6 ms·

Not sure why the author is so negative on Yubikey. His only reason is that an attacker can steal his laptop with the key plugged in. That’s a user error. I muc

Not sure why the author is so negative on Yubikey. His only reason is that an attacker can steal his laptop with the key plugged in. That’s a user error. I much rather have Yubikey over all other forms of security because it simply forces the attacker to be physically present. Why is that important? Because even if your laptop is stolen with your Yubikey at a local Starbucks, you’re more likely to catch that person versus a completely remote attack. Security isn’t just about attacks. You also need to think about mitigation and recovery following the attack.

signal11 6y ago
Also, Bluetooth based keys exist that don’t have to be plugged in.
edent 6y ago
Author here. I did provide a few other reasons - mostly around usability of YubiKeys. Try observing a non-techie set one up and tell me if you think it is as easy as it could be. Realistically, you're probably not going to catch a mugger. Otherwise robberies like that wouldn't occur. Snatching a laptop with a key physically plugged in it is probably easier than snatching a laptop and a separate phone. Regardless of my opinions on tech, if you think being mugged is "user error" then may I suggest spending a couple of days volunteering for a local Victim Support charity.
- hehehaha 6y ago
  Hey I understand but didn’t think other reasons were valid. I apologize if my comment came out curt. I know how that feels. However, I think you should reconsider your opinions on Yubikey. They’re significantly better than all other commercially available security solutions at the moment. Edit: your comment also gave me an idea. Perhaps there should be a phone-based service that you can dial that locks out your account for a predetermined time period? Or it could even be tied to someone else that you can trust.
- lrvick 6y ago
  I have helped literally hundreds of people setup Yubikeys across several companies. Your take is just not my experience at all. Tapping a blinking light it is much easier than fussing with a 2FA app and works when someone's phone is dead. Yubikeys in particular are near indestructible. They even work after you soak them in acetone overnight and melt the plastic off. I tried. When it says "plug in your device" you plug it in. When it says tap you tap. Also the mugger comment is not part of a typical threat profile. Yubikeys and similar devices are meant to protect you from remote attackers which is the class of attack 99.9999% of people need to defend against. If a mugger points a gun at you, no form of 2FA is going to save you. Also my Yubikey has a pin enabled and fingerprint enabled WebAuthn devices exist. I have several. If you are carrying things so valuable you are worried about being mugged, you can probably afford a higher end model with a fingerprint or pin. Edit: yes I know random muggings happen, but a hit and run mugger that knows what a Yubikey is and already has your password is a hiiiiighly targeted attack. -That- pretty much never happens unless you are walking around with a $1,000,000 in Bitcoin in which case it has happened a total of 5 times that are public.
  - screamingninja 6y ago
    > If a mugger points a gun at you, no form of 2FA is going to save you. https://xkcd.com/538/ https://xkcd.com/538/
  - ajcp 6y ago
    If it's so easy why did you have to help hundreds of people across several companies set it up?
    - tialaramex 6y ago
      You have to (well, I guess if it isn't your job you don't have to but it's polite) help people set up anything. Doesn't mean it isn't easy. Helped my mum set up Zoom (so she could attend virtual church apparently), is Zoom not easy? Two (three?) jobs back I had to set a bunch of people up on one time passcodes. Those seem pretty easy right? Still had to go there in person and show them.
  - 6y ago
- nwotnagrom 6y ago
  I agree on the idea around usability of YubiKeys. I have them also and believe they are great, but I never seem to have them when I need them. Of course, maybe its on another floor or another room and I am being lazy not walking over there, but it is an added inconvenience on a process that needs to be balanced between security and convenience.
  - proactivesvcs 6y ago
    Adding a rotating 2FA to a password database, for one.
- drivebycomment 6y ago
  Your opinion is in this case based on your ignorance and misunderstandings. The main threat model U2F key protects against is phishing, and phishing is the largest threat currently. The password is sufficient to protect you for opportunistic offline attacks like theft or loss.
- ahmedalsudani 6y ago
  > may I suggest spending a couple of days volunteering for a local Victim Support charity. Please try being less condescending. Losing the keys, due to whatever reason, means losing one factor. If the user loses the key, the "mugger" still needs to get the users' passwords. 2FA = something you know + something you own. Having one factor compromised should not compromise your accounts if the service you are using is configured correctly.
