10 ms·
The linked article is correct, but uncharitable. It correctly states the behavior of two-factor auth systems but incorrectly understands their value. Yes, 2FA
by ajross 6y ago
The linked article is correct, but uncharitable. It correctly states the behavior of two-factor auth systems but incorrectly understands their value.
Yes, 2FA won't protect you from being phished by a site if you aren't careful. 2FA absolutely will protect you from a phishing site using the password it stole.
So no, when someone says "Use 2FA if you might be phished" you shouldn't be replying "That's not how 2FA works", you should reply "That's right! But let me explain why you are still at risk of password theft and should still be careful."
- shawnz 6y agoThe attacker could proxy the 2FA request from the real site using the password you enter and therefore you wouldn't be protected.
- Spivak 6y agoYes, that’s basically the author’s point. But it does protect you against someone trying to use your password on another site.
- FeepingCreature 6y agoYes, you can MITM 2FA, but you can't timeshift 2FA.
- cortesoft 6y agoRight, they could have access to your account, but not full access. A good website will ask for 2FA again if a user tries to do something destructive (like change password, email, or disable 2FA). They wouldn’t be able to do those things.
- deleted 6y ago[deleted]
- TacticalCoder 6y ago> A good website will ask for 2FA again if a user tries to do something destructive (like change password, email, or disable 2FA). They wouldn’t be able to do those things. The page mocking the login page where you need to answer the 2FA will simply phish your 2FA then, after a little delay pretending there's some lag, would say "wrong code, please try again". Now the person enters a second 2FA (which, due to the delay, would be different than the first one). As I've just commented in a top-level comment: I've seen sites using a 72 hours delay before any destructive change can be made, coupled with the sending of an email containing a link allowing to unilaterally prevent the change. I've also seen sites using two 2FA (TOTP style), one for login, one for any setup/destructive change. And there are sites using both techniques. It's not 100% foolproof but it's better than "one 2FA phished and it's game over".
- kube-system 6y ago> 2FA absolutely will protect you from a phishing site using the password it stole. The author is pointing out that they will steal both the password and your 2FA token.
- valvar 6y agoWhile this is possible, it does require significantly more effort on the part of the attacker and there are many more points of failure. So I'm guessing most phishing sites don't actually do that, even though of course some do.
- kube-system 6y agoAll that is required is that they phish in real-time or automate the attack. These attacks are not uncommon in the wild. MITM’ing three fields in a login page is not much harder than writing two fields to a DB. And it’s basically trivial to do it over the phone.
- ascar 6y agoIf you look at the context of the article, you should assume that phishing attack is sophisticated enough and responding to that attack with "you should use 2FA" is missing the point (which is exactly what the author claims). 2FA (at least the simple OTP variants) don't protect against phishing, they just protect against sloppy phishing attempts.
- bostik 6y agoPhishing has been commoditised, the criminals don't write their own pages anymore. In fact the phishing toolkits have been doing TOTP passthrough/relay for a few years now. For the attacker, it's a nice feature: victim could be using SMS, authenticator app or even an out-of-band delivered token book - they are all captured and passed along equally well. U2F and FIDO2 with hardware keys are the only realistic safeguards. On the other hand, I do subscribe to the stated problem, because for most people they are a usability snag. The NFC variant has the potential to address this, though: instead of plugging a key in and touching the blinky button, you just wave your keyring next to the device. Too bad NFC readers are not universally available on phones, tablets or laptops.
- u801e 6y ago> 2FA absolutely will protect you from a phishing site using the password it stole. That's assuming one used a different password for the email or mobile provider.
