3 ms·
The easiest way to mitigate this is to require two-phase commits on any transaction above X% of the pool. A flash loan requires that the funds be returned befo
by dcolkitt 6y ago
The easiest way to mitigate this is to require two-phase commits on any transaction above X% of the pool.
A flash loan requires that the funds be returned before the end of a transaction. If removing funds is a two-step process, then by definition you can’t use attack it with a flash loan.
Of course there’s always the possibility of someone with that much capital to stake attacking. But the number of participants with $50 million in funds lying around is a lot less than the number with $0. It drastically shrinks the attack surface.
- v64 6y agoMaker had to do a similar two-phase mitigation after a flash loan was used to borrow enough MKR token to change the result of a governance vote. [1] [1] https://forum.makerdao.com/t/urgent-flash-loans-and-securing-the-maker-protocol/4901 https://forum.makerdao.com/t/urgent-flash-loans-and-securing...