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Trivial what you think of as subjective and unquantifiable are simply so because your brain is too complicated to be taken apart while its running to inspect it

Trivial what you think of as subjective and unquantifiable are simply so because your brain is too complicated to be taken apart while its running to inspect it effectively with our present level of technology. A subjective experience is just how your brain models your own program in order to produce a progressively refined program that will have a higher chance of successful reproduction. The magical thing you think is beyond comprehension just isn't real.

happythomist 6y ago
How do you go about quantifying the sensory experience of red, then? You can observe that red light has a wavelength of 620 to 750 nm, or that we've assigned it the RGB colour code of #FF0000, but neither fact actually captures or explains the sensory experience. Even trying is a fool's errand, because sensory experiences are inherently qualitative, not quantitative.
- tsimionescu 6y ago
  That's an assumption. Perhaps if we were able to understand the brain's inner workings, we could see that 'the experience of red' is precisely 'these 3 neurons firing ever 0.0112 seconds at an intensity of X while receiving 0.001 micrograms of serotonin' (completely made up, obviously). Until we start understanding how the brain encodes and 'computes' thought, we can't really claim to know if it is or isn't simply a computer.
  - happythomist 6y ago
    > Perhaps if we were able to understand the brain's inner workings, we could see that 'the experience of red' is precisely 'these 3 neurons firing ever 0.0112 seconds at an intensity of X while receiving 0.001 micrograms of serotonin' (completely made up, obviously). Even if we knew that a person saw red when such and such neurons fired, the neurons firing would still just be a material correlate. It would be in no way equivalent to or explain anything about the sensation itself.
    - tsimionescu 6y ago
      You are thinking of something similar to the level of today's neuroscience and brain imaging, where indeed we can only establish correlations. But I am talking about a much more in-depth understanding of the working of the brain, similar to the level of understanding we have of a microprocessor all the way from transistors to the algorithms running on it. If we could understand human thought at a similar level, we MIGHT find out that "the feeling of red" is not fundamentally different than "the understanding that 1 + 1 = 2", and we could come up with quantifications of it in different ways, from the physical representation in the brain to a certain "bit pattern" in the abstract model of the human brain computer. Note that the argument for qualia is not one that proves the existence of qualia - it is essentially only a definition. We have no reason to believe that the thing which the term qualia describes actually exists in the world, beyond our own personal experience, which is circular in a way. The argument goes "I feel like this thing I'm experiencing is a qualia, therefore I assume that things similar to me also have qualia", which sounds logical enough. But then, "things similar to me" is actually defined in such a way that it basically assumes qualia exist, since an AGI whose internal state we could probe precisely enough to prove that qualia do not exist for it is then assumed to be outside of "things similar to me".
      - happythomist 6y ago
        > If we could understand human thought at a similar level, we MIGHT find out that "the feeling of red" is not fundamentally different than "the understanding that 1 + 1 = 2", and we could come up with quantifications of it in different ways, from the physical representation in the brain to a certain "bit pattern" in the abstract model of the human brain computer. I guess the idea is that an abstract concept like "the understanding that 1 + 1 = 2" would be easier to "quantify" in the relevant sense than "the feeling of red", but I don't think that's true. The very concept of a representation presumes an intellect in which that representation is mapped to the underlying concept. No particular physical state objectively signifies some abstract concept any more than the word "dog" objectively signifies that particular type of animal. But our mental states must be able to do so, because denying this would be denying our ability to engage in coherent reasoning and therefore self-defeating. So those mental states can't be "implemented" solely using physical states. This argument was actually proposed by the late philosopher James Ross and developed in greater detail by Edward Feser. [1] A similar argument -- though he didn't take it as far -- was made by John Searle (of Chinese Room fame). [2] But in any event, I would reject the notion that any representation of "the feeling of red" is equivalent to the sensation itself. > Note that the argument for qualia is not one that proves the existence of qualia - it is essentially only a definition. We have no reason to believe that the thing which the term qualia describes actually exists in the world, beyond our own personal experience, which is circular in a way. Well, I think it is self-evident that qualia exist for me, and that those same qualia demonstrate that there are physical correlates of qualia. I also think there is good reason to think that qualia exist in others because we share the same physical correlates. Can I completely prove or disprove that others have qualia? No -- not you, not a rock, not an AGI. But I still have the physical correlates, which gives me some basis to draw conclusions. [1] http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2017/01/revisiting-ross-on-immateriality-of.html http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2017/01/revisiting-ross-on-i... [2] https://philosophy.as.uky.edu/sites/default/files/Is%20the%20Brain%20a%20Digital%20Computer%20-%20John%20R.%20Searle.pdf https://philosophy.as.uky.edu/sites/default/files/Is%20the%2...
goatlover 6y ago
All you've done is replace subjective experience with talk of modeling one's own program. What you haven't done is shown how the two are in any way equivalent.

