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In society there are always competing rights and duties to be balanced. Rights very rarely absolute. In this case the right to privacy has to be balanced with
by mytailorisrich 6y ago
In society there are always competing rights and duties to be balanced. Rights very rarely absolute.
In this case the right to privacy has to be balanced with the need in society for the law to be enforced and police investigations to be carried out.
There are never been "end-to-end" unbreakable privacy. People have a right to privacy so their private communications are kept private but at the same time the police has always been able to access those communications should it be necessary and according to the law. Claiming that an 'intact' right to privacy means an absolute right to absolute privacy is simply not how it has ever been.
Strong end-to-end encryption essentially means that the police cannot access communications ever, even if they get a warrant because they don't have a technical mean to do so. That's quite reasonably something that is deemed a problem. How do we deal with this?
- simonh 6y agoThis is simply not true. Conversations on private premises have never been legitimate targets of surveillance, and it's not generally* been illegal to encode or encrypt mail or other private papers or communications. Mandatory back doors are an entirely novel and highly intrusive encroachment on civil liberties. Edited from "has never been"
- rlpb 6y ago> ...it's never been illegal to encode or encrypt mail or other private papers or communications In what country? France, for example, used to restrict the use of strong encryption. Example summary: http://www.opengroup.org/security/meetings/apr98/French-Encryption-Regulation-rev.htm http://www.opengroup.org/security/meetings/apr98/French-Encr...
- fogihujy 6y agoThis seems to be about hardware/software that performs encryption? I've yet to see any modern democratic government prevent someone from using a one-time pad, a piece of paper and a pencil to encrypt a message.
- deleted 6y ago[deleted]
- kwhitefoot 6y agoIt has pretty much always been illegal to encrypt Telex as far as I know. Not that telex matters much any more, does anyone still use it?
- bondarchuk 6y agoBefore all these electronic gadgets it was pretty absolute. Just go to some remote place with noone around and talk.
- mnw21cam 6y agoMaths means you can't deal with this. Sorry. You only get two choices: 1. Secure legal communication that no-one can break. 2. A ban on strong non-backdoored encryption, where the backdoor keys will be misused and leaked to criminals. Meanwhile, criminals can just keep using secure illegal communication that no-one can break. Maths means that you don't get to choose a position in-between these two choices.
- jlokier 6y agoMaths actually doesn't agree with you. It is possible to construct end-to-end strongly encrypted systems with a backdoor that is governed by a strong social consensus process. For example, Shamir secret sharing to split the backdoor key among a group of parties that you respect in aggregate. If, say, 50% of those parties agree that you've been a particularly awful criminal they might vote that your nefarious chat should be opened up for the authorities to examine, by contributing their key fragments. All sorts of social consensus protocols can be built, with arbitrary rules. Probably most of them aren't such a good idea, but math does allow it. These days we would probably use a blockchain and smart contracts to provide very strong barriers against leakage. Imagine the key fragments locked inside a smart contract that only gives out the key when N anonymous decision makers concur that the key should be given out, as well as deciding to whom it should be given. In some zero-knowledge protocols it would not even be possible to find out who voted, only the result. It is also possible, in ideal maths world, to design systems where an AI trawls through private conversations but can only reveal information if certain conditions are detected. That sounds a bit dark, but if the conditions are also governed by social consensus processes perhaps that isn't so bad. For example if the AI is instructed (by social consensus, not authoritarians) "only extract a network of conversations if they show a clear pattern of $ParticularlyAwfulCrime, otherwise leave people to their privacy" perhaps that isn't so bad. We don't have the technology to do that now, but we may get it eventually; math is not the obstacle.
- Nasrudith 6y agoThat has so many wrong assumptions. First off the assumption that there is a group trusted in aggregate. If I trusted them they would have been party to it in the first place! Second the logistics of it are "clever dick" as opposed to a real solution - like suggesting using one off Hoffman encoding to compress a large file to only 1 bit. Third - blockchain to protect against leakage? That is the exact opposite of its job. Buzzwords aren't magic spells.
- furi 6y ago>Strong end-to-end encryption essentially means that the police cannot access communications ever, even if they get a warrant because they don't have a technical mean to do so. This isn't true. It means they cannot access communications without revealing to at least one of the communicating parties that they are doing so. The messages are still decrypted on the endpoint devices for reading, a warrant could be used to acquire those devices from their owners. Device encryption can complicate this some of the time, but that remains fairly hit-and-miss (and is a separate issue, you could have mandatory key disclosure without backdoored E2E and vice versa). >the police has always been able to access those communications should it be necessary and according to the law. And neither is this. To find out the contents of a verbal conversation that was not recorded (most of them, even today) the police would need to ask one of the participants to tell them what happened, and the participants can usually refuse to self-incriminate. Even if the conversation was recorded the recording would usually be in the possession of one of the participants as recording a conversation while not being a participant is illegal, at least where I live. To find out the contents of a letter they would need to intercept it during transit or recover it from its destination at a later date. If the letter has been destroyed they're back to asking the recipient or sender to tell them what it said who again can usually refuse to testify. To find out what was said via instant messaging under this no end-to-end encryption scheme, they can, at any time, simply ask a third party who cannot refuse to testify. This is an utterly unprecedented invasion of privacy and I struggle to see anything that could justify it in a (part of the) world where crime seems to be on a downward trend.