4 ms·

CCP can win a successful invasion, but turning Taiwan into dust will backfire hugely. Starving Taiwan into submission is at best case scenario a massive hit to

by yyyk 6y ago

CCP can win a successful invasion, but turning Taiwan into dust will backfire hugely. Starving Taiwan into submission is at best case scenario a massive hit to China's foreign and economic relations (ensuring a block analog to NATO just to counter China) in order to get an economically devastated province, with possible internal stability hit since eventually Chinese citizens will know what it cost. This isn't a good tradeoff for the CCP, unless they are so strong 15-30 years from now that they get the same dominance US had in 90s (in which case they probably can get Taiwan anyway without paying that price), or if there's an internal threat that must be appeased ASAP. E: China can do your scenario physically, and probably avoid the world's wrath in the immediate military term. Nonetheless, the world will see a popular first-world society reduced to rubble, and other first-world societies will see themselves in the wreckage. No matter the excuse, there's no way there won't be a mass reaction afterwards. Sure, other countries may well avoid taking direct part in the immediate hostilities, but soon after you'll see a counter-block if only due to realist concerns (after all, if China can get away with that the world is already multi-polar). If war happens, I expect an attempt at a quick military win and slow starvation if and only if the ordinary military efforts outright fail; And the alternative being humiliating defeat which the CCP can't afford, and the CCP doesn't get some face saving way to climb down. IMHO, at any other scenario it's better for the CCP to sacrifice men and win in an ordinary manner than to get much of the world to unite against it.

yyyk 6y ago
(I'm responding to the second edit). I think you massively underestimate the psychological effect of seeing a first-world country reduced to a third-world country if Taiwan doesn't surrender very quickly. Also, the realist concern is classic 'balance the strongest power' dynamic. I don't think China has to worry about an outright official blockade, but you'll end up with a Cold War rerun and Chinese companies being unofficially driven off the West, SK and Japan working together, possible SK/Japan nukes at the very least. China played a lot of cards trying to keep other countries not ganged up against it, best not ruin it to get a devastated province. Simply put, any starvation scenario where Taiwan decides to fight will be a disaster for CCP too. So I believe any CCP strategist understands it's better to sacrifice men and take Taiwan outright without turning it to Yemen (a preference which you stated as well). A quick enough operation will be ignored by the world for reasons you provided, and they may well be in a position to do that soon. The 'wait out months/years and publicly starve out Taiwan' is incredibly poor in comparison.
- dirtyid 6y ago
  Long blockade Taiwan is the forceful reunion option. Blockades are inherently an act of war. It would be calibrated attacks of military power and communication infrastructure that would leave civilian realm mostly intact. No salacious photos of cratered cities, PR would play better than unavoidable PLA paratroopers + civilian "collateral damage". Meanwhile only avenue for food + aid would be provided by PRC, each landing boat potentially accompanied by occupation force + minimal destruction to incentivize capitulation, this is compatible with CCP political work. Occupation force cordons off to green zone, controls infrastructure, while local loyalist does most of the repression. On the outside Taiwan will still appear to be a first-world country. Yemen comparison is extreme end of invasion spectrum. The reason I dismiss quick invasion is for all the reasons analyst cite why invading Taiwan would be hard. Landing operations on Taiwan scale has never been done before. It will massively outscope Normandy. I question if it's even feasible. Let alone quick. Especially with massively telescoped logistics movement that US/TW can rapidly react to. Whereas quick air superiority and naval blockade is the kind of campaign that can be disguised with annual exercises. The main reason cited for why PRC would want a quick invasion is to prevent US intervention on Taiwan proper... but US lost that option. So it's not a relevant factor. And it shows in actual Chinese military acquisitions very few additions to amphibious capabilities, massive blue water naval buildup. PRC's only concern so far seems to be circumventing US counter-blockade. There's almost no credible movement towards amphib capabilities outside of notional signalling exercises with ~100 amphib tanks total. PRC sent 900+ tanks to Russia for military exercises. I would not presume an invasion until China properly invests in amphib capabilities. SK/Japan working together... I doubt with their history. Ditto with Japan nuclearizing against their constitution. If they did, there'd be no reason to host US bases. I don't actually think China has played a lot of cards so far, there's just a lack of coordination in the region because... everyone fucking hates each other. Japan/Korean/China hate triangle. SCS is a 6 party dispute. ASEAN has divided loyalties. There's only a vague consensus that the future is Asian, and US is useful to hedge against China, but not at the expense of sabotaging everyone's collective future. As for EU/Anglos, maybe. But at the end of the day, Taiwan is full of yellow people. 1st world countries stood by while secular, liberalizing brown countries got repressed back to poverty by US foreign intervention. My opinion is they'll stand at sidelines if China is sufficient local hegemon, especially if the realist want China to check against US. EU has their own foreign policy aspirations after all. Multipolarity means EU + China against US. Or at least EU not teaming up with US against China. EU + China has their own interest alignments. Both EU and China require maritime hydro carbon trade as existential matter. China having parity blue water navy as US to also secure trade routes is good for everyone who wants to continue to freeload. And unlike US, EU knows China has to provide this service indefinitely, and is reliable if core interests respected (like Taiwan). Ultimately, if west wants to divest from China, it's survivable. They account for 10% of Chinese GDP. If you told Xi today to take a 10% hit on GDP in exchange for Taiwan, he'd take that deal. Of course peaceful is always preferable. It's just hard to see how that could be charted right now. My gut feeling is cracking down on HK is reset of one country two systems, 30 years is a long time to mold HK into a more enticing alternative than one country one system. I think Taiwan can get away with some sort of suzerainty option with understanding that it's only delaying the inevitable.