- deleted 6y ago[deleted]
- dheera 6y agoAlso, I'm a big fan of U2F keys including Yubikeys. I don't use SMS, deprecated it 10 years ago in favor of e-mail, and would never use SMS for 2FA. I still have a virtual SMS number that forwards to my e-mail for the idiot sites that still insist on it. For most people, SMS is hackable, tied to a single battery-powered device, easy to steal (after which for most people in the default phone configuration the SMS verification codes will happily pop-up on the lock screen without unlocking the phone), and hugely inconvenient if you are in front of a desktop computer all day and have to go find your phone (at home for example I pretty much never have my phone next to me). SMS also famously locks people out of their accounts when they go to another country and have to use a different SIM card. Also, if you have a giant desktop in front of you, it's ridiculous to not use that as your 2FA device. You should NEVER have to pick up a 6" handheld device for 2FA when you have a massive immobile, hard-to-steal device in front of you that in my case is also physically locked down to furniture. Yubikeys and other U2F keys do exactly this. The article is wrong about one thing: "But if you’ve stolen my laptop and the YubiKey is plugged in, then you’ve got the keys to my kingdom." No. My preferred way to use Yubikeys is to buy one for each immobile device (home/office desktops) that stays plugged in, and ONE mobile key that lives in my wallet. Register all keys with critical services. If any device gets stolen (highly unlikely for the immobile devices, the mobile device is the only one I need to worry about really), go home, log in with another key and remotely disable it. My main gripe is websites that don't allow multiple Yubikeys. AWS is at the top of my hall of shame.
- sulam 6y agoI would love to be a fan of Yubikeys, in fact most people would say I _am_ a fan of Yubikeys, I think I have like 10 of them (due to product evolution and always buying a few when I buy one). Unfortunately most of the sites I use do not have anything to do with them.
- dheera 6y agoHave you tried using the Yubico Authenticator? It usually solves the problem for the sites that don't support U2F, such as PayPal, Coinbase, Gusto, and others.
- rdiddly 6y ago2FA absolutely will protect you from a phishing site using the password it stole. Not if it also steals the 2nd factor. My response would be more like "2FA is good but not for this problem." This problem is about going to the wrong site. The solution is to go only to the right site.
- lisper 6y ago> The solution is to go only to the right site. i.e. blame the victim. This generalizes to: the solution to user error is for the user not to make errors. So no, that is not the solution.
- scottLobster 6y agoActually better education and training is often the only real solution. It isn't "victim blaming" if the situation is at least theoretically within the victim's control. If some random "plumber" that I didn't call for shows up at my house, asking to be let in to replace some of my pipes, and I say "okay", then he robs me, is it victim blaming to say perhaps I should have been more suspicious of strange plumbers randomly showing up at my house to do work?
- lisper 6y ago> education and training is often the only real solution No. That is never the real solution. At best it is a necessary evil, but generally resorting to this is a reflection of a failure of imagination. The reverse authentication problem in particular is easily solved by the right UI design plus some improved infrastructure behind the scenes. Certificate pinning, for example, would help a lot. The hard part is not coming up with a solution, or even implementing it, but convincing everyone to adopt the solution because it doesn't help unless it is widely deployed.
- alisonkisk 6y agoExplain how any solution prevents the user from opting out of yubikey and typing self-XSS into Dev console to get owned. Unless you have a 100% vendor controlled system, (more than Apple + ChromeOS combine) you have to rely on the user not breaking their own security.
- 8ytecoder 6y agoIf it’s a website which supports API key or any token of sorts (without expiry or long expiry), they could do some real damage even if they can’t use the 2FA again. Another thing would be to disable 2FA. All they have to do to achieve this is to use the phished credentials to immediately login with the original site, trigger 2FA and then show a field to capture it and pass along. Then capture all the cookies. The best defense against phishing is to use a password manager that does domain matching.
- cutemonster 6y agoAny such password manager you like? Didn't know they could do domain matching
- CamJN 6y agoNot the person you asked, but: 1Password which I like, and Lastpass which I don't, both do domain matching in the browser extension. All iOS password managers that integrate into the system do domain matching as well.
- cutemonster 6y agoThanks, In addition to that, now I noticed that in the blog post: > I recommend the open source Bit Warden. A password manager stores your passwords. But it also stores the web address of site’s login page. If you visit githud, the password manager won’t prompt you to use the login details for github