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Sure. And how does a TLS connection for the ISO download solve this problem? You would need to make sure that the TLS connection is to the correct server. How d
by warkdarrior 6y ago
Sure. And how does a TLS connection for the ISO download solve this problem? You would need to make sure that the TLS connection is to the correct server. How do you check it is the right server? Probably by checking the hostname against some webpage and the TLS certificate against some CA roots in your browser. How you get the right hostname? How do you know the CA roots in your browser are correct? How do you know your browser executable and config are correct?
- bigiain 6y agoThere's an extremely wide range of adversaries between "potentially capable of MITMing a network I use" and "potentially capable of screwing with my OS/browser's CA roots or actively acquiring and misusing an illegally obtained valid TLS cert for ubuntu.com". Sure, most nation states can craft whatever TLS cert they want, with only some risk of bad press if they get caught signing a ubuntu.com TLS cert fraudulently via a CA they control/coerce. If those people are my adversary I'm screwed. "YOU'RE STILL GONNA GET MOSSAD'D UPON!" A TLS connection for the download (and the gpg signature) protects against people like the disgruntled hotel IT guy, the kid futzing with the cafe wifi, an evil housemate, some crappy rooted IoT shit somebody hooked up to the wifi, an overly curious coworker or corporate IT drone, the red team in a company pen test. I've heard the arguments here - that it's a difficult problem for all the mirror operators to add ssl certs, that it'll stop downloads being cacheable, etc. But I didn't really buy those arguments 5 years ago, and these days, with LetsEncrypt and HSTS - I think those arguments are even more bogus than they were in 2015...