10 ms·
Molly for Android: A fork of Signal for Android with passphrase lock
- kitkat_new 6y agoWhen is there going to be legal action? https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=17723973 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=17723973
- jayp1418 6y agoNo legal action as long as they dont use word "Signal" anywhere. Molly is good client
- kuschku 6y agoActually, if they use the [edit: official backend servers] of Signal, moxie is still going to threaten to sue them into oblivion again. The objection to libresignal wasn't just based on the name. That's why signal isn't actually FLOSS.
- bildung 6y agoThats wrong, the backend is FLOSS and available here: https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-Server https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-Server What is potentially problematic is not the usage of the same backend but of the same actual servers.
- kuschku 6y agoFixed the comment, but then again, either Molly users will only ever be able to chat with other Molly users, or Moxie is going to threaten them.
- GekkePrutser 6y agoYeah this is why I'll never view Signal as a real Whatsapp replacement. It fixes some of WA's issues but not many. There's still no federation and the ban on third-party apps makes it very hard to connect it to anything else.. I want fewer chat apps, not another new one alongside everything else :) The mautrix-weechat bridge to Matrix uses the actual production Signal desktop client so they don't block it, but it's super wasteful because of this, it uses almost 1GB of memory just to relay some messages :P And it also uses your phone number as ID, doesn't allow integration with bots like Telegram does do, etc. It's ok for a small niche of people needing super secure chats but it's not the be-all end-all chat app. So I recommended everyone around me against Signal as a Whatsapp replacement.. We should move to something that is solving all the problems, not just some of them. I think it's crucial that the network itself is just as open as the software, otherwise Signal can be sold and we end up with the same mess as Whatsapp once more (remember Whatsapp actually used to be a pretty decent IM app before Facebook took it over). Open protocols have been the building blocks of the internet and this fragmentation is making it a mess. I think Matrix is the way to go, I just wish they could simplify their E2E a bit.. Right now it's too much in the way in terms of user experience.
- zaroth 6y agoThe last commit on that branch is April, 2020 so I can't imagine that's kept up-to-date?
- akvadrako 6y agoWhat is the legal basis for blocking a third-party client which doesn't abuse any trademarks? The Signal source is GPL 3.0, so definitely libre.
- bildung 6y agoThe source code licence has nothing to do with the right to access a particular service. Additionally, the organization behind signal is not bound to the licence, they can do whatever they want with their own code, it's their code after all. If the server code is licenced as AGPL3 that grants others particular rights in addition to those granted by regular law, under particular constraints, to use and modify said source code, and thus enables e.g. Molly to provide their own servers.
- sneak 6y agoUsing the official client also has nothing to do with the right to access a particular service. I think it would be a losing battle for OWS to go after a popular forked client that talks to the official OWS signal servers.
- akvadrako 6y agoThey are unrelated but the grandparent made two points. They said it wasn't FOSS, but it is; that only depends on the license. My question was what prevents a third party from connecting to Signal's servers.
- angry_octet 6y agoThe main problem with projects like these is that I don't know (without manually checking myself) whether they are actually tracking the Signal source code effectively. Building Signal isn't exactly straightforward (just due to Android/iOS crud). We need something like build attestation from reproducible builds to be extendable to slightly different source codes. Other than that, love it. Now to add iOS backups and cross platform imports... And strip out gifs (or at least make them disabled for me). And force by default unknown callers to go via a relay... So many wishlist items which are probably wasted effort because they will bit rot without being accepted by Signal.
- asddubs 6y agodoes signal not accept pull requests or something? currently there's two signal forks on the frontpage, would be much better to upstream the effort if that's viable
- kuschku 6y agoSignal accepts pull requests theoretically, they just usually reject everything.
- asddubs 6y agoi looked at the history and it seems they just close them even when they merge them, and then merge them via their own commits. but you can see them accepting stuff in the comments of the closed pull requests
- bjt2n3904 6y agoSignal is my go-to messenger. I use it exclusively, and have advocated others to move to it. There are many sore points with Signal that are well known, but Molly has pointed out a significant one. I simply do not trust the OS exclusively to keep the messages secure at rest. The fact that I could use a passphrase, swipe pattern, or other mechanism to encrypt the database separately from Android was a boon, and I'm greatly saddened that they have removed that feature. Perhaps a second layer of encryption doesn't really matter all that much. If Android's security is as bad as I think it is, then a second layer might just amount to security by obscurity. But it's the principle of things. angry_octet raises an excellent point. I wish this would return as a mainstream feature.
- faitswulff 6y agoFrom what I understand, Signal messages should really only be considered encrypted in flight. At either end the massage could be picked up by an insecure device (custom keyboard, keylogger, screenshots, etc.), and a determined hacker will be able to compromise any casual user’s phone. Still, there’s value in encrypting in-flight messages.
- Zhenya 6y agoOr any app/bt device that has access to notification (if your settings allow the message content to appear in the notification). Great example is Android Wear.
- spuz 6y agoWhen I installed Signal recently I was asked for a passphrase. What is this passphrase used for if not to encrypt my messages?
- gergely 6y agoYou might be thinking about Signal PIN: https://support.signal.org/hc/en-us/articles/360007059792-Signal-PIN https://support.signal.org/hc/en-us/articles/360007059792-Si...
- spuz 6y agoYes exactly. When I look at the settings in the app it says "PINS keep information stored with Signal encrypted only you can access it." However the page that you linked does not mention encryption. I can't see anywhere explain exactly what the PIN does. Does it encrypt your data or not?
