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There is no evidence that the SHA-512 cryptographic hash algorithm is breakable by any modern machinery, so why are we keeping password hashes secret? Yes, but
by stcredzero 16y ago
There is no evidence that the SHA-512 cryptographic hash algorithm is breakable by any modern machinery, so why are we keeping password hashes secret?
Yes, but we're still working out the theoretical underpinnings of hash algorithms.
http://domino.research.ibm.com/comm/research_projects.nsf/pages/cryptographic_hash.hashfunction-theory.html http://domino.research.ibm.com/comm/research_projects.nsf/pa...
Also, if one looks at past performance, it seems like it's only a matter of time before a hash algorithm is broken in some way.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cryptographic_hash_function#Cryptographic_hash_algorithms http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cryptographic_hash_function#Cry...
There is nothing wrong with obscurity, provided that 1) you don't use it as a replacement for standard security and 2) it doesn't interfere with the operation and auditing of your standard security.
- JoachimSchipper 16y agoReversing hashes, even thoroughly broken ones, is still quite impractical - it's collision attacks that you have to watch out for. Of course, you don't break password hashes by reversing the hash, you break password hashes by just trying (variations on) dictionary words until one matches the hash. For that purpose, SHA-256 is not a good choice, since it's too fast - use PBKDF2/bcrypt.
- SoftwareMaven 16y agoReversing a hash is impossible, so a collision is "reversing" it. All that really matters is that you've got something that the auth system will think is the right password.
- JoachimSchipper 16y agoYou're confusing a collision (find any x, y such that f(x) = f(y)) and a second preimage attack (find any x such that f(x) = y for some particular y). The latter is much more difficult, but the former can still be used - see "rogue CA".