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"There is a crucial difference between believing that a computer can simulate a brain and believing that a windmill can do so." That depends entirely on what y

"There is a crucial difference between believing that a computer can simulate a brain and believing that a windmill can do so." That depends entirely on what you think a brain is, and it just so happens that a prevalent view these days is that a brain is a computer, and so of course it follows very easily that a computer can simulate a brain. But once that assumption is gotten rid of, it doesn't follow so easily at all. People are ignoring a good lot of scientific method when they propose that were a computer to every simulate a brain the veracity of that simulation could ever be verified. The only data that could ever be provided would be a very limited set, namely, to the external behaviors. What would essentially be needed in the simulation, that is the production of consciousness, could never empirically tested. Consciousness as an object isn't even a scientific entity, it's something that can only be corroborated internal to the agent that has it. It isn't analyzable into parts and it isn't able to be abstracted out of its environment, and so cannot be turned into a scientific object. The brain, on the other hand, we might suppose is an object fitted to empirical methods, but what people really want to get at is consciousness, and the brain without that is probably not the problem most people have in mind. So one could simulate the brain but only on a very restricted very of what a brain is. On the other hand, on second thought I do agree with you that evolution produces technologies and even maybe that that's all evolution has ever done. I'm afraid I'll have to think about that point more if I am to respond to it specifically, though I think it's tangential to the rest of the argument I am trying to make above (which is admittedly sketchy).

