3 ms·
ECC isn't a direct mitigation against Rowhammer attacks, as memory errors caused by three or more flipped bits would still go undetected (unless you're using Ch
by theevilsharpie 6y ago
ECC isn't a direct mitigation against Rowhammer attacks, as memory errors caused by three or more flipped bits would still go undetected (unless you're using ChipKill, but that's a rare setup).
However, flipped three bits simultaneously isn't trivial, and the attempts that flip fewer bits will be detected and logged.
- rajesh-s 6y agoRight! Section 1.3 of this publication discusses possible mitigations for the row hammer problem and where ECC fits in https://users.ece.cmu.edu/~omutlu/pub/rowhammer-summary.pdf https://users.ece.cmu.edu/~omutlu/pub/rowhammer-summary.pdf
- GregarianChild 6y agoThe paper you cite is from 2014 and the mitigations discussed there have all been circumvented. [1] is from 2020 and a better read for Rowhammer mitigation. [1] J. S. Kim et al, Revisiting RowHammer: An Experimental Analysis of Modern DRAM Devices and Mitigation Techniques https://arxiv.org/abs/2005.13121 https://arxiv.org/abs/2005.13121
- rajesh-s 6y agoThanks for pointing that out!
- GregarianChild 6y agoIsn't ChipKill just another form of ECC? If so there is a number of bitflips that ChipKill can no longer correct / detect. [1] seems to say that they observed some flips in dRAM with ChipKill, although the paper is a bit vague here. [1] B. Schroeder et al, DRAM Errors in the Wild: A Large-Scale Field Study http://www.cs.toronto.edu/~bianca/papers/sigmetrics09.pdf http://www.cs.toronto.edu/~bianca/papers/sigmetrics09.pdf