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"Serious buyers only: solarleaks@protonmail.com - - Q: Is this really happening? Can you provide proof? A: Yes and yes. Q: Why no more details? A: We aren't f
by liquidify 6y ago
"Serious buyers only: solarleaks@protonmail.com
- -
Q: Is this really happening? Can you provide proof?
A: Yes and yes.
Q: Why no more details?
A: We aren't fully done yet and we want to preserve the most of our current access. Consider this a first batch.
Q: I'm [vendor] and want my data back?
A: Talk to us.
Q: Why not leak it for free?
A: Nothing comes free in this world.
Q: How to buy?
A: Contact us for more information."
These don't sound like things that the Russian government or any nation state would be saying.
Makes the U.S. intelligence / media look stupid. And if it turns out that it is some individuals that happen to live in Russia, it still makes the U.S. look stupid.
- willxinc 6y agoAre the US intelligence community / media saying that the attack was by the Russians?
- 1MachineElf 6y agoYes https://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/532756-us-intel-agencies-blame-russia-for-massive-solarwinds-hack https://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/532756-us-intel-age...
- willxinc 6y agoAh, thanks for the source / context.
- zwp 6y agoWashington Post attributed the attack to Russian actor APT29/Cozy Bear on Dec 14th [1], quoting unnamed sources. FireEye [2] Dec 13th & Volexity [3] Dec 14th were more cautious, citing an unknown actor that they dubbed UNC2452, and Dark Halo, respectively. Recorded Future made a fair but ultimately inconclusive case for Chinese attribution [4], Dec 30th. US gov/CISA continues to claim "Russian linked" [5], Jan 5th. Kaspersky reported a link to the Kazuar malware used by Russian actor Turla [6], Jan 11th. CrowdStrike's report on the malware injector [7], Jan 11th says "does not attribute the SUNSPOT implant, SUNBURST backdoor or TEARDROP post-exploitation tool to any known adversary". [1] https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/russian-government-spies-are-behind-a-broad-hacking-campaign-that-has-breached-us-agencies-and-a-top-cyber-firm/2020/12/13/d5a53b88-3d7d-11eb-9453-fc36ba051781_story.html https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/russian-gov... [2] https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/evasive-attacker-leverages-solarwinds-supply-chain-compromises-with-sunburst-backdoor.html https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/evasive... [3] https://www.volexity.com/blog/2020/12/14/dark-halo-leverages-solarwinds-compromise-to-breach-organizations/ https://www.volexity.com/blog/2020/12/14/dark-halo-leverages... [4] https://www.recordedfuture.com/solarwinds-attribution/ https://www.recordedfuture.com/solarwinds-attribution/ [5] https://www.cisa.gov/news/2021/01/05/joint-statement-federal-bureau-investigation-fbi-cybersecurity-and-infrastructure https://www.cisa.gov/news/2021/01/05/joint-statement-federal... [6] https://securelist.com/sunburst-backdoor-kazuar/99981/ https://securelist.com/sunburst-backdoor-kazuar/99981/ [7] https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/sunspot-malware-technical-analysis/ https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/sunspot-malware-technical-a...
- lemonspat 6y agoThat's an impressively detailed response. Did you happen to track all these kinds of quotes routinely for your own research, or are you that good at finding this info that quickly.
- willxinc 6y agoAhh interesting, thanks for the response. Surprisingly enough, Kaspersky also attributed it to a Russian APT, so I'm still not sure about the parent post's claim that it makes the US look stupid, if it's the global intelligence community saying so.
- liquidify 6y agoNo evidence has every been shown. It is easy to site a lot of people parroting the idea that it came from Russia, but aside from some vague connections, there is 0 hard evidence. If you were an Israeli, Iranian, Chinese, etc... hacker, you would obviously tunnel through servers in foreign countries that were easy scapegoats. So even if there was actual evidence (which there isn't) it still wouldn't mean anything unless it could be tracked back to an originating IP and connected to an individual with a motive and without an alibi. The benefits of blaming things on Russia for certain political parties are obvious, but those politicians and media members continue to make claims while never presenting any evidence, so you really have to ask yourself what is more likely to be true; A bunch of vapid politicians self benefitting claims without evidence, or the far more obvious possibility that a group of techie people from some random country hacked an easy target for money. Occam's razor say it is the later.
- deleted 6y ago[deleted]
- intern4tional 6y agoSo, attribution doesn't work that way. During an active incident, attribution details are not published. This incident still has people responding to it, and potentially further impacted victims. Indicators of compromise are published to allow for entities to hunt for malware or evidence of breach within their environments, but details that directly attribute a particular strain of malware to a threat actor are generally not shared (at least with the general public). Publishing those details could cause the threat actor to change those details and therefore evade detection and persist in impacted environments. Let's take the Google breach of 2009, known as Operation Aurora as an example (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Aurora https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Aurora). China was claimed to be the culprit at the time, but it was not until three years later that Fireeye / Mandiant finally published the details that were used to track and identify the threat actor as part of their APT1 report (https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2013/02/mandiant-exposes-apt1-chinas-cyber-espionage-units.html https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2013/02/mandian...). In this particular case, even though the known impacted entity count is around 250, around 18 thousand entities downloaded the backdoored version of SolarWinds and are at risk. Publishing attribution details now could negatively impact their response. When respected entities in the field make a claim on attribution, generally it is accepted as if those entities were lying, their service (and potentially some of their executives as they are publicly traded in some cases) would go to jail. It's important to note that each responding team will have access to different data sources and be able to make different claims as a result. CrowdStrike declined to do attribution, whereas FireEye was more definitive with naming a group. This is likely as FireEye was impacted first hand and was able to capture indicators that are not public. (One of the steps of IR is containment, where you observe a threat actors activity to figure out where they are in your environment, so you literally get to watch them some.) The people in charge of the various government agencies are politicians without experience in this area true, but they are briefed and educated by the experts that do have experience in that space. Likewise, Washington Post is known for vetting stories in this space carefully. At this stage in the game, it is highly unlikely it is not Russia, as this sales pitch is very similar to when Russian associated actors leaked the NSA toolset. It too was advertised for sale via bitcoin (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Shadow_Brokers https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Shadow_Brokers). Anyways, if you're interested in this space, go find your local incident response (DFIR) meetup and ask how they track malware families. IP addresses are probably not one of their best signals for who made malware or executed an attack.