smosher 15y ago
I'm having a hard time with your argument. Some things jump out: The only data that could ever be provided would be a very limited set, namely, to the external behaviors. - This isn't true at all. We slice open brains to find out how they work. We stick things in them to measure and stimulate them. One fellow even had a camera installed to produce phosphenes via electrodes on his visual cortex. Science has gone well beyond external behaviours. (We are talking about the mechanics of brains here, so B. F. Skinner doesn't get an invitation. Once the brain simulation is running and babbling then he can psychoanalyze it all he likes.) Consciousness as an object isn't even a scientific entity, - That's good news, not bad. If it's not a scientific entity, we don't have to worry about it or hold it up to scientific scrutiny. Similarly we can stave off worrying about whether it has a soul, and which God it belongs to should it in fact have a soul--whatever that means. but what people really want to get at is consciousness, and the brain without that is probably not the problem most people have in mind. So one could simulate the brain but only on a very restricted very of what a brain is. - A brain is whatever science says it is. The word you want to (and are free to) play with is consciousness. For maximum convenience, you may define it as the quality a brain produced by sexual human reproduction has and that which an artificial brain made by humans has not. Whatever it is it makes us very special indeed! There was more sarcasm there than I would have liked, but I can't resist. So I apologize, but I hope you see my point: arguing that a simulation is impossible because of some mysterious scientific non-entity is simply not a scientifically valid argument. (Bio-/electro-)mechanically speaking there is no known inherent barrier to simulation. Roger Penrose likes the idea that there is some sort of quantum entanglement responsible for human consciousness but it's not supported and he's having a hard time even demonstrating that his specific claims are possible. So for now, I am happy to assume that (robust, human-like) brain simulation is possible in principle. I don't know, of course, and I probably will not live to see it. Then again, computing is a runaway train and there are some compelling players in the simulation field at this time--so who knows?
- henrikschroder 15y ago
  Consciousness as an object isn't even a scientific entity, - That's good news, not bad. If it's not a scientific entity, we don't have to worry about it or hold it up to scientific scrutiny. Similarly we can stave off worrying about whether it has a soul, and which God it belongs to should it in fact have a soul--whatever that means. Ah, but this is the crux of the Chinese Room argument. You're saying that since we can't measure it or detect it, it doesn't exist, and therefore isn't important. When you have a brain simulation going and having a conversation with it, that's enough for you. It says it's conscious, and we can't measure consciousness, therefore it is conscious. I disagree. Strongly. That brain simulation is a zombie. The man in the room does not speak Chinese. But we'll see. I actually think we will, Kurzweil might be somewhat of a crackpot with his singularity, but his extrapolations of increases in processing power say that we'll have the power to simulate a human brain in a pocket-sized thing in 2030-something, and the power to simulate all of humanity in 2040-something. I'll be around 60 years old then, and hopefully still sticking around. :-)
  - henrikschroder 15y ago
    (Brilliant, this is the second time I argue against strong AI here, and only received downvotes instead of comments. That's not how this place is supposed to work.)
  - gosub 15y ago
    You're saying that since we can't measure it or detect it, it doesn't exist, and therefore isn't important If you can't measure it or detect it, how would you know it's there and it's the source of the phenomenon? If I tell you that it's not consciousness but magic pixie dust, invisible and non-detectable magic pixie dust, would you start searching for Neverland?
    - henrikschroder 15y ago
      I am conscious. I experience being conscious every waking hour of my life. I don't know why, I can't objectively describe the experience of it, but I know it is there. I can't speak for you, but given that we're of the same species, I'm gonna assume that you are conscious like me. Conscious machines? No, that'll require a lot more convincing than a song and a dance.
ckuehne 15y ago
>>There is a crucial difference between believing that a computer can simulate a brain and believing that a windmill can do so. >That depends entirely on what you think a brain is No. It depends on what you think a computer is. You see, the reason why many scientist today believe that a brain is computer or can be simulated by a computer is that computers are universal machines. In contrast to a mill, which can only mill grains, a computer can simulate earthquakes, the weather, cars, other computers, and, you guessed it, mills. >People are ignoring a good lot of scientific method when they propose that were a computer to every simulate a brain the veracity of that simulation could ever be verified. You seem to ignore the http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turing_test http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turing_test. >What would essentially be needed in the simulation, that is the production of consciousness, could never empirically tested. How do you know that I am conscious? Or any other person you converse with for that matter.
- lists 15y ago
  >How do you know that I am conscious? Or any other person you converse with for that matter. That's exactly his point, and that problem hasn't budged an inch since Descartes.
pessimizer 15y ago
Thinking there is a difference between believing that a computer can simulate a brain and believing that a windmill can do so doesn't depend at all on what you think a brain is, or on what a brain actually is. The case that was made by the parent is that since a computer can simulate a windmill, there is a distinct difference in the relative likelihood of the beliefs, not that either was actually true. Depending on the idea that the brain was a computer to prove that it could be simulated by a computer would be pretty much assuming the conclusion.
Symmetry 15y ago
Consciousness as an object isn't even a scientific entity, it's something that can only be corroborated internal to the agent that has it. If this were really true I would have no basis for thinking that other human beings were conscious, and thus I would have no reason to think that computers couldn't perfectly simulate other human beings.

smosher 15y ago

I'm having a hard time with your argument. Some things jump out: The only data that could ever be provided would be a very limited set, namely, to the external behaviors. - This isn't true at all. We slice open brains to find out how they work. We stick things in them to measure and stimulate them. One fellow even had a camera installed to produce phosphenes via electrodes on his visual cortex. Science has gone well beyond external behaviours. (We are talking about the mechanics of brains here, so B. F. Skinner doesn't get an invitation. Once the brain simulation is running and babbling then he can psychoanalyze it all he likes.) Consciousness as an object isn't even a scientific entity, - That's good news, not bad. If it's not a scientific entity, we don't have to worry about it or hold it up to scientific scrutiny. Similarly we can stave off worrying about whether it has a soul, and which God it belongs to should it in fact have a soul--whatever that means. but what people really want to get at is consciousness, and the brain without that is probably not the problem most people have in mind. So one could simulate the brain but only on a very restricted very of what a brain is. - A brain is whatever science says it is. The word you want to (and are free to) play with is consciousness. For maximum convenience, you may define it as the quality a brain produced by sexual human reproduction has and that which an artificial brain made by humans has not. Whatever it is it makes us very special indeed! There was more sarcasm there than I would have liked, but I can't resist. So I apologize, but I hope you see my point: arguing that a simulation is impossible because of some mysterious scientific non-entity is simply not a scientifically valid argument. (Bio-/electro-)mechanically speaking there is no known inherent barrier to simulation. Roger Penrose likes the idea that there is some sort of quantum entanglement responsible for human consciousness but it's not supported and he's having a hard time even demonstrating that his specific claims are possible. So for now, I am happy to assume that (robust, human-like) brain simulation is possible in principle. I don't know, of course, and I probably will not live to see it. Then again, computing is a runaway train and there are some compelling players in the simulation field at this time--so who knows?

