>>You cannot yell "fire" in a movie theatre. >Actually, you can. This is protected by Brandenberg as I understand it. Brandenberg says that the government can

>>You cannot yell "fire" in a movie theatre. >Actually, you can. This is protected by Brandenberg as I understand it. Brandenberg says that the government can't restrict inflammatory speech unless it's "directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action". The case specifies three requirements for punishing speech: 'intent', 'immenent lawless action', and 'likely to incite'. Shouting 'fire' is discussed in the opinion as potentially prosecutable: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/395/444/ https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/395/444/ > The line between what is permissible and not subject to control and what may be made impermissible and subject to regulation is the line between ideas and overt acts. > The example usually given by those who would punish speech is the case of one who falsely shouts fire in a crowded theatre. > This is, however, a classic case where speech is brigaded with action. See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513, 357 U. S. 536-537 (DOUGLAS, J., concurring). They are indeed inseparable, and a prosecution can be launched for the overt acts actually caused. Apart from rare instances of that kind, speech is, I think, immune from prosecution. Certainly there is no constitutional line between advocacy of abstract ideas, as in Yates, and advocacy of political action, as in Scales. The quality of advocacy turns on the depth of the conviction, and government has no power to invade that sanctuary of belief and conscience. P.S. the theater company can ban you for being a nuisance even if it's not illegal.