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Broken crypto ("bunch of randoms have rolled their own crypto", to be precise [0]) is pretty much the only argument HN has against Telegram. They use the same

by ffpip 6y ago

Broken crypto ("bunch of randoms have rolled their own crypto", to be precise [0]) is pretty much the only argument HN has against Telegram. They use the same 7 year old russian article [1] to show the said broken crpyto, despite that being written like the month telegram launched on HN. They have fixed all these long ago and even rolled out MTProto 2.0. Nobody wants to break this crypto despite criticizing it. There's a 300K$ cash prize [2]. [0] - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=6913632 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=6913632 [1] - https://m.habr.com/en/post/206900/ https://m.habr.com/en/post/206900/ [2] - https://telegram.org/faq#q-what-if-my-hacker-friend-says-they-could-decipher-telegram-mes https://telegram.org/faq#q-what-if-my-hacker-friend-says-the...

approxim8ion 6y ago
The bounty isn't as much of an assurance as they would have you believe. Good publicity nonetheless. Relevant article from Moxie Marlinespike: https://archive.vn/SIl9M https://archive.vn/SIl9M A theorized valid attack that was deemed invalid by the fine print in their bounty program: https://web.archive.org/web/20181118154823/https://www.alexrad.me/discourse/a-264-attack-on-telegram-and-why-a-super-villain-doesnt-need-it-to-read-your-telegram-chats.html https://web.archive.org/web/20181118154823/https://www.alexr... These are criticisms of MTproto 1, there is barely any literature about the new version.
- Anon1096 6y ago
  I think this exact comment sequence with these exact links has been played out on every Hacker News thread about Telegram since its inception.
- ffpip 6y ago
  Yeah I know it's just publicity. Just like 'Apple will pay 1 million dollars for iphone hack' articles. But Moxie (or any other cryptographer) could use the money for Signal's development. It's a large amount.
  - bjoli 6y ago
    Moxie clearly states that: the competition is framed in such a way that it would be bordering impossible to break it even uf it had been using primitives known to be broken.
ikawe 6y ago
> Broken crypto ("bunch of randoms have rolled their own crypto", to be precise [0]) is pretty much the only argument HN has against Telegram. Also that there's no crypto for every group chat and every default 1:1 chat.
- wyuenho 6y ago
  Default 1:1 chat and group chat are secured by the server-client protocol. No e2e encryption by default is deliberate https://telegram.org/faq#q-why-not-just-make-all-chats-39secret-39 https://telegram.org/faq#q-why-not-just-make-all-chats-39sec...
  - bjoli 6y ago
    Well, anyone releasing a serious communication app in the last 11 years that didn't do at least that should have been flogged...
    - wyuenho 6y ago
      I disagree with this. A point the FAQ didn't mention is user psychology. Technically, the correct way to use e2ee chat on both Signal and Telegram is to verify the key fingerprint using a secure channel separate from Telegram. In reality, few people do it, so the default makes a huge difference. If all of my Signal chats are e2ee by default, and I operate under the assumption that most if not all of my chats are encrypted and secure by default, when a chat that really needs to be secured comes in, I wouldn't think of verifying the fingerprint in a separate channel first, because Signal didn't train me to do so. If it did, Signal would have been a lot more annoying to use, because it'll have to pop up warnings and all that. Enabling e2ee in Telegram is an explicit act, which means that what that mean is enabled, I know for sure I need to make sure it's really secure, and it will trigger my memory about verifying fingerprints. I would argue this trains the user to think more about operational security instead of just theoretical information security. As far as I can understand, Telegram's secrecy by default is __good enough__. They control all of their data centers and internal networks, and they have been known to refuse to comply with government orders. Given that I continue to use Apple and Google services with similar or lessor guarantees, I consider that good enough, and I'll choose my messaging app based on secondary factors such as usability and features. Telegram wins hands down in these areas.

by ffpip 6y ago

approxim8ion 6y ago

The bounty isn't as much of an assurance as they would have you believe. Good publicity nonetheless. Relevant article from Moxie Marlinespike: https://archive.vn/SIl9M https://archive.vn/SIl9M A theorized valid attack that was deemed invalid by the fine print in their bounty program: https://web.archive.org/web/20181118154823/https://www.alexrad.me/discourse/a-264-attack-on-telegram-and-why-a-super-villain-doesnt-need-it-to-read-your-telegram-chats.html https://web.archive.org/web/20181118154823/https://www.alexr... These are criticisms of MTproto 1, there is barely any literature about the new version.

Anon1096 6y ago
I think this exact comment sequence with these exact links has been played out on every Hacker News thread about Telegram since its inception.
ffpip 6y ago
Yeah I know it's just publicity. Just like 'Apple will pay 1 million dollars for iphone hack' articles. But Moxie (or any other cryptographer) could use the money for Signal's development. It's a large amount.
- bjoli 6y ago
  Moxie clearly states that: the competition is framed in such a way that it would be bordering impossible to break it even uf it had been using primitives known to be broken.

ikawe 6y ago

> Broken crypto ("bunch of randoms have rolled their own crypto", to be precise [0]) is pretty much the only argument HN has against Telegram. Also that there's no crypto for every group chat and every default 1:1 chat.

wyuenho 6y ago
Default 1:1 chat and group chat are secured by the server-client protocol. No e2e encryption by default is deliberate https://telegram.org/faq#q-why-not-just-make-all-chats-39secret-39 https://telegram.org/faq#q-why-not-just-make-all-chats-39sec...
- bjoli 6y ago
  Well, anyone releasing a serious communication app in the last 11 years that didn't do at least that should have been flogged...
  - wyuenho 6y ago
    I disagree with this. A point the FAQ didn't mention is user psychology. Technically, the correct way to use e2ee chat on both Signal and Telegram is to verify the key fingerprint using a secure channel separate from Telegram. In reality, few people do it, so the default makes a huge difference. If all of my Signal chats are e2ee by default, and I operate under the assumption that most if not all of my chats are encrypted and secure by default, when a chat that really needs to be secured comes in, I wouldn't think of verifying the fingerprint in a separate channel first, because Signal didn't train me to do so. If it did, Signal would have been a lot more annoying to use, because it'll have to pop up warnings and all that. Enabling e2ee in Telegram is an explicit act, which means that what that mean is enabled, I know for sure I need to make sure it's really secure, and it will trigger my memory about verifying fingerprints. I would argue this trains the user to think more about operational security instead of just theoretical information security. As far as I can understand, Telegram's secrecy by default is __good enough__. They control all of their data centers and internal networks, and they have been known to refuse to comply with government orders. Given that I continue to use Apple and Google services with similar or lessor guarantees, I consider that good enough, and I'll choose my messaging app based on secondary factors such as usability and features. Telegram wins hands down in these areas.