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I think you're missing the fundamental point made in your citation - whether you suffer from technical debt or not, you can solve the problem without rewriting

by johnmaguire2013 6y ago

I think you're missing the fundamental point made in your citation - whether you suffer from technical debt or not, you can solve the problem without rewriting from scratch. Again, quote from the article cited above: > There’s a subtle reason that programmers always want to throw away the code and start over. The reason is that they think the old code is a mess. And here is the interesting observation: they are probably wrong. The reason that they think the old code is a mess is because of a cardinal, fundamental law of programming: > It’s harder to read code than to write it. > [...] Even fairly major architectural changes can be done without throwing away the code. On the Juno project we spent several months rearchitecting at one point: just moving things around, cleaning them up, creating base classes that made sense, and creating sharp interfaces between the modules. But we did it carefully, with our existing code base, and we didn’t introduce new bugs or throw away working code. > A second reason programmers think that their code is a mess is that it is inefficient. The rendering code in Netscape was rumored to be slow. But this only affects a small part of the project, which you can optimize or even rewrite. You don’t have to rewrite the whole thing. When optimizing for speed, 1% of the work gets you 99% of the bang. > Third, the code may be doggone ugly. One project I worked on actually had a data type called a FuckedString. Another project had started out using the convention of starting member variables with an underscore, but later switched to the more standard “m_”. So half the functions started with “_” and half with “m_”, which looked ugly. Frankly, this is the kind of thing you solve in five minutes with a macro in Emacs, not by starting from scratch.

wpietri 6y ago
I don't think I'm missing that point. Once the technical debt is so deep that bankruptcy seems like a good option, digging out is also not a great option. It's certainly possible now if it wasn't then; people like Michael Feathers have done great work charting paths out of an accumulation of garbage code. But at the time of JWZ's resignation letter, Martin Fowler's book Refactoring had been out for all of 3 months. In particular, Netscape was faced with a choice: they could either do a total rewrite quickly, or take much longer to do a slow rewrite while still pushing forward, but at a much reduced development speed. That's fine if you're some large enterprise in a stable field with a solid revenue stream. But a startup competing in the then-fast-evolving world of the Internet? Competing against the monopolistic giant of Microsoft, who was desperate to dominate the space? There's little reason to think a slow cleanup would have been any better than a fast rewrite for Netscape. Especially if their solution involved open-sourcing things, which a) requires a non-awful code base, and b) reduces the pace of refactoring and cleanup. So I think it's fair to say that either way Netscape was killed by technical debt.
- johnmaguire2013 6y ago
  > It's certainly possible now if it wasn't then; people like Michael Feathers have done great work charting paths out of an accumulation of garbage code. But at the time of JWZ's resignation letter, Martin Fowler's book Refactoring had been out for all of 3 months. Nothing has fundamentally changed between now and then. Sure, the information may be more readily available, and we can argue that it's unfair to judge Netscape by today's standards, but even so, I think the article you linked makes a strong argument that technical debt did not kill Netscape, and that their approach to managing it did. This is why it goes on to discuss other, more successful approaches. > In particular, Netscape was faced with a choice: they could either do a total rewrite quickly, or take much longer to do a slow rewrite while still pushing forward, but at a much reduced development speed. Were they actually faced with this choice? The article you linked points out there are at least 3 reasons people choose to do rewrites. This is one of them ("architectural problems"). Even still, the article's argument is that this is a false dichotomy, and that there are better alternatives. I also think "total rewrite quickly" is an oxymoron and a bit disingenuous. Your article points out it took them three years. In my experience, they typically take full-blown products at least two years - if they are successful at all. If you are worried about Microsoft beating you because you are slowed by technical debt, you certainly need to be worried about Microsoft beating you because you didn't ship anything for three years. That is the entire point the article makes. The very first sentence reads: > Netscape 6.0 is finally going into its first public beta. There never was a version 5.0. The last major release, version 4.0, was released almost three years ago. Three years is an awfully long time in the Internet world. During this time, Netscape sat by, helplessly, as their market share plummeted. I find your next point surprising, given your citation: > There's little reason to think a slow cleanup would have been any better than a fast rewrite for Netscape. The article you cite makes this exact argument: > You are putting yourself in an extremely dangerous position where you will be shipping an old version of the code for several years, completely unable to make any strategic changes or react to new features that the market demands, because you don’t have shippable code. You might as well just close for business for the duration. It then goes on to list alternatives, including a "slow" rewrite, during which time you can still ship code. None of this is to say that too much technical debt can't slow you down to the point that you cannot keep up with your competitors - but it is certainly not the argument your citation makes. Its argument is tangential, and related only in the sense that technical debt is presumably what pushed Netscape to make the decision it did. I have to say, I am fascinated by our difference in takeaways from this article.

