3 ms·
> If it's the latter, it's not vulnerable to the previous attack, but if you have a known point of reference (so you can deduce what the offset is) It sounds l
by kibwen 6y ago
> If it's the latter, it's not vulnerable to the previous attack, but if you have a known point of reference (so you can deduce what the offset is)
It sounds like this approach could be prevented by having a random fixed offset for each user, so that you have no point of reference unless you already know where that specific user is. [Removed bit about regenerating this offset infrequently.]
EDIT: You could even do this in conjunction with the quantization mitigation, which sounds like it would shore up the slight weaknesses with that approach (where being on a quantization boundary makes it obvious where you are in that dimension) for the best of both worlds, as long as you're okay with further decreasing accuracy.
- algesten 6y agoWith enough data points you'd easily figure out that offset. Just overlay each data point with map data and decide whether the location makes sense. (i.e. you're unlikely to most of the time be in the middle of a lake, farm field etc)
- deleted 6y ago[deleted]
- mikepurvis 6y agoOr if the person is traveling at highway speed, it would be pretty easy to fit that track to nearby highways.
- andreareina 6y agoOffset as function of user and location?
- jessaustin 6y agoWhere is this function stored?
- ganafagol 6y agoAs a random secret in the reporting device. The secret can then be used with a cryptographic hash to produce a deterministic but unpredictable offset, based on the current location. Something like: reported_position = true_position + hash(secret + true_position)
- ganafagol 6y agoHm that will essentially behave like random noise though, assuming that the position is sufficiently high resolution. So you'll need to round it in any case, and once you do that heavily enough, there is no need for this crypto magic.
- deleted 6y ago[deleted]
- deleted 6y ago[deleted]