4 ms·
It's obvious which port you've bound it to. Can you can do it in less time than testing all ports until you find it? (an average of 2^15 connections?). Also i
by jodrellblank 16y ago
It's obvious which port you've bound it to.
Can you can do it in less time than testing all ports until you find it? (an average of 2^15 connections?).
Also if you run it on port 22 and someone tries 22 then that will not trigger any port-scan-detectors. If you run it on port N and they are scanning all ports, you can block them before they find SSH.
It is obscurity, it's making finding/confirming SSH 1/65535 instead of 1/1.
All your comments here are of the nature "Everyone's an idiot. Ignore the explanations and arguments raised in the article they're just wrong. Trust me."
- tptacek 16y agoThere's this person you are thinking of who is actually vulnerable to something an SSH scanner is looking for. What I'd like to know is, what is that person reasonably going to do when his portscan detector goes off? Why didn't he do it a month ago instead of waiting? I hope my comments here are of the nature of "My mind is boggling as to why smart people think these measures are anything but laetrile." Also: do you think I'm just making it up? Don't be passive-aggressive. If you think I'm full of it on this topic, just say so.
- philh 16y ago> There's this person you are thinking of who is actually vulnerable to something an SSH scanner is looking for. The point is that if a vulnerability gets discovered in future, he doesn't want to be on a list of "servers that are now vulnerable". When he hears about the exploit, he'll fix it. But if the bad guys hear about it first, not being on that list is useful obscurity. > If you think I'm full of it on this topic, just say so. You're probably not full of it, but it's hard to extract much value from your comments.
- tptacek 16y agoOnce every ~4-6 years or so someone will find a vulnerability in OpenSSH. When that happens, the list of vulnerable servers is "everyone running SSH". Maybe there's some attacker that is keeping a database of every SSH server on the Internet, but I doubt it. I don't think it's hard to extract value from my comments. I think you don't want the value that's in my comment, because that value is "you are spending time and energy doing something that isn't providing the security benefit you think it is", and that's not fun to hear.
- epistasis 16y agoYou don't think an attacker would hold on to the results of scanning for SSH servers? They just scan for days then throw it all away? I had absolutely no idea what you were trying to say with your first reply to me. It's only by digging through lots of your other replies that I got the hint that it may be an attempt at sarcasm, but I'm still not sure. You are not supporting your assertions, or even making your assertions clear.
- tptacek 16y agoYes. They scan for days and throw away all the results that aren't "machine I can log into".
- pmylund 16y agoIf a company with a large and complex web property, e.g. Microsoft.com or Google.com, asked you if it mattered whether they allow DNS AXFR, what would your answer be?
- tptacek 16y agoNobody enables AXFR. AXFR isn't a default. I wouldn't advise someone to override that default. If one of my clients then asked me, "because I don't enable AXFR, is wide-open-dev-machine.customer.com safer?", I would say "no, it is not".
- pmylund 16y agoSo you agree that disabling AXFR, if AXFR is enabled, is a good idea? Could you explain why you think wide-open-dev-machine.customer.com is NOT safer without AXFR (assuming it blocks robots, and the web server only serves the site for "wide-open-dev-machine.customer.com")? I'm just trying to understand how it could not be considered beneficial in any way, however much (which is what you're claiming).
- tptacek 16y ago
- jodrellblank 16y agoThere's this person you are thinking of who is actually vulnerable to something an SSH scanner is looking for. What I'd like to know is, what is that person reasonably going to do when his portscan detector goes off? Why didn't he do it a month ago instead of waiting? Auto-ban the source of the portscanning, and limit what the now-known-hostile source IP can do next. This person is probably doing nothing more than an automated nightly security update. Someone running an exploit against SSH which may work is bad, someone unable to run an exploit against SSH because they didn't find it before being blocked by an intrusion detection system is better. And, because it wasn't scanning a month ago. I hope my comments here are of the nature of "My mind is boggling as to why smart people think these measures are anything but laetrile." Also: do you think I'm just making it up? Don't be passive-aggressive. If you think I'm full of it on this topic, just say so. They are of that "lol, dumbasses" nature. That's annoying and unhelpful. The submission is an article where the author explains some specific thoughts on some specific potential security measures, your replies are of the nature "lol no; ha ha nope; wrong again". I don't claim your view is wrong, but neither are you giving any of us mere mortals anything more to go on than trusting your reputation. Great, "SHA-512 is plutonium", that's gonna help me what ... be afraid of it? "None of these security measures do anything to improve security"? Well that's literally not true, so are you merely claiming that they do to little to be worth it? Or what? "People do things they think are heplful but which aren't helpful so we feel less powerless"? No, we do them because we think they help. That's just an ad-hom. Changing the SSH port to a random one makes a scan to find it 32,000 times more effort, on average. The author claims that makes it too expensive for people to scan for. You claim it's "obvious" where you put it so it doesn't help. Well it isn't obvious where you put it. It just isn't. You do have to scan for it.
- tptacek 16y ago1. Your comments seems premised on the notion that OpenSSH vulnerabilities are routine. They are not routine. They are not hard to keep up with. And if you do not keep up with them, nothing you do is going to protect your server. I am reading tea leaves to arrive at this conclusion about your mindset, yes, but it's still worth pointing out. 2. Blocking sources is a silly way to defend against a server. Anyone who is actually using SSH exploits to break into servers has lots of sources. Meanwhile: anything a scanner is looking for, you're not vulnerable to; if you were, you're already owned. All blocking the source does is make you feel btter. 3. Yes, you should be afraid of using SHA-512. Yes, that is the point of that comment. 4. "32,000" sounds like a large number on a message board, but write an evented port scanner† and see how big that number really is. † Programming Challenge Level: 3 (Casual Comment On Hacker News - http://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=2317547)* http://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=2317547)*.