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> I think this is an oversimplification, because in practice, there will be a gradient of people around the inflection point who would be willing to take less i
by AnthonyMouse 6y ago
> I think this is an oversimplification, because in practice, there will be a gradient of people around the inflection point who would be willing to take less in order to stop working, and that gradient will vary by the individual and by the job.
This is less of a problem than you would think, because the people for whom this is the case are the exact people who would already be in the "make it higher" camp.
Suppose you make $20,000/year from your job ($15,000 after tax) and then get a $12,000 UBI, so $27,000 in total. $12,000 is less than $27,000, but maybe if it was $15,000 and then you didn't have to work, you might be willing to take the pay cut. But this is the same person who benefits from raising it to $15,000 even if they continue to work; it doesn't change their vote.
Whereas the person making $52,000/year ($39,000 after tax, $51,000 after the UBI) is not going to be inclined to go from $51,000/year to $15,000/year even if it meant they didn't have to work, so all of those people are going to want to keep it at $12,000, to say nothing of anybody making more than that.
> Additionally, I can also imagine politicians promising increases to the UBI without concomitant tax increases, funded by bonds or other kind of financial mechanisms for monetary injection whose long-term negative externalities would be easy to obfuscate from voters.
But we have this problem already. It's an independent problem.
If you can find a way to stop it, do it. But if they're going to do it anyway then better that the money goes to everybody than that it goes to whichever cronies have the best lobbyists.