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i wonder what would have happened if strategic planning in France would not have been centered on the Maginot line. It may be that they were too much focused on

i wonder what would have happened if strategic planning in France would not have been centered on the Maginot line. It may be that they were too much focused on defensive fortifications and didn't use the tanks they had effectively. https://tanks-encyclopedia.com/ww2/france/ww2_French_Tanks.php https://tanks-encyclopedia.com/ww2/france/ww2_French_Tanks.p... "The failure of French tanks was owed to obsolete tactical concepts, compromises which led to undermanned tanks and busy commanders, lack of air support and very poor communication aggravated by a rigid, scattered chain of command. In short, French armor could have had prevailed if better commanded and with better coordination and supplies. The ensuing losses were an incredible waste of military might, reproduced almost to the letter by the USSR in the summer of 1941." More arms here and there would not have made a big difference in the battle of France, given that the system failed as a whole.

azernik 6y ago
The issue wasn't so much the emphasis on the Maginot Line; it was diplomatic failure of appeasement. tl;dr French security strategy relied heavily on a strong alliance with Belgium, and they threw that away in 1936-8 Since the First World War, when Belgium's territory had been used by Germany as a route into France, Belgium had been in an alliance with France. This meant that while they built up fortifications on the German border, they expected to use the Belgian fortifications (places like Fort Eben-Emael) on its border with Germany as a northern extension of Maginot. When France and Britain failed to oppose the remilitarisation of the Rheinland in 1936, however, Belgium lost confidence that France would actually honor its security guarantees and declared neutrality again. They extended the Maginot fortifications along the Franco-Belgian border, but not didn't have the time or money to build it up to the standard of the rest of the line. Meanwhile, in 1940, instead of being manned by a fully-mobilized wartime army and probably elements of the French and British armies, the Belgian fortifications were held by skeleton crews of an only-moderately-alert neutral army.
- MichaelMoser123 6y ago
  just like in software: when a system fails entirely everyone is blaming someone else.
hef19898 6y ago
The maginot line worked rather well, at the end the fortresses were surrounded, and yet most them surrendered after the armistice and were not conquered. I seems a little bit like a combination of surperiour command and control and luck on the German side, and bad luck combined with bad and lacking C&C on the allies side. I always wondered how thins would have played out, if the western allies would have invaded the western part of Germany when the Wehrmacht was still busy in Poland. Same way I wonder how the Pacific war would have developed had the Japanese destroyed the oil depots in Pearl Harbour or even launched an invasion. I guess it would just have prolonged the war and killed even more people, in case of Pearl Harbour.
- MichaelMoser123 6y ago
  I don't know, if the French army would have done better during the failed Saar offensive of 1939 then it would also have done better in 1940. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saar_Offensive https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saar_Offensive
  - hef19898 6y ago
    Yeah, good point. In the end it is just nice what-ifs. It turned out the way it did.

azernik 6y ago

The issue wasn't so much the emphasis on the Maginot Line; it was diplomatic failure of appeasement. tl;dr French security strategy relied heavily on a strong alliance with Belgium, and they threw that away in 1936-8 Since the First World War, when Belgium's territory had been used by Germany as a route into France, Belgium had been in an alliance with France. This meant that while they built up fortifications on the German border, they expected to use the Belgian fortifications (places like Fort Eben-Emael) on its border with Germany as a northern extension of Maginot. When France and Britain failed to oppose the remilitarisation of the Rheinland in 1936, however, Belgium lost confidence that France would actually honor its security guarantees and declared neutrality again. They extended the Maginot fortifications along the Franco-Belgian border, but not didn't have the time or money to build it up to the standard of the rest of the line. Meanwhile, in 1940, instead of being manned by a fully-mobilized wartime army and probably elements of the French and British armies, the Belgian fortifications were held by skeleton crews of an only-moderately-alert neutral army.

MichaelMoser123 6y ago
just like in software: when a system fails entirely everyone is blaming someone else.

hef19898 6y ago

The maginot line worked rather well, at the end the fortresses were surrounded, and yet most them surrendered after the armistice and were not conquered. I seems a little bit like a combination of surperiour command and control and luck on the German side, and bad luck combined with bad and lacking C&C on the allies side. I always wondered how thins would have played out, if the western allies would have invaded the western part of Germany when the Wehrmacht was still busy in Poland. Same way I wonder how the Pacific war would have developed had the Japanese destroyed the oil depots in Pearl Harbour or even launched an invasion. I guess it would just have prolonged the war and killed even more people, in case of Pearl Harbour.

MichaelMoser123 6y ago
I don't know, if the French army would have done better during the failed Saar offensive of 1939 then it would also have done better in 1940. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saar_Offensive https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saar_Offensive
- hef19898 6y ago
  Yeah, good point. In the end it is just nice what-ifs. It turned out the way it did.