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The goal of not disavowing a first strike was to deter a conventional attack. If your explicit policy is "we will only use nukes if you use nukes" then the impl

The goal of not disavowing a first strike was to deter a conventional attack. If your explicit policy is "we will only use nukes if you use nukes" then the implicit policy is: you can invade Europe without fear of nuclear escalation. Instead of being upset at hypothetical nuclear fallout that never happened, we should look at the policy as a massive success at preventing war from happening.

int_19h 6y ago
Or we could look at the internal policy discussions that took place among Soviet leadership back in the day, since now much of that is unclassified. And it turns out there was no serious threat of a large-scale conventional war in Europe initiated by the USSR - at least not since 1960s or so. If anything, the Soviets were scared that NATO would do it.
- eitland 6y ago
  Well well. That's one way to look at it and it is an interesting way to look at it Another way to look at is that is equally important IMO is to realize they not only planned to but actually had occupied most of eastern Europe before that time. Stopping this planning during the 1960ies might be related to - Stalins death a decade before or - to realizing NATO was getting too strong or - to the enthusiasm for global communism waning - or something else. I certainly wouldn't subscribe it to some inherent peaceful nature of USSR though. For all the flak that the Americans (often rightfully) get we must not pretend that there was an obvious, readily available better alternative in trying to deescalate in the 60ies.
  - int_19h 6y ago
    I didn't claim anything about the "inherent peaceful nature" of the USSR. It was an empire; empires are generally not peaceful. However, there's a very simple and obvious reason as to why this mode of thinking prevailed after Stalin's death. The leaders who subsequently took power were those who saw the devastation of WW2 very close up, and knew full well of the true economic and social cost (to remind, Soviet losses were 20 million officially, but the real numbers were quite a bit higher). The result was a firm commitment to "never again!" - that is, regardless of ideology and politics of the day, the axiom was that there shouldn't be another devastating war like that in the Russian heartland. And it was obvious that any major war with NATO carried a significant risk of such devastation - Soviets simply didn't have enough resources to guarantee the upper hand in a conventional engagement against the combined forces of US and Europe. (Stalin didn't care about any of this - to his mode of thinking, sacrificing 20 million to grow his power was perfectly acceptable. That's why, as you correctly noted, the change didn't happen until some time after his death, once his political legacy waned.) Note also that this explains some other things, such as the occupation of eastern Europe - its primary purpose was to serve as a buffer zone in any conflict with NATO, so that any territorial losses and devastation accompanied by large-scale warfare would be concentrated in those areas, as opposed to Russia proper.
  - fit2rule 6y ago
    It is difficult to observe the belligerence from both sides, properly. You may not have as solid a grasp on how the Russians feel about American aggression, as one might allow would give a balance to the issue. Fortunately, others were able to find that balance, in a culture of distrust and hate.

int_19h 6y ago

Or we could look at the internal policy discussions that took place among Soviet leadership back in the day, since now much of that is unclassified. And it turns out there was no serious threat of a large-scale conventional war in Europe initiated by the USSR - at least not since 1960s or so. If anything, the Soviets were scared that NATO would do it.

eitland 6y ago
Well well. That's one way to look at it and it is an interesting way to look at it Another way to look at is that is equally important IMO is to realize they not only planned to but actually had occupied most of eastern Europe before that time. Stopping this planning during the 1960ies might be related to - Stalins death a decade before or - to realizing NATO was getting too strong or - to the enthusiasm for global communism waning - or something else. I certainly wouldn't subscribe it to some inherent peaceful nature of USSR though. For all the flak that the Americans (often rightfully) get we must not pretend that there was an obvious, readily available better alternative in trying to deescalate in the 60ies.
- int_19h 6y ago
  I didn't claim anything about the "inherent peaceful nature" of the USSR. It was an empire; empires are generally not peaceful. However, there's a very simple and obvious reason as to why this mode of thinking prevailed after Stalin's death. The leaders who subsequently took power were those who saw the devastation of WW2 very close up, and knew full well of the true economic and social cost (to remind, Soviet losses were 20 million officially, but the real numbers were quite a bit higher). The result was a firm commitment to "never again!" - that is, regardless of ideology and politics of the day, the axiom was that there shouldn't be another devastating war like that in the Russian heartland. And it was obvious that any major war with NATO carried a significant risk of such devastation - Soviets simply didn't have enough resources to guarantee the upper hand in a conventional engagement against the combined forces of US and Europe. (Stalin didn't care about any of this - to his mode of thinking, sacrificing 20 million to grow his power was perfectly acceptable. That's why, as you correctly noted, the change didn't happen until some time after his death, once his political legacy waned.) Note also that this explains some other things, such as the occupation of eastern Europe - its primary purpose was to serve as a buffer zone in any conflict with NATO, so that any territorial losses and devastation accompanied by large-scale warfare would be concentrated in those areas, as opposed to Russia proper.
- fit2rule 6y ago
  It is difficult to observe the belligerence from both sides, properly. You may not have as solid a grasp on how the Russians feel about American aggression, as one might allow would give a balance to the issue. Fortunately, others were able to find that balance, in a culture of distrust and hate.