It's hard to answer that without knowing what you regard as "censorship." If a newspaper declines to publish a letter to the editor, is that censorship? If a

It's hard to answer that without knowing what you regard as "censorship." If a newspaper declines to publish a letter to the editor, is that censorship? If a publishing company and writer negotiate a contract which includes a "morals clause", allowing the publisher to choose terminate a contract in case the author is accused of immoral, illegal, or publicly condemned behavior, then is that censorship if the publishing company decides to exercise that clause? If a company has terms of service which prevents issuing threats of physical violence, and a user of that company violates those terms, so the company drops the user, then is that censorship? If I'm asked to speak at a Python conference and at my talk I instead talk about child slavery, causing the organizers to cut the microphone, stop the talk, and eject me from the conference - is that censorship? Generally speaking, these all fall under freedom of association, and are not forms of censorship. Now, there's also government censorship, but most of the talk about "censorship" these days seems to conflate negative criticism and social consequences as a form of censorship. But as John Stuart Mill wrote: > We have a right, also, in various ways, to act upon our unfavourable opinion of any one, not to the oppression of his individuality, but in the exercise of ours. We are not bound, for example, to seek his society; we have a right to avoid it (though not to parade the avoidance), for we have a right to choose the society most acceptable to us. We have a right, and it may be our duty, to caution others against him, if we think his example or conversation likely to have a pernicious effect on those with whom he associates. We may give others a preference over him in optional good offices, except those which tend to his improvement. In these various modes a person may suffer very severe penalties at the hands of others, for faults which directly concern only himself; but he suffers these penalties only in so far as they are the natural, and, as it were, the spontaneous consequences of the faults themselves, not because they are purposely inflicted on him for the sake of punishment.