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Yes and no. Techniques like Zero-knowledge proofs, homomorphic encryption and multiparty computation exists, but none of them are sufficient for elections. The
by Natanael_L 6y ago
Yes and no.
Techniques like Zero-knowledge proofs, homomorphic encryption and multiparty computation exists, but none of them are sufficient for elections. The security requirements are simply too complex, and we can't require that every voter manages a private keypair to issue their votes from an electronic device they can't audit.
Paper voting is safer.
- woofie11 6y agoThe systems I know don't require voters to keep a private key pair.
- Natanael_L 6y agoThen how else do you validate the identity of the voter? What do you gain if you can't prevent fraud by inserting fake votes?
- woofie11 6y ago* You have a list of people who voted. That's public. * You have a list of votes. That's public (and not correlated with the above) by anonymous tokens. * You have an anonymous token, which lets you verify your own vote. If the list of people who voted doesn't match up to real people, that's detectable. If I go into Massachusetts and find 10% of the people claimed to have voted don't exist, I can confirm fraud. If someone who didn't voted has there vote counted, that also confirms fraud. Anyone can count up and add up the votes. That's public too. And anyone can confirm their own vote was counted.
- Natanael_L 6y agoHow are those tokens less complicated to use than a private keypair? How do you ensure that the votes are cast anonymously, without leaking metadata from timing, etc?