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Does the government, in fact, know how to do those things? How would we know if they did or didn't? I notice that they spend oddly large amounts of money on an
by pjscott 6y ago
Does the government, in fact, know how to do those things? How would we know if they did or didn't?
I notice that they spend oddly large amounts of money on anything for which we know what the cost roughly should be -- e.g. CDC web sites -- and don't seem to do so very quickly or very well. Should we assume that they're a lot more competent at things we know less about?
- angry_octet 6y agoAgencies are less likely to be competent in non core areas. This should not be surprising. There is no career path for you doing software in an agency like the CDC run by bio science people. Same for the Air Force, which is run by fast jet pilots, the Congress by lawyers and liars, Commerce by thieves, etc. Even banks and trading firms, who live and die by software, are run by accountants and economists. Unless an organization recognizes the core importance of software and carves out a specialisation stream and C level ownership of it, they rarely achieve more than brief or isolated competence. This is the reason why SV is so appealing -- nowhere else do SWEs hold sway over entire companies and industries. Govt can do excellent software if it becomes a priority, they could pay competitive wages (there are special pay scales for doctors and lawyers), but they choose not to because of risk aversion from politicians, who mistakenly believe they can outsource the risk. For something like this, paying Eventbrite to do it wouldn't have been a bad place to start. But the fat cat consulting firms never have domain expertise beyond getting Govt contracts.
- GVIrish 6y agoThere's a couple of reasons government IT projects turn out this way. In my experience, a lot of the time it's not so much that the contractor is trying to make money by prolonging the problem. It's that the customer doesn't know how to be a competent product owner that prioritizes and scopes things properly. Then, frequently the software being designed ends up replicating broken/inefficient business processes, so it ends up being difficult to make cleans and efficient software. This becomes worse when there's legacy software in the mix where the customer wants the contractor to port over all of the clunky functionality of the old app. Which of course isn't documented in the first place, so you've got to perform software archaeology to figure out what it did. Some other show stoppers I've seen are when key stakeholders act as gatekeepers and prevent developers from talking to SMEs directly, so you have to build your requirements based on what the person with the 10,000 foot view knows. So of course you get incomplete and sometimes completely wrong requirements. And you might not find out how wrong they are until after you've spent a lot of time building things Just those dynamics alone can add an enormous amount of cost or outright doom a project. I could probably fill a blog with all of the dysfunctional stuff I've seen in federal IT, but suffice it to say that these factors can easily balloon costs and timelines to a comical degree. This $44 million failure is actually small compared to some other government IT failures like the billion dollar Air Force accounting system.