3 ms·
> 3. Signal forces all TCP/IP metadata to one stack, which if combined with heuristical analysis, I strongly suspect it would be possible to work out which IPs
by tialaramex 6y ago
> 3. Signal forces all TCP/IP metadata to one stack, which if combined with heuristical analysis, I strongly suspect it would be possible to work out which IPs communicate with which other IPs even without aid of SGX contained metadata.
I don't think you've thought about this properly. The fact you've mistaken this (the Don't Stand Out principle) for a flaw in Signal - rather than a clear strength compared to federated systems - is a bad sign.
> 5. Signal has built their entire social graph on phone numbers
The Signal system doesn't maintain a social graph. That's another huge flaw of many alternatives, since of course an attacker would (and this has already happened) harvest the social graph from the system.
Suppose you turn up with a Federal Judge tomorrow at Signal's offices, demanding a list of the groups I'm in, friends I know, people I've communicated with. Moxie can't help you. You supply my telephone number. Moxie still can't help you. OK, you demand a list of all Signal groups. Well here's all the new-style Signal groups. They have opaque IDs, their names, membership lists and all other metadata are encrypted, with keys Signal does not have.
Now, if you do the same for Riot.im you get truckloads of interesting information about whichever user or users you were interested in, including where to look next for more information about other users they know or communicate with. Even better, the "privacy conscious" users will often, as you've recommended, not be on Riot but instead on a low population Matrix server they control, neatly isolating them so you needn't even bother gathering a "graph" at all.