> For instance, dendrite.matrix.org uses a relatively stable 480MB of RAM, despite being in thousands of rooms spanning tens of thousands of users. That's impr

> For instance, dendrite.matrix.org uses a relatively stable 480MB of RAM, despite being in thousands of rooms spanning tens of thousands of users. That's impressive, congrats! I hear your frustration, and I think only time can solve this problem, and it does eventually. It's the same with Signal and the initially poor user experience. > It makes NO sense to end-to-end encrypt a public chatroom which by definition is intended to be indexed and visible and smeared all over the wider world. Even if you don't want encryption, authentication is still good to have, so quick question: who authenticates messages when you deactivate E2EE in Matrix? In the case of a public room hosted on server S, A sends a message M1, then sends another M2. Assuming that S is not actively MITM until after the first message (so any initial key exchange can happen), can I be sure that the second message will not be tampered with? IIUC a Signal group where a client would then broadcast all messages to the world would still provide such a guarantee. Is that the case as well for Matrix?