truth. So truth seems to be reduced (or elevated?) to something we can never reach, and only aspire to. It makes it into some kind of metaphysical object, whose nature can't be empirically established. I think it's best to avoid talking about truth, when trying to do philosophy. Just do the reasoning, and draw some conclusions if you can.
- boo_boo 6y ago> I think it's best to avoid talking about truth, when trying to do philosophy. Just do the reasoning, and draw some conclusions if you can. Yes, let's throw all of epistemology into the trash
- denton-scratch 6y agoWouldn't be the first time a field of philosophy has been trashed. The logical positivists did their best to trash metaphysics (I think rather effectively). Epistemology is theory of knowledge; it's a statement in epistemology (one which you might disagree with) that knowledge and truth are not the same thimg.
- tgv 6y agoBut what are these conclusions worth, then? How do you accept that the premises and reasoning are solid? Where does it go from "this table is wooden" (an example used in this discussion somewhere; let's ignore the linguistic problems) to "but that truth is manufactured"?
- whimsicalism 6y agoI agree that this article is rehashing the age-old continental vs. analytical debate, I disagree that because the debate is old, it is thus worthless. I see many defending the "perfectly clear" meaning of continental philosophers, even if they don't obviously build up a clear argument from assumptions like a "10 year old" analytic philosopher might do. Many, in my view, are forgetting just quite how obscurant many of these philosophers are. I am a little older than 10 years old now, but this passage (from Judith Butler), for instance, is close-to-incomprehensible to me > The move from a structuralist account in which capital is understood to structure social relations in relatively homologous ways to a view of hegemony in which power relations are subject to repetition, convergence, and rearticulation brought the question of temporality into the thinking of structure, and marked a shift from a form of Althusserian theory that takes structural totalities as theoretical objects to one in which the insights into the contingent possibility of structure inaugurate a renewed conception of hegemony as bound up with the contingent sites and strategies of the rearticulation of power.
- baron_harkonnen 6y ago> is close-to-incomprehensible to me Because it's written for an audience of people who are very familiar with structuralism, Althusser, and the general development of Marxist philosophy over a 200 year period of time. This is no different than a paper like "Attention is All You Need" expecting you to have a background in neural networks, recurrent neural networks specifically, neural-language models, and the transformer architecture. It's strange to me that philosophy is presumed exempt from having technical language and expecting a prepared reader where nearly all other fields are not.
- MockObject 6y agoWhen I consider that sentence, except with all the technical terms replaced with ones with which I am well acquainted, it would still be quite a severe mouthful, begging to be rewritten for clarity. And that is the point.
- whimsicalism 6y ago> the general development of Marxist philosophy over a 200 year period of time. Lenin, Trotsky, Luxemburg, they are all quite clear. Many modern marxists, like G.A. Cohen, write similarly clearly. > Attention is All You Need That paper actually defines quite a bit of what it is talking about. Nor are the sentences run-on or as dense in jargon as this. I've actually read quite a bit of the "psychoanalysis"-inspired philosophy sub-genre inaugurated by Lacan. I think it is insulting to compare the jargon used in that context, where authors will often admit to be intentionally obscurant, with a technical paper like Attention is All You Need.
- 6gvONxR4sf7o 6y agoYou gave some examples of what this kind of truth doesn’t cover. Fire is hot. Australia exists. This table is wooden. The sun is hot. Could you give some examples of what it does cover?
- maze-le 6y agoCurrency XYZ is stable. This sentence reflects a socially constructed truth (or falsehood) insofar as we have to agree on what the symbol XYZ stands for, what a currency is (is bitcoin a currency, are apples -- depends on the context) and what criteria of stability we have. We can measure the exchange rate of a currency compared to others and we can define criteria for what we call stability in this context -- and we can make propositions based on that model, but only if we agree on the model. But all of that comes down to our socially constructed definitions. We cannot objectively measure the value of a currency like we measure the wavelength of a photon. Other examples: "A Tough stance on crime works" (or has a lower crime rate other possible explanations). "Tomorrow there will be a traffic jam on intersection XYZ" (or won't there be a traffic jam because people assume that there will be and avoid that intersection).
- deleted 6y ago[deleted]
- 6gvONxR4sf7o 6y agoAre these examples like saying "this movie sucks" or “specific person X is tall?” In that “tall” is fuzzy and social, but if we agreed on a precise definition (“any person at least Y height is defined as tall“), we could give it truth in the photon sense, but as it’s collectively used today, it’s too imprecise a word to assign true or false?
- maze-le 6y agoNot every fuzzy proposition is necessarily a social construct. Your example of a tall object is as good as your definition of "tall" is, but once that is defined any object can be measured objectively. A good way of determining if something is a social construct is to ask yourself if the proposition would still hold if one were to remove all social lifeforms from the universe. A "tall" object would still be tall (to the degree that we can define tall) and it could still be measured somehow. In my example talking about a currency or an exchange rate wouldn't even make sense if we don't have a society that exchanges money or goods.
- yboris 6y agoTo me it seems like this is the trouble: for you, reading Foucault, it is clear what is meant by truth and that the word is constrained to a narrow scope. But to others, including me, it is not at all clear how far the scope goes. So if the defense of this ambiguity is to require everyone to read several books by the author first, I find it unacceptable. Without clarity, people can think they agree, while they disagree. Similarly, they might think they disagree, when in fact they agree. I have a hard time comprehending why so many people defend vague language.
- kar5pt 6y agoI think you can criticize Foucault to a point for being unclear sometimes, but you have to remember that sentence was taken out of context. Words get meaning from their context, so I don't think it's fair to expect every sentence a philosopher has written to make perfect sense on it's own without reading the surrounding essay/book.
- coldtea 6y ago>To me it seems like this is the trouble: for you, reading Foucault, it is clear what is meant by truth and that the word is constrained to a narrow scope. But to others, including me, it is not at all clear how far the scope goes. Well, why would it be clear from the start (without familiarity)? I mean, what "weight" on a NN means is not clear to me until I study machine learning, right? Then I find out that it doesn't have the same meaning as it does in dietary terms, physics, or legal matters (the "weight of the situation"). For people reading Foucault when he wrote it, which is theory-obsessed bibliophiles in 1960-1980s Paris academic and student and political world, primarily, it was as clear as would be for Peter Norvig to read an AI paper and understanding everything.
- kar5pt 6y agoI created an account to say this, but you said it better than I ever could. I just want to second the idea that the quote he gives as an example of Foucault's "obscurantism" is perfectly clear to someone who's actually read Foucault. The quote is unclear to someone who's never read Foucault because the author took it out of context. The "constraints" on discourse which Foucault references at the end of the quote is literally what Foucault spent his entire early career studying and explaining. To act like he just throws the word out there and never explains what he's talking about is intellectual libel.