4 ms·

Why us it poor? (Genuinely asking).

user-the-name 6y ago
No real push to use sandboxing or to limit access to personal information. Any app you install can do anything it wants with all of your data.
- fsflover 6y ago
  Can't you run apps on behalf of restricted users?
  - vaduz 6y ago
    Via CLI you can, but GUI apps connect to your X server session, and then the fun begins - any application you allow to connect can essentially capture your keyboard, mouse, clipboard and a ton of other fun things,as there is no sandboxing applied between them. It's inherent in the design of the X protocol. There are solutions that are intended to force the sandboxing by opening a new Xserver for every application, e.g. Firejail [0], but that comes with another set of interoperability problems. Wayland was supposed to address some of these concerns, but it will only do so for applications that natively talk wayland protocol, not the ones that connect through x-protocol via xwayland [0] https://firejail.wordpress.com/ https://firejail.wordpress.com/
    - fsflover 6y ago
      I expected that Wayland isolates the applications by default, not just when they allow it. So you might be interested in Qubes OS, which provides a very strong isolation through virtualization.
      - vaduz 6y ago
        XWayland is essentially a translation layer consisting of Xserver and Wayland client [0]. Therefore it has all the same problems a normal Xserver has, which they do acknowledge: > A Wayland compositor usually spawns only one Xwayland instance. This is because many X11 applications assume they can communicate with other X11 applications through the X server, and this requires a shared X server instance. This also means that Xwayland does not protect nor isolate X11 clients from each other, unless the Wayland compositor specifically chooses to break the X11 client intercommunications by spawning application specific Xwayland instances. X11 clients are naturally isolated from Wayland clients. I use QubesOS, but it comes with its own set of problems as well. [0] https://wayland.freedesktop.org/docs/html/ch05.html https://wayland.freedesktop.org/docs/html/ch05.html
        Joe_Cool 6y ago
        That does not sound different from what Windows does. By default all programs running under the same user can access all windows of other applications (except UAC elevated ones). It's a relic from when OLE and Clipboard in Windows 3 just was (very simplified) a pointer to RAM.
        vaduz 6y ago
        The only reason it is worse with X11 is that it is an inherently networked protocol, so the same statements also apply to any remote connections you might allow to your X server. It also makes it somewhat easier to capture Xkb / Xinput events purely through API, without need for any elevation or excessive polling of the devices ("it just works"). That includes any systems you might have SSHed into with X forwarding enabled, as it automatically extends the trust there. Yes, your ssh client might try to enable X SECURITY extension (which clamps acesss to just the current window), but it is disabled by default or bypassed anyway by the users as that extension is known to crash quite a few programs. Both are a product of their time when the prevailing approach was to trust the programs you run.
  - user-the-name 6y ago
    Not easily, no. Doing so is a big kludge, rather than being part of a system actually designed to offer useful security measures.
- tremon 6y ago
  I know, it's amazing, isn't it? Just think of the amazing possibilities this new "general-purpose computing" could unlock!
  - user-the-name 6y ago
    Claiming that a lack of security is a feature, actually, is not a great strategy.
- oauea 6y ago
  This definitely is a feature. You can use sandboxing if you want to. See kernel namespaces (used by Docker), Ubuntu's snaps, etc. But breaking almost all software by default just because some incompetent users keep choosing to install malware is not a great strategy.
  - sneak 6y ago
    It isn't the dichotomy you set it up to be. macOS solved this without "breaking almost all software by default" using per-app, per-directory permissions for the file system, over and above the decades-old POSIX file modes model. You're making excuses for the lack of security innovation on Linux workstations. They've fallen behind.
    - oauea 6y ago
      To be frank, Mac is not a model I would want to follow. I am the sysadmin and owner of my machine, not Apple or some other organization. They have no business telling me what software I can and can't run, or what files that software can access.
      - user-the-name 6y ago
        They do neither.
        oauea 6y ago
        They most definitely do, using their developer program. Look up Apple vs Epic for a case where they weaponized this.
        user-the-name 6y ago
        You can run any software you want on macOS. You can't publish any software you want on the App Store.
        6y ago

