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> I don't think you can say that life is built on computational processes unless you use a definition of "computation" that is so vague and all-encompassing tha

> I don't think you can say that life is built on computational processes unless you use a definition of "computation" that is so vague and all-encompassing that it becomes effectively meaningless. I mean, there's nothing physically stopping us from simulating a brain, right? It's a finite object with a finite amount of physical ingredients, and therefore with a finite amount of computing power we can simulate what it does. To me personally, that's a computational process. Maybe that's an overly broad definition of computation, but I think these debates tend to be about whether there is something fundamentally different about "life" (by which I assume you include consciousness). But maybe that's not what you're saying. > He points out that "if we are to suppose that the brain is a digital computer, we are still faced with the question 'And who is the user?'" What does that question even mean? I think it seems deep because we humans have a tendency to ascribe some sort of supernatural aura to our lived experience. Life is something incredible but that (at least to my knowledge) is not uncomputable... > There is no computational process that will produce the sensations of colour or sound or touch. Got one: the brain! > At best you will have some representation that requires having actually experienced those sensations to understand it. Why does a computer not "experience" something?

happythomist 6y ago
I think you're missing the central point, which is that computation is observer relative. Anything can be interpreted as a computational process. Searle: "Thus for example the wall behind my back is right now implementing the Wordstar program, because there is some pattern of molecule movements which is isomorphic with the formal structure of Wordstar. But if the wall is implementing Wordstar then if it is a big enough wall it is implementing any program, including any program implemented in the brain." That's why Searle asks "who is the user?" At some point things have to stop being observer relative and have an intrinsic meaning or essence of their own. > Got one: the brain! That's circular reasoning. The point is that qualia are not something which, in principle, can be the subject of computation. There is no way to represent the fullness of sensation itself, like the redness of red or the softness of silk, as information. So how can our brains be "computing" it?
- michaelmrose 6y ago
  Presumably the redness of red is VERY hard to communicate fully brain to brain because the experience of it is dependent upon every input and computation before that point however we manage to do it well enough. Its like saying that some deficits in computability prevent us us from doing arithmetic and therefore from launching rockets successfully at distant targets. I might never know the exact pattern in my brain of the "redness of red" as experienced by you but it seemed to work well enough for my brain to form a pattern similar enough to communicate thoughts just as the incompleteness or inherent lack of precision of measurement don't prevent the rocket from being launched successfully.
  - happythomist 6y ago
    The issue is not whether we can pragmatically communicate the concept of "red" by piggybacking on some (presumed) common experience, but whether that experience of redness itself is information. It is obviously not, and I do not understand why you insist otherwise.
    - michaelmrose 6y ago
      Making up something you can't define and then describing the thing you invented as uniquely human is a bad argument.
    - Born_Again 6y ago
      This idea boils down to if you believe the human brain exists purely in physical space. Let's assume it does. There is no free will. Every thought, every neuron, every sense can be represented and is controlled solely by energy and matter. We could record the electrical signals between your optic nerve and your brain, and send those same signals to your brain again in the future. We could recreate what you perceive as red by shocking your brain in the right place at the right time. If we perfectly understood the human brain, the sensation of red would be defined as a sequence of neurons that need to be turned on and off at the right time. As far as I know, the only thing limiting us from perfectly understanding the brain is our limitations with measuring it. I don't know of any scientific studies that claim the brain exists outside of physical space. Let's assume the brain doesn't exist purely in physical space. Free will exists. There is something immeasurable and outside of matter and energy that experiences the color red. Sensations are impossible to define because they exist only in this immeasurable world. I heard about a guy that claimed it was obvious that the origin of lightning and earthquakes were from the gods themselves. I try not to think like that guy.

happythomist 6y ago

I think you're missing the central point, which is that computation is observer relative. Anything can be interpreted as a computational process. Searle: "Thus for example the wall behind my back is right now implementing the Wordstar program, because there is some pattern of molecule movements which is isomorphic with the formal structure of Wordstar. But if the wall is implementing Wordstar then if it is a big enough wall it is implementing any program, including any program implemented in the brain." That's why Searle asks "who is the user?" At some point things have to stop being observer relative and have an intrinsic meaning or essence of their own. > Got one: the brain! That's circular reasoning. The point is that qualia are not something which, in principle, can be the subject of computation. There is no way to represent the fullness of sensation itself, like the redness of red or the softness of silk, as information. So how can our brains be "computing" it?

michaelmrose 6y ago
Presumably the redness of red is VERY hard to communicate fully brain to brain because the experience of it is dependent upon every input and computation before that point however we manage to do it well enough. Its like saying that some deficits in computability prevent us us from doing arithmetic and therefore from launching rockets successfully at distant targets. I might never know the exact pattern in my brain of the "redness of red" as experienced by you but it seemed to work well enough for my brain to form a pattern similar enough to communicate thoughts just as the incompleteness or inherent lack of precision of measurement don't prevent the rocket from being launched successfully.
- happythomist 6y ago
  The issue is not whether we can pragmatically communicate the concept of "red" by piggybacking on some (presumed) common experience, but whether that experience of redness itself is information. It is obviously not, and I do not understand why you insist otherwise.
  - michaelmrose 6y ago
    Making up something you can't define and then describing the thing you invented as uniquely human is a bad argument.
  - Born_Again 6y ago
    This idea boils down to if you believe the human brain exists purely in physical space. Let's assume it does. There is no free will. Every thought, every neuron, every sense can be represented and is controlled solely by energy and matter. We could record the electrical signals between your optic nerve and your brain, and send those same signals to your brain again in the future. We could recreate what you perceive as red by shocking your brain in the right place at the right time. If we perfectly understood the human brain, the sensation of red would be defined as a sequence of neurons that need to be turned on and off at the right time. As far as I know, the only thing limiting us from perfectly understanding the brain is our limitations with measuring it. I don't know of any scientific studies that claim the brain exists outside of physical space. Let's assume the brain doesn't exist purely in physical space. Free will exists. There is something immeasurable and outside of matter and energy that experiences the color red. Sensations are impossible to define because they exist only in this immeasurable world. I heard about a guy that claimed it was obvious that the origin of lightning and earthquakes were from the gods themselves. I try not to think like that guy.