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This firewall issue isn't the only privacy feature strip from Big Sur release. Unfortunately no big media care about other huge problem Apple introduced. My on

by SXX 6y ago

This firewall issue isn't the only privacy feature strip from Big Sur release. Unfortunately no big media care about other huge problem Apple introduced. My only hope they will also fix full disk encryption in this update. Since Big Sur broken installation of macOS on passphrase-encrypted disk partitions. I bought into M1 hype and now it's end up that you no longer able to have separate password for the disk encryption.

orf 6y ago
Most users don’t want a separate password for disk encryption though, so I’m not sure it’s a huge problem?
- La1n 6y ago
  Most users probably also didn't care about the first-party firewall exemptions. They could have asked people if they wanted a separate password for disk encryption (e.g. a small checkbox).
  - fpoling 6y ago
    It is highly non-trivial to extract private key from Apple encryption chips, last time I heared the price is at least 100K USD, and probably much higher now. So unless one values own secrets that high, a short password could be OK.
- webmobdev 6y ago
  It's about choice and control over your data - an educated user knows that with hardware encryption, it is very difficult to retrieve data if the hardware fails. There's also the trust factor where you would prefer to have the keys, rather than trust some device. (E.g. Some Western Digital drives have problems with their hardware encryption and made the data on it irretrievable for many - https://github.com/andlabs/reallymine/issues/53 https://github.com/andlabs/reallymine/issues/53 . More here - https://carltonbale.com/western-digital-mybook-drive-lock-encryption-failure-and-recovery/ https://carltonbale.com/western-digital-mybook-drive-lock-en...). What is being questioned and criticized is the removal of this choice. Especially when a product claims a commitment to privacy.
- ddtaylor 6y ago
  IMO that's a big problem. They are completely different risk categories. My FDE password is absurdly long and complicated, since I never want someone who gains physical access to get all my data, but my Linux user account password isn't as long since it's main purpose is to stop someone from getting passed my lock screen if I was to leave my system unattended.
  - mvanbaak 6y ago
    Both are 'physical access'. If one does not power down your system, your FDE is unlocked. So they only need your Linux user account password to get access to the data on your disk. FDE only protects your data when it's locked. Normally this is when your system is shut down.
    - KraftKacke 6y ago
      Separation is still recommended. Storage encryption can be attacked differently than a running system.
    - GekkePrutser 6y ago
      True but it's a slightly different category as he wouldn't leave his system on but locked in a potential high risk scenario.
      - jiofih 6y ago
        You mean he would shut down a MacBook every day after us? That’s blasphemy.
        fpoling 6y ago
        At least with 10.15 and earlier you can configure MacOS to hybernate after certain amount of time when it will ask for FDE password on wake up and load everything from the disk.
    - ddtaylor 6y ago
my123 6y ago
On the M1, that's by design. If you install macOS on an external volume it doesn't have that behaviour. On the internal disk, it's there because they carried over the iOS infrastructure, where your login password is the FDE one. macOS also now boots before asking for your password, like iOS. (the OS volume itself isn't encrypted and is read-only, the data volume is encrypted with your password)
- SXX 6y ago
  How do you know it's "by design"? By default macOS was always using this encryption scheme, but there was always possibility to have an optional FDE. Now this is broken and I can't even manage to get macOS installed when any encrypted partition is present since it's also cause installer to fail. I obviously find it being absolutely terrible "design" decision since there no way on earth anyone can count disk encryption key that is unlockable by user password or faceid secure. PS: If someone have any idea how having separate boot password can be hacked aroud I'll really appreciate the advice.
  - my123 6y ago
    Apple Silicon Macs use per-file encryption tied to the credentials: https://support.apple.com/en-gb/guide/security/secf6276da8a/web https://support.apple.com/en-gb/guide/security/secf6276da8a/... Was carried over from iOS. A way to bypass it _should_ be possible, but will entail having the System volume of the volume group to have different properties than the Data part. Otherwise the OS will fail to load. (on Apple Silicon Macs, macOS is fully booted already when you input the password, so if you encrypt macOS...) On older Macs, a Preboot UEFI application application prompts you for the password prior to booting. What you can do as a workaround: Create a second account which you'll only use to unlock the drive and then run sudo fdesetup add -usertoadd unlockUser and then sudo fdesetup remove -user PrimaryUser. That'll give the rights to unlock the drive only to that unlock user. You can also use sudo fdesetup removerecovery -personal to destroy the ability of the recovery key to unlock the drive.
    - SXX 6y ago
_underfl0w_ 6y ago
Is it no longer possible to set a separate password by reformatting the disk in Recovery to one of the "Encrypted" options before (re-)installing to that volume? That's how I set up multiple passwords for FDE on a recent hackintosh build, but I don't have an M1 and this wasn't Big Sur, so maybe I'm missing something obvious that has changed lately and I'm way off-base. It had to manually be done in that order though, otherwise it defaulted to the user account password for FDE.
fpoling 6y ago
Hm, isn’t the trick is to have a separated account just to boot into with a strong password and remove the primary account from a set of accounts allowed to unlock the disk? I have used that on older macos not to bother with reinstallation of os to enable password-encrypted partition.

by SXX 6y ago

orf 6y ago

Most users don’t want a separate password for disk encryption though, so I’m not sure it’s a huge problem?