  - IncRnd 6y ago
    > 2FA = something you know + something you own. That's not exactly correct. Another factor is something you are, such as a fingerprint or eye. There are three classes of factors from which drawing any two is called 2FA. There is also a 1.5 factor auth, used for example by many banks, in which there is a server challenge for the very vulnerability stated in the article.
  - Closi 6y ago
    What’s the second factor with yubikey? The site seems to say it’s passwordless.
    - growse 6y ago
      A yubikey doesn't replace a password.
      - Closi 6y ago
        Oh, it seemed like that was what this site was saying: https://www.yubico.com/solutions/passwordless/ https://www.yubico.com/solutions/passwordless/
- cbsmith 6y ago
  Being mugged isn't "user error", and the good part about YubiKeys is that the consequences of being mugged are much more intuitive (it's just like I had my keys stolen). The "I left my keys in my coat" problem you have seems like it has a pretty obvious solution: don't keep your YubiKey on your key chain. Do you have a wallet or cell phone that you carry with you at all times? Put it in the wallet or cell phone case.
- gnufx 6y ago
  I've spent a lot of my life around Toxteth and Moss Side, and that doesn't affect my threat model relevant to phishing and FIDO. Mugging is probably less of a threat than break-in anyway, as far as compromised hardware goes. You separate the token when it's at risk, and the setup procedure claimed for FIDO, to the extent it exists, seems about as easy as it could be. It's a key. People can understand physical security to a reasonable degree, and typically not abstract computer security.
- pg_bot 6y ago
  Speaking as an author of a webauthn library who helps users set up their security keys as part of their training, it's about as easy as it can be. We give each of our customers 2 yubikeys for each user when they sign up, tell them to keep one on their keychain and the other in a safe location only accessible to them. If you lose/destroy your main key revoke its access use your backup and buy/setup a new one. No one has had difficulty understanding the process for our site since we show them all the steps up front and describe what to do in common scenarios. If your customers have a problem setting it up, it's a reflection of poor user experience not protocol design.
- polack 6y ago
  If your laptop get stolen (with Yubikey in it) you only loose one of your TWO factors. So the thief does not have access to your account since they don't know your passwords. Also, if a user can't learn how to operate a Yubikey after 10 minutes I don't think there is anything that can keep them safe online.
- deleted 6y ago
  [deleted]
Ottolay 6y ago
Fully agree that a physical attack is much less likely. Also, the use of a PIN or fingerprint[1] to authenticate the yubikey itself and not sent over the network, mitigates the stolen key scenario. [2] [1] https://www.yubico.com/blog/getting-a-biometric-security-key-right/ https://www.yubico.com/blog/getting-a-biometric-security-key... [2] https://developers.yubico.com/WebAuthn/WebAuthn_Developer_Guide/FAQ.html https://developers.yubico.com/WebAuthn/WebAuthn_Developer_Gu...
zimbatm 6y ago
Another issue not mentioned by the author is what happens if the Yubikey is lost or breaks. The story around this type of event is sort of ignored and not understood properly. AFAIK it's not possible to duplicate a key (by design), meaning that the user will have to update all their websites' 2FA (hopefully there is a recovery method available).
- hehehaha 6y ago
  Yes. You must have at least two keys registered. However it’s worth noting that most services do not offer priority. Meaning you can use either one. I think it makes sense to designate back up keys and only to be used when user reports lost/stolen primary key.
  - thatnerdyguy 6y ago
    But what is the story there? You have a backup key, hopefully stored "off site", now you want to enroll in another website. You have to get that backup key before you do that? Or bookkeep which sites you have on the backup key and which you don't?
    - hehehaha 6y ago
      This is a very good point and perhaps something Yubikey and similar services should consider: paired keys. Once paired the backup can always replace original if user reports it missing or lost regardless of when they were paired.
    - taeric 6y ago
      Actually, this is one area where pgp's use in pass works really well. You use your public key to encrypt passwords. So, adding a new one doesn't need the physical key.
- PeterisP 6y ago
  While it's not possible to duplicate an existing key, it is possible to create duplicate keys in the first place - you can't get the secrets out, but you can write identical secrets to two or more keys if you want to. This adds some convenience, though it also does add some risks e.g. in case of breach you can't tell which token was misused, you can't invalidate a lost key without invalidating others at the same time.

