3 ms·
There are fully reverse-engineered FPGAs and open source toolchains to drive them. The real question is: Is there anything hidden in the silicon? That's somet
by rwmj 6y ago
There are fully reverse-engineered FPGAs and open source toolchains to drive them.
The real question is: Is there anything hidden in the silicon? That's something you can only solve by owning your own fab - the US military approach.
- eeZah7Ux 6y agoGood luck hiding an effective backdoor in an FPGA. The attacker (the FPGA fab) has no idea of how it's going to be programmed.
- rwmj 6y agoThe usual thing the military worries about is a "kill switch" (a very unlikely sequence of bits) which disables the hardware completely. The idea is that at the beginning of a war, the kill signal is broadcast by the enemy by every means possible which brings all your electronics to a halt. This can be hidden in an FPGA - for example attached to the input pins or SERDES - without needing to know anything about the application. (Article: https://spectrum.ieee.org/semiconductors/design/the-hunt-for-the-kill-switch https://spectrum.ieee.org/semiconductors/design/the-hunt-for...)
- eeZah7Ux 6y agoTriggering a malfunction is incredibly easy compared to a proper backdoor. A kill signal could also be injected through side channels e.g. a power line, and the kill mechanism could be implemented in many other semiconductors than an FPGA.
- fest 6y agoThe argument here usually is: with a fixed silicon chip, vendor can hide the backdoor in various locations and be it triggered by various events (e.g. a particular sequence of incoming ICMP packets would overwrite the first byte of response with content of some register). With FPGA, the vendor can't really know where a particular register is located, or where incoming packets are processed, as it is highly dependent on the synthesised CPU design and can even be non-deterministic. This does not mean that there is no way vendor can backdoor the chip you are getting, but it does narrow the possibilities significantly.