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The exact same flaw (your party might misuse the system and expose secrets) exists in the design of PGP/GPG and whenever it comes up in that context it's a reas
by na85 6y ago
The exact same flaw (your party might misuse the system and expose secrets) exists in the design of PGP/GPG and whenever it comes up in that context it's a reason to throw GPG into the garbage disposal. But when it's an Apple product suddenly the product is fine and it's the parties' fault for not using it properly?
Why the disconnect?
- gruez 6y ago>The exact same flaw exists in the design of PGP/GPG and whenever it comes up in that context it's a reason to throw GPG into the garbage disposal. I literally never heard of this. There are problems with PGP (eg. no forward secrecy, non-reputability, unencrypted headers) but "your counterparty could be compromised" isn't one of them.
- na85 6y agoI'm referring to "your counterparty can hit reply-all and forget to encrypt" which is a mistake in the same category as "your counterparty might have backups enabled", i.e. it's easy to misuse in a way that ends up defeating secrecy.
- upofadown 6y agoI think the reference is to the idea that a correspondent might do a unencrypted CC of a message that contains previously encrypted text as per this infamous anti-PGP rant: * https://latacora.micro.blog/2019/07/16/the-pgp-problem.html https://latacora.micro.blog/2019/07/16/the-pgp-problem.html