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It has been some years since I read about the original document leak, but as I recall, she shared documents from her workplace that either had printer steganogr
by walrus01 6y ago
It has been some years since I read about the original document leak, but as I recall, she shared documents from her workplace that either had printer steganography ID codes embedded into them (images in a raster scan of a paper document), or some form of digital stego IDs in electronic documents.
Basically not very different from how major motion picture studios embed some sort of unique ID code into the compressed video files given out pre-release, to reviewers (and workprints sent to 3rd party CGI studios) so that they can track down a leak.
None of which Winner was aware of the existence at the time. Some of those codes made it through to the reporting, and were published to the Internet, making it fairly easy for federal law enforcement to track her down.
I have also not seen any information saying that the journalists who received the documents, definitively were, or were not aware of the presence of the ID numbers stegoed into the documents.
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/06/the-mysterious-printer-code-that-could-have-led-the-fbi-to-reality-winner/529350/ https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/06/the-m...
https://blog.erratasec.com/2017/06/how-intercept-outed-reality-winner.html https://blog.erratasec.com/2017/06/how-intercept-outed-reali...
On a more meta level, it's a hard problem to solve with handling and publishing leaked documents, because on one side you have the vast resources of the NSA and the US intelligence community coming up with new steganographic and other methods to embed tracking ID numbers into documents. The full size, scale, budget and weight of various federal agencies' "counterintelligence" efforts.
And on the other side you have investigative journalists who do not have PhD level degrees in math/cryptography, and do not have the technical resources to definitely search through a huge pile of documents and say with 100% confidence that any possible tracking IDs have been stripped out.
I don't think I could reasonably expect a person from a journalism/liberal arts degree educational and work experience background to identify steganography.
- Fnoord 6y ago> It has been some years since I read about the original document leak, but as I recall, she shared documents from her workplace that either had printer steganography ID codes embedded into them (images in a raster scan of a paper document), or some form of digital stego IDs in electronic documents. All modern printers have this steganography feature. "In October 2004, consumers first heard of the hidden feature, when it was used by Dutch authorities to track down counterfeiters who had used a Canon color laser printer." [1] This is written in "PC World" in 2004 by journalist Wilbert de Vries. He now works for Tweakers, back then he worked for Webwereld. 2004 was mid-end heydays of Webwereld. I'm quite sure I read about this technology on Webwereld back then. Later on, this got covered on CCC as well, not sure which years. My point / opinion? The Intercept could have known (see above), and, given he nature of their content ([2]), should/ought to have known. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Machine_Identification_Code https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Machine_Identification_Code [2] The fact they had Greenwald/Poitras on board says enough (they were key figures in the Snowden leaks). You can look at their content from the era 2017 if in doubt.
- wyaeld 6y agoThe whole point was that the Intercept had specialist security experts on staff who know this, but the reporter rushed the story, told his own sources in the intelligence community critical info without realizing, and never actually spoke to the Intercept security team. The fact that the Editor-in-chief did not ensure their own processes were followed for an NSA leak is a failure.
- quesera 6y agoJournalists and office staff in First Look's line of business should definitely be aware of these risks. But it's certainly possible that they simply failed here. That possibility warrants an internal investigation, to determine the nature of the failure, and to signal internally and publically that they take their responsibility to sources seriously. No organization likes to be criticized from within. But some organizations are strengthened by their reaction to criticism (whatever the source), and others are diminished. Laura Poitras is a credible party. I'm inclined to believe her side of the story here. Related (though not directly): Bellingcat is doing impressive work. https://www.bellingcat.com/ https://www.bellingcat.com/
- threwaway4392 6y ago> I don't think I could reasonably expect a person from a journalism/liberal arts degree educational and work experience background to identify steganography. Typing the whole leaked document into a brand new Word file does not require experienced background and would protect your sources against most steganography tricks
- nitrogen 6y agomost steganography tricks There are still variations in word ordering, word choice, included/omitted subtle details, etc. to watch out for.
- _jal 6y ago> I don't think I could reasonably expect a person from a journalism/liberal arts degree educational and work experience background to identify steganography. I agree with nearly everything you said, except this. As others have noted, this sort of document tracing has been deployed and well-known for a long time. I would expect investigative journalists working the NatSec beat to have read a bit of other NetSec investigative journalism, and mention of things like this come up fairly regularly. Not to mention, contact with people like security researchers, EFF staff, etc. will all tend to expose you to information like this - it is part of the paranoid air people who discuss this stuff breathe. Also, a bit of tradecraft is just part of an investigative journalist's job. If I recall correctly, the Intercept people weren't accused (by anyone serious) of intentionally outing her, just of being dangerously incompetent to collaborate with.
- Melting_Harps 6y ago> It has been some years since I read about the original document leak, but as I recall, she shared documents from her workplace that either had printer steganography ID codes embedded into them (images in a raster scan of a paper document), or some form of digital stego IDs in electronic documents. Correct. > Finally, this was clearly careless on the part of the Intercept, no proof has ever been given that this was malicious, and I'm not seeing any here. Maybe not malicious, but definitely haphazard; they're dealing with incredibly sensitive information, from people in intelligence agenecies who do not hesitate to neutralize a potential threat. In all honesty, Reality got off easy, after the Snowden and Manning/Assange sagas it beceome clear the US has will not hesitation to chase people to the ends of the World, and in apply what the UN has stated to be torture in Assange's case, and outright inhumane pressure in Manning's case that has forced her to attempt suicide. I wouldn't be surprised if many of these leaks don't eventually end up with trips to a rendition camp under the guise of 'national security' the way some of the most jingoistic in Washington speak and vote and this goes for both R/D parties. I honestly want to see Laura on a massive platform like Joe Roan so she can go in depth on OPSEC and INFOSEC for the common non tech user told from her very relevant position and elaborate on the many misgivings from the Intercept--it's very telling that Glenn, Laura and Edward have all departed from it and there seems to be a common theme here. I'd also like to hear what Laura has to say about Jacob Applebaum's departure from the TOR Community for so long now, she touched on her relationship with him in her last documentary about Assange. I really miss Jacob's State of the Onion speeches at the CCC and him being a general thorn in in the side of most Nation states security apparatuses. Something never really felt right about his rape accusations, as they tried to get Julian on similar charges in Sweden with nearly no evidence and just a massive media campaign, but succeed in making Jacob a pariah as he is no where to be seen--even when his close friend and possible mentor Assange was wasting away in jail.
- Stierlitz 6y ago> .. as I recall, she shared documents from her workplace that either had printer steganography ID codes embedded into them .. None of which Winner was aware of the existence at the time .. An 'intelligence specialist' doesn't know about protecting the source, I don't think so ;]