4 ms·

No Secret Software!

39 points by naish 18y ago

demallien 18y ago
Am I alone in having serious doubts of the ability to have an open source implementation of a voting machine? The problem is that to have any benefit from having an open source solution, all of the code in the system needs to be open source, including all of the drivers etc. As drivers need to be adapted to the specific hardware that they run on, it is normally only the manufacturer of the equipment that can write them. Think video drivers in Linux, as an example. Hardware manufacturers probably see little commercial advantage in providing their source code, and even if they do, there is no guarantee that what they give out as source code is really what they have loaded into the voting machine.
- rcoder 18y ago
  It's not about them seeing the "commercial advantage" in free market terms; it's about mandating a particular approach (in this case, open hardware and software from top to bottom) because it's the only way to insure that the basic infrastructure used in elections works. This is not a case where the whims of the market should decide the approach taken. If no one gets rich on the design and implementation of electronic voting systems, that's fine. I'd rather see it run by well-intentioned, poorly-paid academics within a strict peer-review model than by unknown private entities.
- olefoo 18y ago
  Actually that could be turned around to drive hardware manufacturers to open source, along the lines of, "if you want to play in this important and visible market, your drivers have to be open source".
berryg 18y ago
In The Netherlands a group has succesfully fought against the use of voting machines with secret software. For now the use of voting machines is not allowed anymore and the Dutch people have to vote using pen and paper. More info: http://www.wijvertrouwenstemcomputersniet.nl/English http://www.wijvertrouwenstemcomputersniet.nl/English. "On May 16, 2008 the Dutch government decided that elections in the Netherlands will be held using paper ballots and red pencil only. A proposal to develop a new generation of voting computers was rejected."
- nailer 18y ago
  I'm not averse to voting machines provied: * The code is publicly available * The code is publicly verifiable - eg, every voter is provided with a 'voting receipt' with a non-identifying UUID and their voting results. Users are allowed to look up this info online at any time they wish.
  - Create 18y ago
    think again. http://cm.bell-labs.com/who/ken/trust.html http://cm.bell-labs.com/who/ken/trust.html
    - nailer 18y ago
      This is a classic, but how does it relate to my post? Are you pointing out that a trojan could still be hidden in public code? If so, I agree. But I think making that code public reduces the risk of it being malicious. Eg, for one you've already made it so that the malware must be implemented as a trojan, rather than being obvious. The other is the code would be under massive scrutiny (hopefully without the developers OKing changes without actually looking at what they do, ala OpenSSL).
      - Create 18y ago
        Read again. You cannot trust code, and making it public is almost irrelevant in this regard. You need the full resources of an "emerging" country, like China, to fully develop your own (e.g. Longsoon). "Moral The moral is obvious. You can't trust code that you did not totally create yourself. (Especially code from companies that employ people like me.) No amount of source-level verification or scrutiny will protect you from using untrusted code. In demonstrating the possibility of this kind of attack, I picked on the C compiler. I could have picked on any program-handling program such as an assembler, a loader, or even hardware microcode. As the level of program gets lower, these bugs will be harder and harder to detect. A well installed microcode bug will be almost impossible to detect." I would be awfully surprised, if people who made millions (from Verisign) by "looking" at ssl would have made that kind of a mistake (effectively freedom frying the French National Guard).
LogicHoleFlaw 18y ago
What blows my mind is how fubar the voting machine industry has been when it has a model example of regulation in the gambling machine industry. I realize that some of the technical design goals are different but many of the regulatory aspects are extremely similar. Reliable and trustworthy voting is the linchpin of democracy. There is no excuse for voting "irregularities" in this day and age.

39 points by naish 18y ago

Am I alone in having serious doubts of the ability to have an open source implementation of a voting machine? The problem is that to have any benefit from having an open source solution, all of the code in the system needs to be open source, including all of the drivers etc. As drivers need to be adapted to the specific hardware that they run on, it is normally only the manufacturer of the equipment that can write them. Think video drivers in Linux, as an example. Hardware manufacturers probably see little commercial advantage in providing their source code, and even if they do, there is no guarantee that what they give out as source code is really what they have loaded into the voting machine.

rcoder 18y ago
It's not about them seeing the "commercial advantage" in free market terms; it's about mandating a particular approach (in this case, open hardware and software from top to bottom) because it's the only way to insure that the basic infrastructure used in elections works. This is not a case where the whims of the market should decide the approach taken. If no one gets rich on the design and implementation of electronic voting systems, that's fine. I'd rather see it run by well-intentioned, poorly-paid academics within a strict peer-review model than by unknown private entities.
olefoo 18y ago
Actually that could be turned around to drive hardware manufacturers to open source, along the lines of, "if you want to play in this important and visible market, your drivers have to be open source".

berryg 18y ago

In The Netherlands a group has succesfully fought against the use of voting machines with secret software. For now the use of voting machines is not allowed anymore and the Dutch people have to vote using pen and paper. More info: http://www.wijvertrouwenstemcomputersniet.nl/English http://www.wijvertrouwenstemcomputersniet.nl/English. "On May 16, 2008 the Dutch government decided that elections in the Netherlands will be held using paper ballots and red pencil only. A proposal to develop a new generation of voting computers was rejected."

nailer 18y ago
I'm not averse to voting machines provied: * The code is publicly available * The code is publicly verifiable - eg, every voter is provided with a 'voting receipt' with a non-identifying UUID and their voting results. Users are allowed to look up this info online at any time they wish.
- Create 18y ago
  think again. http://cm.bell-labs.com/who/ken/trust.html http://cm.bell-labs.com/who/ken/trust.html
  - nailer 18y ago
    This is a classic, but how does it relate to my post? Are you pointing out that a trojan could still be hidden in public code? If so, I agree. But I think making that code public reduces the risk of it being malicious. Eg, for one you've already made it so that the malware must be implemented as a trojan, rather than being obvious. The other is the code would be under massive scrutiny (hopefully without the developers OKing changes without actually looking at what they do, ala OpenSSL).
    - Create 18y ago
      Read again. You cannot trust code, and making it public is almost irrelevant in this regard. You need the full resources of an "emerging" country, like China, to fully develop your own (e.g. Longsoon). "Moral The moral is obvious. You can't trust code that you did not totally create yourself. (Especially code from companies that employ people like me.) No amount of source-level verification or scrutiny will protect you from using untrusted code. In demonstrating the possibility of this kind of attack, I picked on the C compiler. I could have picked on any program-handling program such as an assembler, a loader, or even hardware microcode. As the level of program gets lower, these bugs will be harder and harder to detect. A well installed microcode bug will be almost impossible to detect." I would be awfully surprised, if people who made millions (from Verisign) by "looking" at ssl would have made that kind of a mistake (effectively freedom frying the French National Guard).

LogicHoleFlaw 18y ago

What blows my mind is how fubar the voting machine industry has been when it has a model example of regulation in the gambling machine industry. I realize that some of the technical design goals are different but many of the regulatory aspects are extremely similar. Reliable and trustworthy voting is the linchpin of democracy. There is no excuse for voting "irregularities" in this day and age.