signal11 6y ago

Also, Bluetooth based keys exist that don’t have to be plugged in.

edent 6y ago

Author here. I did provide a few other reasons - mostly around usability of YubiKeys. Try observing a non-techie set one up and tell me if you think it is as easy as it could be. Realistically, you're probably not going to catch a mugger. Otherwise robberies like that wouldn't occur. Snatching a laptop with a key physically plugged in it is probably easier than snatching a laptop and a separate phone. Regardless of my opinions on tech, if you think being mugged is "user error" then may I suggest spending a couple of days volunteering for a local Victim Support charity.

hehehaha 6y ago
Hey I understand but didn’t think other reasons were valid. I apologize if my comment came out curt. I know how that feels. However, I think you should reconsider your opinions on Yubikey. They’re significantly better than all other commercially available security solutions at the moment. Edit: your comment also gave me an idea. Perhaps there should be a phone-based service that you can dial that locks out your account for a predetermined time period? Or it could even be tied to someone else that you can trust.
lrvick 6y ago
I have helped literally hundreds of people setup Yubikeys across several companies. Your take is just not my experience at all. Tapping a blinking light it is much easier than fussing with a 2FA app and works when someone's phone is dead. Yubikeys in particular are near indestructible. They even work after you soak them in acetone overnight and melt the plastic off. I tried. When it says "plug in your device" you plug it in. When it says tap you tap. Also the mugger comment is not part of a typical threat profile. Yubikeys and similar devices are meant to protect you from remote attackers which is the class of attack 99.9999% of people need to defend against. If a mugger points a gun at you, no form of 2FA is going to save you. Also my Yubikey has a pin enabled and fingerprint enabled WebAuthn devices exist. I have several. If you are carrying things so valuable you are worried about being mugged, you can probably afford a higher end model with a fingerprint or pin. Edit: yes I know random muggings happen, but a hit and run mugger that knows what a Yubikey is and already has your password is a hiiiiighly targeted attack. -That- pretty much never happens unless you are walking around with a $1,000,000 in Bitcoin in which case it has happened a total of 5 times that are public.
- screamingninja 6y ago
  > If a mugger points a gun at you, no form of 2FA is going to save you. https://xkcd.com/538/ https://xkcd.com/538/
- ajcp 6y ago
  If it's so easy why did you have to help hundreds of people across several companies set it up?
  - tialaramex 6y ago
    You have to (well, I guess if it isn't your job you don't have to but it's polite) help people set up anything. Doesn't mean it isn't easy. Helped my mum set up Zoom (so she could attend virtual church apparently), is Zoom not easy? Two (three?) jobs back I had to set a bunch of people up on one time passcodes. Those seem pretty easy right? Still had to go there in person and show them.
- 6y ago
nwotnagrom 6y ago
I agree on the idea around usability of YubiKeys. I have them also and believe they are great, but I never seem to have them when I need them. Of course, maybe its on another floor or another room and I am being lazy not walking over there, but it is an added inconvenience on a process that needs to be balanced between security and convenience.
- proactivesvcs 6y ago
  Adding a rotating 2FA to a password database, for one.
drivebycomment 6y ago
Your opinion is in this case based on your ignorance and misunderstandings. The main threat model U2F key protects against is phishing, and phishing is the largest threat currently. The password is sufficient to protect you for opportunistic offline attacks like theft or loss.
ahmedalsudani 6y ago
> may I suggest spending a couple of days volunteering for a local Victim Support charity. Please try being less condescending. Losing the keys, due to whatever reason, means losing one factor. If the user loses the key, the "mugger" still needs to get the users' passwords. 2FA = something you know + something you own. Having one factor compromised should not compromise your accounts if the service you are using is configured correctly.
- IncRnd 6y ago
  > 2FA = something you know + something you own. That's not exactly correct. Another factor is something you are, such as a fingerprint or eye. There are three classes of factors from which drawing any two is called 2FA. There is also a 1.5 factor auth, used for example by many banks, in which there is a server challenge for the very vulnerability stated in the article.
- Closi 6y ago
  What’s the second factor with yubikey? The site seems to say it’s passwordless.
  - growse 6y ago
    A yubikey doesn't replace a password.
    - Closi 6y ago
      Oh, it seemed like that was what this site was saying: https://www.yubico.com/solutions/passwordless/ https://www.yubico.com/solutions/passwordless/
cbsmith 6y ago
Being mugged isn't "user error", and the good part about YubiKeys is that the consequences of being mugged are much more intuitive (it's just like I had my keys stolen). The "I left my keys in my coat" problem you have seems like it has a pretty obvious solution: don't keep your YubiKey on your key chain. Do you have a wallet or cell phone that you carry with you at all times? Put it in the wallet or cell phone case.
gnufx 6y ago
I've spent a lot of my life around Toxteth and Moss Side, and that doesn't affect my threat model relevant to phishing and FIDO. Mugging is probably less of a threat than break-in anyway, as far as compromised hardware goes. You separate the token when it's at risk, and the setup procedure claimed for FIDO, to the extent it exists, seems about as easy as it could be. It's a key. People can understand physical security to a reasonable degree, and typically not abstract computer security.
pg_bot 6y ago
Speaking as an author of a webauthn library who helps users set up their security keys as part of their training, it's about as easy as it can be. We give each of our customers 2 yubikeys for each user when they sign up, tell them to keep one on their keychain and the other in a safe location only accessible to them. If you lose/destroy your main key revoke its access use your backup and buy/setup a new one. No one has had difficulty understanding the process for our site since we show them all the steps up front and describe what to do in common scenarios. If your customers have a problem setting it up, it's a reflection of poor user experience not protocol design.
polack 6y ago
If your laptop get stolen (with Yubikey in it) you only loose one of your TWO factors. So the thief does not have access to your account since they don't know your passwords. Also, if a user can't learn how to operate a Yubikey after 10 minutes I don't think there is anything that can keep them safe online.
deleted 6y ago
[deleted]