- saltedonion 6y agoMaybe that’s the entire point
- sudosysgen 6y agoWhile that's possible, pushed far enough this line of reasoning is unfalsifiable and evidence is thin either way.
- ryanlol 6y ago> These don't sound like things that the Russian government or any nation state would be saying. Why not? Sharing stolen source costs them nothing, and nation state hackers have budgets just like the rest of us. They probably wouldn’t even get in big trouble for selling this stuff and using the money to buy themselves lambos, a nice bonus on top of the government hacker salary.
- Proven 6y agoBecause by giving away the data, they leak info about who did it.
- throwaway99252 6y ago>a nice bonus on top of the government hacker salary. The current narrative is that they aren't on payroll or under orders, but instead individuals or groups within the collective (cozy bear) act on their own initiative to win putin's favor.
- ryanlol 6y ago>The current narrative According to whom?
- anewaccount2021 6y agoUS digital infrastructure is the ultimate soft target. I assume for every SolarWinds we hear about, there are others that the government squashes due to sheer embarrassment or national security concerns.
- naikrovek 6y ago> Q: Why not leak it for free? A: Nothing comes free in this world. They didn't pay to get that data they're now charging money for. "Nothing is free when we're offering it" they should say.
- nhumrich 6y agoWe pay for things with money and time. They absolutely "paid" for the money if you consider the amount of time they probably put into it.
- ymosy 6y agoRussia behaved exactly the same after the DNC hack. They made up a story about some Romanian hacker called Guccifer but their cover up was debunked by Vice: https://www.vice.com/en/article/wnxgwq/guccifer-20-is-likely-a-russian-government-attempt-to-cover-up-their-own-hack https://www.vice.com/en/article/wnxgwq/guccifer-20-is-likely...
- ymosy 6y agoAccording to https://www.srcbeat.com/2021/01/solarleaks/ https://www.srcbeat.com/2021/01/solarleaks/ their email sent to solarleaks@protonmail.com bounced back with "Address does not exist" error.
- ALittleLight 6y agoI was about to check if I could register it, but then thought that might be a bad idea.
- freebuju 6y agoLol. Proton mail has strong encryption and is hosted in one of the most strongest jurisdictions in the world as regards privacy laws. Nothing to worry about :) Tutanota on the other hand lost a court battle in Germany and had to give up email data from one of their suspected-to-be-criminal clients [0] 0:https://www.cyberscoop.com/germany-court-ruling-tutanota-email-monitoring/ https://www.cyberscoop.com/germany-court-ruling-tutanota-ema...
- freeflight 6y agoThe whole basis of Vice debunk is "Nobody heard of a Guccifer 2.0 persona before", which is not exactly strong evidence for anything. Particularly considering Guccifer is a real person and referencing other hackers not that unheard of.
- Thorentis 6y ago> The main element pointing to Russia is the timeline of the events. I didn't realize the bar for "debunking" had become so low.
- shbooms 6y ago> These don't sound like things that the Russian government or any nation state would be saying. I mean this could just be an attempt to make it _seem_ like it's not a nation state. One way to essentially guarntee that it _was_ a nation state is for the stolen data to never turn up for sale to the public/back to the owners as we would naturally assume whoever the actor was was happy just keeping everything to themselves, something only a nation state would ever really do. a non-nation state's only real motivation would be financial and so if no evidence of that ever came about, the only real alternative would be to assume it was a nation state.
- michaelt 6y agoWell, or the hack was by some greyhat/kid who realised they were in over their head and that keeping evidence of their crime around was a dumb move.
- deleted 6y ago[deleted]
- freeflight 6y ago> These don't sound like things that the Russian government or any nation state would be saying. This goes both ways: Or they would be exactly the kind of things a government would say to dispel any notion of it being a government. > Makes the U.S. intelligence / media look stupid. And if it turns out that it is some individuals that happen to live in Russia, it still makes the U.S. look stupid. I wonder whatever happened to that whole mantra of the early 2000s and 2010s when governments would regurgitate the difficulty in dealing with "cyber" due to the "asymmetric" nature of "cyber warfare"? Somehow that was completely forgotten over the last decade in favor of blaming any and all InfoSec breaches instantly on some state actor. One has to wonder how much of that is just deflecting from bad practices with "The enemy is a state, nothing we could do to defend against an attacker that powerful!" in favor over admitting "Yeah some autistic dude in his parents basement pwned all our stuff because our security is completely amateurish".