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The regulator believing "this system isn't legible to us and so adds burden to our work" is roughly equivalent to the author's conclusion: "They want us to be c
by musingsole 6y ago
The regulator believing "this system isn't legible to us and so adds burden to our work" is roughly equivalent to the author's conclusion: "They want us to be compliant, not secure".
The correct response to all of this would have been an accepted means for individual departments to submit requests for updates/changes to the standard to be voted on before they are forced to comply. The issue at hand is no mechanism for feedback. You can only comply or leave. This is the consistent failure of top-down governance.
- CaptArmchair 6y ago> The correct response to all of this would have been an accepted means for individual departments to submit requests for updates/changes to the standard to be voted on before they are forced to comply This would result in, what's pejoratively called, "design by committee" which inevitably comes with bike-shedding, tit-for-tat politics and so on. The NIST is an public institution with a long history which traces back to the origins of the United States. It's a formal part of the state. And it's raison d'être is to ensure that decision making around standardization actually happens. [1] [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Institute_of_Standards_and_Technology https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Institute_of_Standard... The point of all of this harkens back to fundamental principle: If you want to travel fast, go alone. If you want to travel far, go with many. The organization of a state catering to many millions follows the latter part of that principle, for better or worst. Standardization doesn't guarantee the optimal solution to a problem, it guarantees a workable solution for the majority of a given problem space. And that's exactly what public governance is about. Ensuring the continued existence of the state as a legitimate, legal entity that governs and serves public interests at large. > The issue at hand is no mechanism for feedback. Well, it's perfectly feasible to... just e-mail them or give them a call. The NIST ITL CSRC lab can easily be reached via their website. [2] If you want to know the decision making process that went into a standard, you can submit a FOIA request. [3] [2] https://csrc.nist.gov/about/contact-us https://csrc.nist.gov/about/contact-us [3] https://www.nist.gov/foia https://www.nist.gov/foia
- musingsole 6y agoThat's cool and all, but this mentality creates animosity in the system's participants where it's unnecessary. You're focused on just the system's outcome and find NIST to be instrumental in delivering those outcomes. I agree. But that fails to address the unneeded stress on the system by antagonizing these isolated groups that have made decisions for reasons and have their own history. Appealing to this top-down system ignores how participating is dehumanizing even as its purpose is to serve the people. I'm arguing you can have your cake and eat it too, we're just choosing not to because decision making carries risks. We want to limit decisions to specific people out of fear of that risk, not out of respect for a system that has proven it's correct.
- CaptArmchair 6y ago> ignores how participating is dehumanizing even as its purpose is to serve the people I feel this is a bit strong worded. I think this gets into the realm of worker/employer relationship. Regardless, as an employee, you are always subject to the authority of the owner of the business, or in public context, the interests of the public. If you want agency and freedom, then the way forward would be starting an independent, private venture. > unneeded I think that's in the eye of the beholder. I don't contend the merits of bcrypt over other algorithms. And I'm just as sensitive as the next person that technology often moves faster then large and complex state machinery. But when you decide to be part of such a machinery, you very much accept that your own role comes with limits and boundaries. And that your sphere of influence only extends so far. > decision making carries risks The inherent risk is erosion of the legitimacy of a public institution. That legitimacy is protected through showing public accountability, and transparency in decision making. Remember, public institutions don't exist on their own accord. The budget they receive comes with public oversight. And that budget isn't private either. OP's salary is paid for by taxpayers, and as such, OP needs to work in such a way that their decision making process can be scrutinized when asked. Legitimacy is, when it comes down to it, a murky concept based on trust, confidence, integrity, honesty, reliability, equability and so on. But, more important, all of that is always in the eye of the beholder. These are subjective concepts. And they can easily be pulled apart. A good analogy of how that fails is what happened to Boeing's 737 Max debacle. How the integrity of the R&D process broke down and, ultimately, led to the deaths of dozens. Boeing lost its most valuable asset: its credibility as reliable aviation manufacturer. The difference between Boeing and the U.S Public Adminstration as that the latter literally governs and serves an entire nation of 330 million citizens. In this specific case, OP's system will be - arguably - weaker, but that's the traded off against avoiding a potential scenario where system engineers are left free to make their own decisions with little to no public oversight, which would be far harder to defend to the general public - all 330 million - in terms of accountability in case of a breakdown. The latter would simply perceive that as a violation of their constitutional rights. The attacks caused by the Solar Winds security failure this month are a good example of that. This is an analysis from the Congress Research Service stating exactly that. It refers to operational procedures and reiterates where accountability lays, and refers to the complexities and challenges of managing cybersecurities. [1] [1] https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IN/IN11559 https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IN/IN11559