wpietri 6y ago

I don't think I'm missing that point. Once the technical debt is so deep that bankruptcy seems like a good option, digging out is also not a great option. It's certainly possible now if it wasn't then; people like Michael Feathers have done great work charting paths out of an accumulation of garbage code. But at the time of JWZ's resignation letter, Martin Fowler's book Refactoring had been out for all of 3 months. In particular, Netscape was faced with a choice: they could either do a total rewrite quickly, or take much longer to do a slow rewrite while still pushing forward, but at a much reduced development speed. That's fine if you're some large enterprise in a stable field with a solid revenue stream. But a startup competing in the then-fast-evolving world of the Internet? Competing against the monopolistic giant of Microsoft, who was desperate to dominate the space? There's little reason to think a slow cleanup would have been any better than a fast rewrite for Netscape. Especially if their solution involved open-sourcing things, which a) requires a non-awful code base, and b) reduces the pace of refactoring and cleanup. So I think it's fair to say that either way Netscape was killed by technical debt.

johnmaguire2013 6y ago
> It's certainly possible now if it wasn't then; people like Michael Feathers have done great work charting paths out of an accumulation of garbage code. But at the time of JWZ's resignation letter, Martin Fowler's book Refactoring had been out for all of 3 months. Nothing has fundamentally changed between now and then. Sure, the information may be more readily available, and we can argue that it's unfair to judge Netscape by today's standards, but even so, I think the article you linked makes a strong argument that technical debt did not kill Netscape, and that their approach to managing it did. This is why it goes on to discuss other, more successful approaches. > In particular, Netscape was faced with a choice: they could either do a total rewrite quickly, or take much longer to do a slow rewrite while still pushing forward, but at a much reduced development speed. Were they actually faced with this choice? The article you linked points out there are at least 3 reasons people choose to do rewrites. This is one of them ("architectural problems"). Even still, the article's argument is that this is a false dichotomy, and that there are better alternatives. I also think "total rewrite quickly" is an oxymoron and a bit disingenuous. Your article points out it took them three years. In my experience, they typically take full-blown products at least two years - if they are successful at all. If you are worried about Microsoft beating you because you are slowed by technical debt, you certainly need to be worried about Microsoft beating you because you didn't ship anything for three years. That is the entire point the article makes. The very first sentence reads: > Netscape 6.0 is finally going into its first public beta. There never was a version 5.0. The last major release, version 4.0, was released almost three years ago. Three years is an awfully long time in the Internet world. During this time, Netscape sat by, helplessly, as their market share plummeted. I find your next point surprising, given your citation: > There's little reason to think a slow cleanup would have been any better than a fast rewrite for Netscape. The article you cite makes this exact argument: > You are putting yourself in an extremely dangerous position where you will be shipping an old version of the code for several years, completely unable to make any strategic changes or react to new features that the market demands, because you don’t have shippable code. You might as well just close for business for the duration. It then goes on to list alternatives, including a "slow" rewrite, during which time you can still ship code. None of this is to say that too much technical debt can't slow you down to the point that you cannot keep up with your competitors - but it is certainly not the argument your citation makes. Its argument is tangential, and related only in the sense that technical debt is presumably what pushed Netscape to make the decision it did. I have to say, I am fascinated by our difference in takeaways from this article.