happythomist 6y ago

How do you go about quantifying the sensory experience of red, then? You can observe that red light has a wavelength of 620 to 750 nm, or that we've assigned it the RGB colour code of #FF0000, but neither fact actually captures or explains the sensory experience. Even trying is a fool's errand, because sensory experiences are inherently qualitative, not quantitative.

tsimionescu 6y ago
That's an assumption. Perhaps if we were able to understand the brain's inner workings, we could see that 'the experience of red' is precisely 'these 3 neurons firing ever 0.0112 seconds at an intensity of X while receiving 0.001 micrograms of serotonin' (completely made up, obviously). Until we start understanding how the brain encodes and 'computes' thought, we can't really claim to know if it is or isn't simply a computer.
- happythomist 6y ago
  > Perhaps if we were able to understand the brain's inner workings, we could see that 'the experience of red' is precisely 'these 3 neurons firing ever 0.0112 seconds at an intensity of X while receiving 0.001 micrograms of serotonin' (completely made up, obviously). Even if we knew that a person saw red when such and such neurons fired, the neurons firing would still just be a material correlate. It would be in no way equivalent to or explain anything about the sensation itself.
  - tsimionescu 6y ago
    You are thinking of something similar to the level of today's neuroscience and brain imaging, where indeed we can only establish correlations. But I am talking about a much more in-depth understanding of the working of the brain, similar to the level of understanding we have of a microprocessor all the way from transistors to the algorithms running on it. If we could understand human thought at a similar level, we MIGHT find out that "the feeling of red" is not fundamentally different than "the understanding that 1 + 1 = 2", and we could come up with quantifications of it in different ways, from the physical representation in the brain to a certain "bit pattern" in the abstract model of the human brain computer. Note that the argument for qualia is not one that proves the existence of qualia - it is essentially only a definition. We have no reason to believe that the thing which the term qualia describes actually exists in the world, beyond our own personal experience, which is circular in a way. The argument goes "I feel like this thing I'm experiencing is a qualia, therefore I assume that things similar to me also have qualia", which sounds logical enough. But then, "things similar to me" is actually defined in such a way that it basically assumes qualia exist, since an AGI whose internal state we could probe precisely enough to prove that qualia do not exist for it is then assumed to be outside of "things similar to me".
    - happythomist 6y ago
      > If we could understand human thought at a similar level, we MIGHT find out that "the feeling of red" is not fundamentally different than "the understanding that 1 + 1 = 2", and we could come up with quantifications of it in different ways, from the physical representation in the brain to a certain "bit pattern" in the abstract model of the human brain computer. I guess the idea is that an abstract concept like "the understanding that 1 + 1 = 2" would be easier to "quantify" in the relevant sense than "the feeling of red", but I don't think that's true. The very concept of a representation presumes an intellect in which that representation is mapped to the underlying concept. No particular physical state objectively signifies some abstract concept any more than the word "dog" objectively signifies that particular type of animal. But our mental states must be able to do so, because denying this would be denying our ability to engage in coherent reasoning and therefore self-defeating. So those mental states can't be "implemented" solely using physical states. This argument was actually proposed by the late philosopher James Ross and developed in greater detail by Edward Feser. [1] A similar argument -- though he didn't take it as far -- was made by John Searle (of Chinese Room fame). [2] But in any event, I would reject the notion that any representation of "the feeling of red" is equivalent to the sensation itself. > Note that the argument for qualia is not one that proves the existence of qualia - it is essentially only a definition. We have no reason to believe that the thing which the term qualia describes actually exists in the world, beyond our own personal experience, which is circular in a way. Well, I think it is self-evident that qualia exist for me, and that those same qualia demonstrate that there are physical correlates of qualia. I also think there is good reason to think that qualia exist in others because we share the same physical correlates. Can I completely prove or disprove that others have qualia? No -- not you, not a rock, not an AGI. But I still have the physical correlates, which gives me some basis to draw conclusions. [1] http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2017/01/revisiting-ross-on-immateriality-of.html http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2017/01/revisiting-ross-on-i... [2] https://philosophy.as.uky.edu/sites/default/files/Is%20the%20Brain%20a%20Digital%20Computer%20-%20John%20R.%20Searle.pdf https://philosophy.as.uky.edu/sites/default/files/Is%20the%2...

goatlover 6y ago

All you've done is replace subjective experience with talk of modeling one's own program. What you haven't done is shown how the two are in any way equivalent.