3 ms·
> Nope. No backups, no sympathy, simple as that. For your personal stuff, sure. But when engineering a service, you should care about everyones stuff, not jus
by londons_explore 6y ago
> Nope. No backups, no sympathy, simple as that.
For your personal stuff, sure. But when engineering a service, you should care about everyones stuff, not just those who are careful.
You should design your service to try to help those users who use the same password they did on myspace in 2004 and write it on a sticky note on their desk. Engineer for those who shared their password with their now-hated ex.
Even if the user takes massive security risks, the service should still try to maximize the users ability to use the service, while minimizing an attackers use/access to the service.
- necovek 6y agoOther than requiring some form of government issued identification (including prior to the incident), or a well built reputation using GPG (but those are not going to be users you mention), how would achieve that today? And as the GP says, what role would 2fa play in that scenario?
- londons_explore 6y ago2fa simply means the user has more ways to potentially identify themselves... That means as a service you should try harder to stop someone else getting in, but also try harder to maintain access for the real owner. The 2fa code should help you do that, because now there are more things that the real account owner can do to identify themselves that an attacker cannot.
- necovek 6y agoThe increased security from 2FA comes from using both factors to authenticate to a service. If you are not using both, then it's a single factor authentication. You still haven't answered the core question: how do you do what you propose (keep strong security and allow easier restoration of an account to the real owner) today?
- nindalf 6y agoI don't know why this is difficult to understand. Any decision Github takes has a trade-off that will affect all users. Any time they allow a bypass of 2FA and email, they are putting potentially every account at risk of compromise. It doesn't matter how good the excuse given to the Github customer service rep is, bypass shouldn't be allowed so that all users' data is kept safe. Let me put it in HN terms. One person grousing how they lost their account due to their own fault is a minor HN comment in the middle of a thread. A person complaining that Github customer service assisted an attacker in account compromise is a front page thread by itself, probably picked up by mainstream news. Does that make Github's decision easier to make?
- qayxc 6y ago> You should design your service to try to help those users who use the same password they did on myspace in 2004 and write it on a sticky note on their desk. Engineer for those who shared their password with their now-hated ex. Those can't be helped. We're not talking about Geocities or MySpace here - we're talking about a service that hosts a distributed version control system aimed at experienced users with a technical background. The target audience is strictly not your average consumer and even then you shouldn't insult the intelligence of your users. 2FA is intended to protect all users of the service and users do have a choice when it comes to selecting their 2nd factor. Doesn't have to be an e-mail or phone. It can be an app-generated token as well. And loosing everything at once is tragic (hence: keep backups!), but suggesting that the locksmith should be allowed to just open the door if you ask nicely and the owners don't show up within an hour would be just as ridiculous as allowing to circumvent 2FA.