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Who is fighting to keep software patents as-is? Who are we up against? I have NEVER read anything in their favor. If we live in a society where the laws need

by dpcan 15y ago

Who is fighting to keep software patents as-is? Who are we up against? I have NEVER read anything in their favor. If we live in a society where the laws need to be changed, why are they just not changing? What horrors could actually come from abolishing software patents? I just don't understand why this is still an argument. Who are we even arguing against? I never see anyone disagreeing with the argument. It's as if everyone hates the same thing yet it continues to exist and all we have to do is change it. So someone just change it.

rwmj 15y ago
There's a big pharma lobby who love patents and lobby for more of the same. This is in itself a problem: there is no separation between types of patents, so we can't (easily) get separate policy on software, business methods, pharma etc. I imagine, for example, no one would particularly complain about software patents if they only lasted for 2 years. But the way it is now, that would mean all patents would expire after 2 years, and the pharma lobby would hate that. Having said all that, best thing is to get rid of all patents, and we'll start again when someone proves that narrow patents in a particular field have a benefit to the economy.
- tzs 15y ago
  Speaking of pharmaceutical patents, I'd like to see two changes: 1. There should be automatic licensing of the patent to anyone who wishes to make the drug, at a royalty rate on gross sales determined by statute. I'm thinking something around 5%. 2. The patent term should be extended from 20 years to something like 100 years. The idea here is that drug companies invest huge amounts in developing new drugs. Many of these don't even pan out. Some make it into production, and they are patented for 20 years. The drug company then has to charge a lot to make up for that huge investment before the patent expires, and the generics come on market. So, for the first 20 years we consumers pay something like $30-50/month (after insurance--it could be $200 or more a month without insurance) for these drugs until they go generic, then it drops to around $4/month (and that is without insurance!). Under my proposal, the generics would come out right away, for maybe around $5/month, and the original company would make back its investment over a very long term instead of needing to make it back over a relatively short term.
tzs 15y ago
IBM: Without the benefit of patent protection, software companies would be forced to rely on secrecy which limits the public’s ability to learn from software innovations, since patent documents are a significant source of technological disclosure. See, e.g., In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Newman, J., concurring). Given the reality that software source code is human readable, and object code can be reverse engineered, it is difficult for software developers to resort to secrecy. Thus, without patent protection, the incentives to innovate in the field of software are significantly reduced. Patent protection has promoted the free sharing of source code on a patentee’s terms—which has fueled the explosive growth of open source software development. and The economic benefits that flow from software innovation are the product of significant investment in research and development. And the incentives provided by the patent system encourage that investment by providing the same quid pro quo as in other technology fields: the promise of economic rewards in exchange for the public disclosure of useful inventions. See generally Testimony of Nicholas M. Donofrio, Executive Vice President, Innovation and Technology, IBM Corp., Before the H.R. Comm. on Science (July 21, 2005); Cong. Office of Tech. Assessment, Finding a Balance: Computer Software, Intellectual Property, and the Challenge of Technological Change, 23 (1992) (recognizing that “patent protection is of importance to the U.S. software industry”). The exclusive rights granted to patentees encourage software innovators to pursue inventions that they might not otherwise pursue, in broad and diverse areas. and Patent protection for software protects innovators from appropriation of their efforts by “free-riders.” Without patent protection, the risk of appropriation may force software innovators into other, more promising ventures. See, e.g., Richard S. Gruner, Better Living Through Software: Promoting Information Processing Advances Through Patent Incentives, 74 St. John’s L. Rev. 977, 1004 (2000). The free-rider problem is particularly acute in the software sector because software products are “vulnerable to rapid, inexpensive copying that undercuts the initial developer’s opportunity to benefit * * *, thereby undermining its incentives to invest in software development.” Pamela Samuelson, et al., A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protections of Computer Programs, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 2308, 2332 (1994). While literal copying is the province of copyright law, the ease of appropriating software source code makes the patented inventions included in the code uniquely susceptible to instant appropriation. These are all taken from the amicus brief IBM filed in the Bilski case. http://www.patentlyo.com/08-964-ibm.pdf http://www.patentlyo.com/08-964-ibm.pdf edit: fixed to replace duplicate quote with the quote I meant to paste in.