Ottolay 6y ago

Fully agree that a physical attack is much less likely. Also, the use of a PIN or fingerprint[1] to authenticate the yubikey itself and not sent over the network, mitigates the stolen key scenario. [2] [1] https://www.yubico.com/blog/getting-a-biometric-security-key-right/ https://www.yubico.com/blog/getting-a-biometric-security-key... [2] https://developers.yubico.com/WebAuthn/WebAuthn_Developer_Guide/FAQ.html https://developers.yubico.com/WebAuthn/WebAuthn_Developer_Gu...

zimbatm 6y ago

Another issue not mentioned by the author is what happens if the Yubikey is lost or breaks. The story around this type of event is sort of ignored and not understood properly. AFAIK it's not possible to duplicate a key (by design), meaning that the user will have to update all their websites' 2FA (hopefully there is a recovery method available).

hehehaha 6y ago
Yes. You must have at least two keys registered. However it’s worth noting that most services do not offer priority. Meaning you can use either one. I think it makes sense to designate back up keys and only to be used when user reports lost/stolen primary key.
- thatnerdyguy 6y ago
  But what is the story there? You have a backup key, hopefully stored "off site", now you want to enroll in another website. You have to get that backup key before you do that? Or bookkeep which sites you have on the backup key and which you don't?
  - hehehaha 6y ago
    This is a very good point and perhaps something Yubikey and similar services should consider: paired keys. Once paired the backup can always replace original if user reports it missing or lost regardless of when they were paired.
  - taeric 6y ago
    Actually, this is one area where pgp's use in pass works really well. You use your public key to encrypt passwords. So, adding a new one doesn't need the physical key.
PeterisP 6y ago
While it's not possible to duplicate an existing key, it is possible to create duplicate keys in the first place - you can't get the secrets out, but you can write identical secrets to two or more keys if you want to. This adds some convenience, though it also does add some risks e.g. in case of breach you can't tell which token was misused, you can't invalidate a lost key without invalidating others at the same time.