by yyyk 6y ago

yyyk 6y ago

(I'm responding to the second edit). I think you massively underestimate the psychological effect of seeing a first-world country reduced to a third-world country if Taiwan doesn't surrender very quickly. Also, the realist concern is classic 'balance the strongest power' dynamic. I don't think China has to worry about an outright official blockade, but you'll end up with a Cold War rerun and Chinese companies being unofficially driven off the West, SK and Japan working together, possible SK/Japan nukes at the very least. China played a lot of cards trying to keep other countries not ganged up against it, best not ruin it to get a devastated province. Simply put, any starvation scenario where Taiwan decides to fight will be a disaster for CCP too. So I believe any CCP strategist understands it's better to sacrifice men and take Taiwan outright without turning it to Yemen (a preference which you stated as well). A quick enough operation will be ignored by the world for reasons you provided, and they may well be in a position to do that soon. The 'wait out months/years and publicly starve out Taiwan' is incredibly poor in comparison.

dirtyid 6y ago
Long blockade Taiwan is the forceful reunion option. Blockades are inherently an act of war. It would be calibrated attacks of military power and communication infrastructure that would leave civilian realm mostly intact. No salacious photos of cratered cities, PR would play better than unavoidable PLA paratroopers + civilian "collateral damage". Meanwhile only avenue for food + aid would be provided by PRC, each landing boat potentially accompanied by occupation force + minimal destruction to incentivize capitulation, this is compatible with CCP political work. Occupation force cordons off to green zone, controls infrastructure, while local loyalist does most of the repression. On the outside Taiwan will still appear to be a first-world country. Yemen comparison is extreme end of invasion spectrum. The reason I dismiss quick invasion is for all the reasons analyst cite why invading Taiwan would be hard. Landing operations on Taiwan scale has never been done before. It will massively outscope Normandy. I question if it's even feasible. Let alone quick. Especially with massively telescoped logistics movement that US/TW can rapidly react to. Whereas quick air superiority and naval blockade is the kind of campaign that can be disguised with annual exercises. The main reason cited for why PRC would want a quick invasion is to prevent US intervention on Taiwan proper... but US lost that option. So it's not a relevant factor. And it shows in actual Chinese military acquisitions very few additions to amphibious capabilities, massive blue water naval buildup. PRC's only concern so far seems to be circumventing US counter-blockade. There's almost no credible movement towards amphib capabilities outside of notional signalling exercises with ~100 amphib tanks total. PRC sent 900+ tanks to Russia for military exercises. I would not presume an invasion until China properly invests in amphib capabilities. SK/Japan working together... I doubt with their history. Ditto with Japan nuclearizing against their constitution. If they did, there'd be no reason to host US bases. I don't actually think China has played a lot of cards so far, there's just a lack of coordination in the region because... everyone fucking hates each other. Japan/Korean/China hate triangle. SCS is a 6 party dispute. ASEAN has divided loyalties. There's only a vague consensus that the future is Asian, and US is useful to hedge against China, but not at the expense of sabotaging everyone's collective future. As for EU/Anglos, maybe. But at the end of the day, Taiwan is full of yellow people. 1st world countries stood by while secular, liberalizing brown countries got repressed back to poverty by US foreign intervention. My opinion is they'll stand at sidelines if China is sufficient local hegemon, especially if the realist want China to check against US. EU has their own foreign policy aspirations after all. Multipolarity means EU + China against US. Or at least EU not teaming up with US against China. EU + China has their own interest alignments. Both EU and China require maritime hydro carbon trade as existential matter. China having parity blue water navy as US to also secure trade routes is good for everyone who wants to continue to freeload. And unlike US, EU knows China has to provide this service indefinitely, and is reliable if core interests respected (like Taiwan). Ultimately, if west wants to divest from China, it's survivable. They account for 10% of Chinese GDP. If you told Xi today to take a 10% hit on GDP in exchange for Taiwan, he'd take that deal. Of course peaceful is always preferable. It's just hard to see how that could be charted right now. My gut feeling is cracking down on HK is reset of one country two systems, 30 years is a long time to mold HK into a more enticing alternative than one country one system. I think Taiwan can get away with some sort of suzerainty option with understanding that it's only delaying the inevitable.