by dpcan 15y ago

rwmj 15y ago

There's a big pharma lobby who love patents and lobby for more of the same. This is in itself a problem: there is no separation between types of patents, so we can't (easily) get separate policy on software, business methods, pharma etc. I imagine, for example, no one would particularly complain about software patents if they only lasted for 2 years. But the way it is now, that would mean all patents would expire after 2 years, and the pharma lobby would hate that. Having said all that, best thing is to get rid of all patents, and we'll start again when someone proves that narrow patents in a particular field have a benefit to the economy.

tzs 15y ago
Speaking of pharmaceutical patents, I'd like to see two changes: 1. There should be automatic licensing of the patent to anyone who wishes to make the drug, at a royalty rate on gross sales determined by statute. I'm thinking something around 5%. 2. The patent term should be extended from 20 years to something like 100 years. The idea here is that drug companies invest huge amounts in developing new drugs. Many of these don't even pan out. Some make it into production, and they are patented for 20 years. The drug company then has to charge a lot to make up for that huge investment before the patent expires, and the generics come on market. So, for the first 20 years we consumers pay something like $30-50/month (after insurance--it could be $200 or more a month without insurance) for these drugs until they go generic, then it drops to around $4/month (and that is without insurance!). Under my proposal, the generics would come out right away, for maybe around $5/month, and the original company would make back its investment over a very long term instead of needing to make it back over a relatively short term.

tzs 15y ago

IBM: Without the benefit of patent protection, software companies would be forced to rely on secrecy which limits the public’s ability to learn from software innovations, since patent documents are a significant source of technological disclosure. See, e.g., In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Newman, J., concurring). Given the reality that software source code is human readable, and object code can be reverse engineered, it is difficult for software developers to resort to secrecy. Thus, without patent protection, the incentives to innovate in the field of software are significantly reduced. Patent protection has promoted the free sharing of source code on a patentee’s terms—which has fueled the explosive growth of open source software development. and The economic benefits that flow from software innovation are the product of significant investment in research and development. And the incentives provided by the patent system encourage that investment by providing the same quid pro quo as in other technology fields: the promise of economic rewards in exchange for the public disclosure of useful inventions. See generally Testimony of Nicholas M. Donofrio, Executive Vice President, Innovation and Technology, IBM Corp., Before the H.R. Comm. on Science (July 21, 2005); Cong. Office of Tech. Assessment, Finding a Balance: Computer Software, Intellectual Property, and the Challenge of Technological Change, 23 (1992) (recognizing that “patent protection is of importance to the U.S. software industry”). The exclusive rights granted to patentees encourage software innovators to pursue inventions that they might not otherwise pursue, in broad and diverse areas. and Patent protection for software protects innovators from appropriation of their efforts by “free-riders.” Without patent protection, the risk of appropriation may force software innovators into other, more promising ventures. See, e.g., Richard S. Gruner, Better Living Through Software: Promoting Information Processing Advances Through Patent Incentives, 74 St. John’s L. Rev. 977, 1004 (2000). The free-rider problem is particularly acute in the software sector because software products are “vulnerable to rapid, inexpensive copying that undercuts the initial developer’s opportunity to benefit * * *, thereby undermining its incentives to invest in software development.” Pamela Samuelson, et al., A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protections of Computer Programs, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 2308, 2332 (1994). While literal copying is the province of copyright law, the ease of appropriating software source code makes the patented inventions included in the code uniquely susceptible to instant appropriation. These are all taken from the amicus brief IBM filed in the Bilski case. http://www.patentlyo.com/08-964-ibm.pdf http://www.patentlyo.com/08-964-ibm.pdf edit: fixed to replace duplicate quote with the quote I meant to paste in.