10 ms·
Full disk encryption and a strict policy of always closing the laptop / lock the screen when leaving. In some scenarios USB ports also need to be physically dis
by 13415 6y ago
Full disk encryption and a strict policy of always closing the laptop / lock the screen when leaving. In some scenarios USB ports also need to be physically disabled.
- neolog 6y agoLocking the screen doesn't enable FDE though, does it?
- 13415 6y agoWhat attacks are you thinking of? A cold boot attack while you're on the toilet? Or that the laptop is stolen? First and foremost you need to ensure physical security anyway. Otherwise a dedicated attacker can also just install a bug.
- gpm 6y agoLaptop is stolen by a foreign intelligence agency who can do things like "pour liquid nitrogen on the ram and swap it to another computer to recover encryption keys" or whatever (I've been told that's a real attack... but it always seemed like an intelligence agency ought to just make a device to read the ram without pulling it at all... just hijack the wires communicating to the ram or something...)
- maccard 6y agoIf that's your threat, the device doesn't leave your sight or possession, ever. I work at a significantly lower threat level than that and we're regularly told that when off site devices don't leave your possession, and on-site, deviecs should be tethered and locked when not in use.
- neolog 6y agoLaptop is stolen.
- cratermoon 6y agoSpeaking of lock screens (and Speakers), did you see Pelosi's screen? Wasn't she on the floor of the House at that time? Why wasn't her screen locked? I can think of half a dozen scenarios of carelessness or time pressure. The first one comes to mind is that she was using it, suddenly evacuated and didn't flip the lock on, and the mob reached her desk before the lock timer expired. But I do wonder if the was even a screen lock.