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The headline can be summaries as 'no' since his only counter-argument seems to be 'the banks should have known better' Pricing for a listing is a very complica
by nikcub 15y ago
The headline can be summaries as 'no' since his only counter-argument seems to be 'the banks should have known better'
Pricing for a listing is a very complicated process. The underwriters, along with the company executives, go out on a very long roadshow and book orders well before the listing date. It is through these orders, not some magic made up numbers, that the final price is determined from.
In the case of LinkedIn, they changed their list price no less than 4 times between the time they filed their S1 with the SEC and the time they finally listed. Initially it was $31, and the last hike to $45 only happen the night before the listing.
LinkedIn management are professionals who understand their business and understand the process, they have a choice of underwriters to work with and a choice of investors to take orders from. This isn't a single bank taking them for a ride - to suggest that is offensive to those who run LinkedIn
Where the real problem lies, and a problem that was not raised in this criticism, is in how orders are taken. This is what Google attempted to solve with their Dutch Auction system. The claim is that the banking community is so tight-knit that they collude with each other to keep the book price down. So what Google did was to hold a silent auction on bids and allotments, only to find when the process was over that most banks essentially bid around the same mark anyway.
Paying out 6.5% of your company to go public does suck - but it is the cost of creating a viable and flowing public market for your stock. You can't just sell that part of the company to 4 or 5 banks and then ask them politely to pass it on - you may as well just raise another private round in that case. The point of the IPO is to diversity ownership as broadly as possibly and to engage firms that would be willing to take on and trade the stock so that a market is created.
None of the alternate mechanisms work, and you need to be a very large and hot company to even challenge the status quo in the way Google did (and in a way LinkedIn did as well - with their two classes of stock). Note that the underwriters are taking a risk since they end up holding a lot of stock, and in the event of the list price dropping there would be a lot of questions asked about the prospectus and roadshow and potential lawsuits. Also on the other hand, there are not a lot of IPO's that take place, so the underwriters need to make the most of the business they do get - they are the ones with the connections to the large funds that purchase stock, so acting as a risk-bearing agent in that capacity does deserve compensation.
LinkedIn didn't help their cause by listing so few shares. When there is scarcity in the market and so much demand, then there is only one way that the list price would go - and that is up. If they listed twice the number of shares to meet demand then there definitely would not have been so much volatility on the opening day (a lot of which was caused by 'market' orders - which means 'buy at any price').
tl;dr: creating a free flowing and liquid public market for your stock is a very complicated, highly regulated and risky process and nobody has figured out a better way to do it
- randallsquared 15y agoThe claim is that the banking community is so tight-knit that they collude with each other to keep the book price down. So what Google did was to hold a silent auction on bids and allotments, only to find when the process was over that most banks essentially bid around the same mark anyway. Your tone seems dismissive of the claim, but finding out that a bunch of people all bid about the same amount when they only way they could find out what each other were bidding is collusion doesn't exactly count as evidence against collusion, does it? It's not great evidence for, but at least if bids were all over the place it would be evidence that many banks don't have an informal cartel or whatever.
- nikcub 15y ago> Your tone seems dismissive of the claim I didn't mean it to come across that way, because I totally believe that they do collude. If they didn't then that entire part of the industry would become hyper competitive, unstable and probably a zero-margin (or even loss-leading) business. These conglomerates in investment banking could handle the business and not make anything on it, they just don't like that. There also is a lot of work involved, so the fees are somewhat justified (see the Microsoft IPO article for an idea of how much work goes into it) - this wasn't helped by Sarbanes Oxley which added a whole new layer of pain-in-the-ass to the process, that only a select few hold the cure for. There is also an element of this only being a problem when there is a significant first-day rise. You don't hear anybody complaining about it when stocks tank or run level on the first day (if you look at all the tech IPO's from past few years - opentable, rackspace, netflix, renren, etc. most have not done too well in short term). What would improve the situation would be the companies being able to raise more of the money overseas and thus introducing more competition into the process. Atm overseas funds can buy in after a listing, but for some reason a lot of the pre-listing sales tend to take place in the USA and amongst the usual suspects.
- RickHull 15y ago> If they didn't then that entire part of the industry would become hyper competitive, unstable and probably a zero-margin (or even loss-leading) business. Well, that's what all colluders and monopolists say. I don't see any problem with this outcome. The inefficient get out of the business, and margins settle back to what the market demands.