La1n 6y ago
Most users probably also didn't care about the first-party firewall exemptions. They could have asked people if they wanted a separate password for disk encryption (e.g. a small checkbox).
- fpoling 6y ago
  It is highly non-trivial to extract private key from Apple encryption chips, last time I heared the price is at least 100K USD, and probably much higher now. So unless one values own secrets that high, a short password could be OK.
webmobdev 6y ago
It's about choice and control over your data - an educated user knows that with hardware encryption, it is very difficult to retrieve data if the hardware fails. There's also the trust factor where you would prefer to have the keys, rather than trust some device. (E.g. Some Western Digital drives have problems with their hardware encryption and made the data on it irretrievable for many - https://github.com/andlabs/reallymine/issues/53 https://github.com/andlabs/reallymine/issues/53 . More here - https://carltonbale.com/western-digital-mybook-drive-lock-encryption-failure-and-recovery/ https://carltonbale.com/western-digital-mybook-drive-lock-en...). What is being questioned and criticized is the removal of this choice. Especially when a product claims a commitment to privacy.
ddtaylor 6y ago
IMO that's a big problem. They are completely different risk categories. My FDE password is absurdly long and complicated, since I never want someone who gains physical access to get all my data, but my Linux user account password isn't as long since it's main purpose is to stop someone from getting passed my lock screen if I was to leave my system unattended.
- mvanbaak 6y ago
  Both are 'physical access'. If one does not power down your system, your FDE is unlocked. So they only need your Linux user account password to get access to the data on your disk. FDE only protects your data when it's locked. Normally this is when your system is shut down.
  - KraftKacke 6y ago
    Separation is still recommended. Storage encryption can be attacked differently than a running system.
  - GekkePrutser 6y ago
    True but it's a slightly different category as he wouldn't leave his system on but locked in a potential high risk scenario.
    - jiofih 6y ago
      You mean he would shut down a MacBook every day after us? That’s blasphemy.
      - fpoling 6y ago
        At least with 10.15 and earlier you can configure MacOS to hybernate after certain amount of time when it will ask for FDE password on wake up and load everything from the disk.
  - ddtaylor 6y ago

my123 6y ago

On the M1, that's by design. If you install macOS on an external volume it doesn't have that behaviour. On the internal disk, it's there because they carried over the iOS infrastructure, where your login password is the FDE one. macOS also now boots before asking for your password, like iOS. (the OS volume itself isn't encrypted and is read-only, the data volume is encrypted with your password)

SXX 6y ago
How do you know it's "by design"? By default macOS was always using this encryption scheme, but there was always possibility to have an optional FDE. Now this is broken and I can't even manage to get macOS installed when any encrypted partition is present since it's also cause installer to fail. I obviously find it being absolutely terrible "design" decision since there no way on earth anyone can count disk encryption key that is unlockable by user password or faceid secure. PS: If someone have any idea how having separate boot password can be hacked aroud I'll really appreciate the advice.
- my123 6y ago
  Apple Silicon Macs use per-file encryption tied to the credentials: https://support.apple.com/en-gb/guide/security/secf6276da8a/web https://support.apple.com/en-gb/guide/security/secf6276da8a/... Was carried over from iOS. A way to bypass it _should_ be possible, but will entail having the System volume of the volume group to have different properties than the Data part. Otherwise the OS will fail to load. (on Apple Silicon Macs, macOS is fully booted already when you input the password, so if you encrypt macOS...) On older Macs, a Preboot UEFI application application prompts you for the password prior to booting. What you can do as a workaround: Create a second account which you'll only use to unlock the drive and then run sudo fdesetup add -usertoadd unlockUser and then sudo fdesetup remove -user PrimaryUser. That'll give the rights to unlock the drive only to that unlock user. You can also use sudo fdesetup removerecovery -personal to destroy the ability of the recovery key to unlock the drive.
  - SXX 6y ago

_underfl0w_ 6y ago

Is it no longer possible to set a separate password by reformatting the disk in Recovery to one of the "Encrypted" options before (re-)installing to that volume? That's how I set up multiple passwords for FDE on a recent hackintosh build, but I don't have an M1 and this wasn't Big Sur, so maybe I'm missing something obvious that has changed lately and I'm way off-base. It had to manually be done in that order though, otherwise it defaulted to the user account password for FDE.

fpoling 6y ago

Hm, isn’t the trick is to have a separated account just to boot into with a strong password and remove the primary account from a set of accounts allowed to unlock the disk? I have used that on older macos not to bother with reinstallation of os to enable password-encrypted partition.