- Conlectus 6y agoAny reasonable length pin would not contain enough information to act as a safe encryption key; it would be too easy to brute force.
- Wingman4l7 6y agoDepends on if the app itself rate-limits attempts, or destroys the encrypted content after a set number of attempts.
- zaroth 6y agoThis would only be true as long as whatever the decryption algorithm is, it is not possible to run it off of the device, or otherwise interrupt the process of resetting the counter used to decide to rate-limit or self-destruct. Famously older iPhones were susceptible to resetting the 'Invalid Attempts to Unlock' counter that the iPhone stored in the Secure Element to workaround the PIN rate-limit, by halting the CPU before it had a chance to increment the value, but right after it returned the pass/fail result. So Signal could be entangling this PIN with a key from the Secure Enclave, and then trying to securely increment a counter inside the Secure Enclave to implement exponential rate-limiting and self-destruct, but it would be tricky to implement correctly.
- 2Gkashmiri 6y agowhy cannot signal foss server be built to be installed like any other sane service on a server and apps that just support custom urls? its not rocket science
- lucideer 6y agoThe main signal developer (Moxie Marlinspike) is strongly against this architecture and won't accept either 3rd-party apps using the Signal servers, nor the main Signal client using 3rd-party servers.
- 2Gkashmiri 6y agoSo whats the point having a Foss setup? Its not for promoting clients and servers? Why dont they instead say its source visible, peope can point put vulnerabilities and all because thats what it is at the end of day today. Pretending to be Foss and then not allowing third party clients, servers is not nice imo
- aidenn0 6y agoYou can fork the signal client and server and setup a competing network. You just won't be allowed on the official Signal network. That's the entire point of FOSS. Open source vs. open network are fairly orthogonal. AIM and ICQ were never open source, but had several 3rd party clients. Outlook is closed-source, but still federates with other e-mail servers. I'll use an open-hardware analogy. Let's say there's a open-hardware go kart. The publishers of the original go kart also own a race track. They only allow their original design on the race track. You can take their design, modify it and drive anywhere you want. A competing race track is closed hardware, with copyrights and patents on their karts. If you base a kart off of their design, they will sue you. If they deign to let you take your home-built kart designed by someone else on their track, they aren't open hardware. If they publish the exact specifications required for karts to run on their track and encourage home-built karts to run on their tracks, they still aren't open hardware.
- 6y ago
- jerry1979 6y agoSignal relies on Intel's SGX for certain operations (such as who contacts who?). Does that worry anyone else?
- blendergeek 6y agoMost chat servers simply know who contacts whom. This is an inherent problem (or strategic advantage) in being a chat server. Signal tries to hide the information from themselves by using Intel SGX. So, while SGX may not be perfect, its better than nothing.
- antpls 6y agoBut how do you validate that they are actually running SGX server side?
- jerry1979 6y agoOn top of that, even if they do run SGX, whoever hosts the SGX instances can just let the NSA into the server room and nobody would be the wiser. It's not like SGX actually works. It actually makes things worse if it allows signal admins to look the other way in good conscience.
- md_ 6y agoI'm super curious if someone can explain the threat model here in more detail. Some of these mitigations seem reasonable, some reasonable-but-very-esoteric, some mostly unreasonable. But maybe I am misunderstanding. Going through the feature list: > Protects database with passphrase encryption Modern Android supports FDE, so this seems like it's no gain for most cases. For users who don't have FDE, I guess it makes sense as long as you aren't concerned about evil maid attacks? (FWIW, Signal's philosophy—here and on RAM protections—seems to be that this is the province of the host OS. I agree!) > Locks down the app automatically after you go a certain time without unlocking your device I don't know what this means—is it the below (i.e. purging decryption keys from RAM on inactivity) or something else? > Securely shreds sensitive data from RAM The threat model here seems to be malicious code that can read the device's RAM. I think it's best to leave these kinds of mitigations to the host OS (i.e., if there is malicious code that can read your RAM, you're _probably_ SOL), but I guess there are probably some attacks (e.g. hardware or local-device attacks) that can dump RAM or something? What are common examples? > Allows you to delete contacts and stop sharing your profile > Clears call notifications together with expiring messages > Disables debug logs
- valldrac 6y agoMolly dev here. For security, the app is helpful in case the device is stolen or searched. In short, it tries to defeat smartphone forensics. The scenario is that someone grab the device and wants to read the chats, contacts, or access any information stored in the app. And you realize or suspect that. For example, because you lost the phone, or because it was left out of sight in an unsafe place. Under the big assumption that the device was clean of malware when Molly was locked there are no technical means to access the data without the password. This is the goal. If there was any security guarantee it would be this one. When Molly is locked, the database is closed, and the only way to open it again is by entering the password. While locked, the app cannot display notifications. I guess this is the main blocker why Signal has not implemented password encryption yet. I have some ideas to fix this in a secure way, but it would require to modify all Signal clients not just Molly. To lock the app, there are two options. Either you tap "lock" in the menu, or you set up a timeout. This timer starts counting down with the Android screen lock. Therefore, it should be adjusted by considering the time you expect an attacker could bypass the Android lock screen, and gain root access to the device, and the period of time you want to be able to receive notifications. There are more lock triggers in the roadmap, like the action of connecting an USB cable... many exploits works through USB. I agree that in a perfect world with zero vulns, all this should be handled by the OS. But even that, there are use cases for Molly. Should your fingerprints or a weak pattern give access to everything stored in your phone? Let me tell you someone's else analogy, "The keys to my front door shouldn’t also unlock my safe. You can rifle through my cutlery, but not my banking records."