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"...well beyond what a typical industrial system will need to protect against..." And the target system also had security systems well beyond the capability of
by giantg2 6y ago
"...well beyond what a typical industrial system will need to protect against..."
And the target system also had security systems well beyond the capability of your local water treatment plant. Let's not forget that these assets deemed as critical infrastructure could be the target of nation states.
All I'm saying is that not being connected is only a small part of security for industrial systems, and that some people wrongly rely on it being enough.
- yodelshady 6y agoThe target system probably fared better than you think - as a whole, it certainly wasn't destroyed. As with this incident, operators were physically present. That seems to be the real lesson (even if - see other war stories on this thread - operators tend to themselves have a creative approach to network security).
- ClumsyPilot 6y agoThe issue was not identified for months, and from what I understood, a significan fraction of the certrifuges were destroyed. The attack worked exactly as designed - wasting time, destoying equipment while being stealthy. Had the attack tried to destoroy all equipment at once" it would have beem spotted immediately.
- yodelshady 6y agoYes, a significant fraction. My point is, physically-present operators did spot AN issue immediately. It wasn't properly attributed to malice for months, sure, but they could still mitigate during that time. Without their presence, would you (as attacker) really bother with all the stealthiness? It certainly hasn't seemed to avoid long-term attribution. Set the controller to +INF RPM and let whoever pours over the logs in the morning spit out their coffee.