I hadn’t thought of it from the perspective of historical data, thanks for that insight. The existence of a law enforcement tool to watch the screen of a speci

I hadn’t thought of it from the perspective of historical data, thanks for that insight. The existence of a law enforcement tool to watch the screen of a specific device at a specific set of times does seem more palatable than the existence of such a tool to decrypt any data stream. 1. Arbitrarily constrains the surveillance to taps on the device itself 2. Tapping the infrastructure would be unnecessarily redundant 3. Given the contemporary security landscape of vulnerable chip architectures and remote access vulnerabilities, the existence of an unpatchable vulnerability (“backdoor”) enabling a sophisticated attacker (“government office with the keys”) to get read-only, remote screen capture just seems like less of a security risk than other, non-hypothetical vulnerabilities that already exist. Not sure how you’d secure those keys though, or what you’d do if they got stolen, but I imagine that it wouldn’t be dramatically different than secure boot key handling. Anyone have insight to that side of things?