henrikschroder 15y ago
Consciousness as an object isn't even a scientific entity, - That's good news, not bad. If it's not a scientific entity, we don't have to worry about it or hold it up to scientific scrutiny. Similarly we can stave off worrying about whether it has a soul, and which God it belongs to should it in fact have a soul--whatever that means. Ah, but this is the crux of the Chinese Room argument. You're saying that since we can't measure it or detect it, it doesn't exist, and therefore isn't important. When you have a brain simulation going and having a conversation with it, that's enough for you. It says it's conscious, and we can't measure consciousness, therefore it is conscious. I disagree. Strongly. That brain simulation is a zombie. The man in the room does not speak Chinese. But we'll see. I actually think we will, Kurzweil might be somewhat of a crackpot with his singularity, but his extrapolations of increases in processing power say that we'll have the power to simulate a human brain in a pocket-sized thing in 2030-something, and the power to simulate all of humanity in 2040-something. I'll be around 60 years old then, and hopefully still sticking around. :-)
- henrikschroder 15y ago
  (Brilliant, this is the second time I argue against strong AI here, and only received downvotes instead of comments. That's not how this place is supposed to work.)
- gosub 15y ago
  You're saying that since we can't measure it or detect it, it doesn't exist, and therefore isn't important If you can't measure it or detect it, how would you know it's there and it's the source of the phenomenon? If I tell you that it's not consciousness but magic pixie dust, invisible and non-detectable magic pixie dust, would you start searching for Neverland?
  - henrikschroder 15y ago
    I am conscious. I experience being conscious every waking hour of my life. I don't know why, I can't objectively describe the experience of it, but I know it is there. I can't speak for you, but given that we're of the same species, I'm gonna assume that you are conscious like me. Conscious machines? No, that'll require a lot more convincing than a song and a dance.

ckuehne 15y ago

>>There is a crucial difference between believing that a computer can simulate a brain and believing that a windmill can do so. >That depends entirely on what you think a brain is No. It depends on what you think a computer is. You see, the reason why many scientist today believe that a brain is computer or can be simulated by a computer is that computers are universal machines. In contrast to a mill, which can only mill grains, a computer can simulate earthquakes, the weather, cars, other computers, and, you guessed it, mills. >People are ignoring a good lot of scientific method when they propose that were a computer to every simulate a brain the veracity of that simulation could ever be verified. You seem to ignore the http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turing_test http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turing_test. >What would essentially be needed in the simulation, that is the production of consciousness, could never empirically tested. How do you know that I am conscious? Or any other person you converse with for that matter.

lists 15y ago
>How do you know that I am conscious? Or any other person you converse with for that matter. That's exactly his point, and that problem hasn't budged an inch since Descartes.

pessimizer 15y ago

Thinking there is a difference between believing that a computer can simulate a brain and believing that a windmill can do so doesn't depend at all on what you think a brain is, or on what a brain actually is. The case that was made by the parent is that since a computer can simulate a windmill, there is a distinct difference in the relative likelihood of the beliefs, not that either was actually true. Depending on the idea that the brain was a computer to prove that it could be simulated by a computer would be pretty much assuming the conclusion.

Symmetry 15y ago

Consciousness as an object isn't even a scientific entity, it's something that can only be corroborated internal to the agent that has it. If this were really true I would have no basis for thinking that other human beings were conscious, and thus I would have no reason to think that computers couldn't perfectly simulate other human beings.