No real push to use sandboxing or to limit access to personal information. Any app you install can do anything it wants with all of your data.

fsflover 6y ago
Can't you run apps on behalf of restricted users?
- vaduz 6y ago
  Via CLI you can, but GUI apps connect to your X server session, and then the fun begins - any application you allow to connect can essentially capture your keyboard, mouse, clipboard and a ton of other fun things,as there is no sandboxing applied between them. It's inherent in the design of the X protocol. There are solutions that are intended to force the sandboxing by opening a new Xserver for every application, e.g. Firejail [0], but that comes with another set of interoperability problems. Wayland was supposed to address some of these concerns, but it will only do so for applications that natively talk wayland protocol, not the ones that connect through x-protocol via xwayland [0] https://firejail.wordpress.com/ https://firejail.wordpress.com/
  - fsflover 6y ago
    I expected that Wayland isolates the applications by default, not just when they allow it. So you might be interested in Qubes OS, which provides a very strong isolation through virtualization.
    - vaduz 6y ago
      XWayland is essentially a translation layer consisting of Xserver and Wayland client [0]. Therefore it has all the same problems a normal Xserver has, which they do acknowledge: > A Wayland compositor usually spawns only one Xwayland instance. This is because many X11 applications assume they can communicate with other X11 applications through the X server, and this requires a shared X server instance. This also means that Xwayland does not protect nor isolate X11 clients from each other, unless the Wayland compositor specifically chooses to break the X11 client intercommunications by spawning application specific Xwayland instances. X11 clients are naturally isolated from Wayland clients. I use QubesOS, but it comes with its own set of problems as well. [0] https://wayland.freedesktop.org/docs/html/ch05.html https://wayland.freedesktop.org/docs/html/ch05.html
      - Joe_Cool 6y ago
        That does not sound different from what Windows does. By default all programs running under the same user can access all windows of other applications (except UAC elevated ones). It's a relic from when OLE and Clipboard in Windows 3 just was (very simplified) a pointer to RAM.
        vaduz 6y ago
        The only reason it is worse with X11 is that it is an inherently networked protocol, so the same statements also apply to any remote connections you might allow to your X server. It also makes it somewhat easier to capture Xkb / Xinput events purely through API, without need for any elevation or excessive polling of the devices ("it just works"). That includes any systems you might have SSHed into with X forwarding enabled, as it automatically extends the trust there. Yes, your ssh client might try to enable X SECURITY extension (which clamps acesss to just the current window), but it is disabled by default or bypassed anyway by the users as that extension is known to crash quite a few programs. Both are a product of their time when the prevailing approach was to trust the programs you run.
- user-the-name 6y ago
  Not easily, no. Doing so is a big kludge, rather than being part of a system actually designed to offer useful security measures.
tremon 6y ago
I know, it's amazing, isn't it? Just think of the amazing possibilities this new "general-purpose computing" could unlock!
- user-the-name 6y ago
  Claiming that a lack of security is a feature, actually, is not a great strategy.
oauea 6y ago
This definitely is a feature. You can use sandboxing if you want to. See kernel namespaces (used by Docker), Ubuntu's snaps, etc. But breaking almost all software by default just because some incompetent users keep choosing to install malware is not a great strategy.
- sneak 6y ago
  It isn't the dichotomy you set it up to be. macOS solved this without "breaking almost all software by default" using per-app, per-directory permissions for the file system, over and above the decades-old POSIX file modes model. You're making excuses for the lack of security innovation on Linux workstations. They've fallen behind.
  - oauea 6y ago
    To be frank, Mac is not a model I would want to follow. I am the sysadmin and owner of my machine, not Apple or some other organization. They have no business telling me what software I can and can't run, or what files that software can access.
    - user-the-name 6y ago
      They do neither.
      - oauea 6y ago
        They most definitely do, using their developer program. Look up Apple vs Epic for a case where they weaponized this.
        user-the-name 6y ago
        You can run any software you want on macOS. You can't publish any software you want on the App Store.
        6y ago