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If you read the document, it has a list of types of data protected by end-to-end encryption, which no one but yourself has access to. This list does not include
by tinus_hn 6y ago
If you read the document, it has a list of types of data protected by end-to-end encryption, which no one but yourself has access to. This list does not include iCloud backups.
If you do not want this to happen, do not turn on the optional iCloud backups.
But anyway, although Apple could decrypt the other data, they declare they don’t. Which is what the labels are about.
- iknowstuff 6y agoIt also does not contain iCloud Photos. Nor iCloud Drive. For that matter, apple can intercept and MITM iMessage when requested by the government and don’t allow you to verify the key unlike, say, Signal or WhatsApp. I mean it’s available in China for a reason.
- jordan_curve 6y agoIf it’s end-to-end encrypted, why would intercepting the message be an issue?
- judge2020 6y agoMITMing future messages could be completely transparent to the user.
- coldcode 6y agoIf it's truly end to end encryption it can't be MITM. However it could be required to be intercepted ETE in China
- iknowstuff 6y agoYou never get to verify that they key you’re signing with matches the key on your correspondent’s device. You are trusting Apple with it, and they could be compelled to MITM your future conversations. This is in contrast with, say, Signal, where you do get to compare keys (and it’s open source with reproducible builds).